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Abstract
This thesis deals with the criminal liability of Internet providers. The
focus is on Germany, but the analysis is put in a wider, comparative context.
This is done with reference to South Africa, as well as Europe and the
American system. This thesis demonstrates and discusses the existing legal
norms to regulate Internet provider liability for illegal content on the Internet
and the international efforts to deal with this issue. In the introduction it is
shown how the Internet has given rise to a new form of global communication
and the accompanying legal problems. This is followed by an examination of
the different functions Internet providers have.
A survey of some of the important crimes affecting the Internet and also
some Internet-specific offences put the more general issue of liability in a
more specific context. Traditional and new forms of crimes are discussed.
This section is followed by an analysis of Internet provider liability under
German criminal law and Germany's Teleservices Act. From an international
criminal law perspective some international instruments, like the Cybercrime
Convention of the Council of Europe, is discussed. National legislation,
especially in the context of the European Union, must always be put in the
proper regional and international context.
The thesis concludes with some thoughts on alternative, or perhaps
complementary, methods to fight illegal and criminal conduct on the Internet.
This is done not as a critique of the responses to Internet crime, but rather to
strengthen the many hands trying to reduce Internet crime.
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Opsomming
Hierdie tesis handeloor die strafregtelike aanspreekliheid van Internet diensverskaffers.
Die fokus val op Duitsland, maar die analise word ook geplaas in 'n wyer, vergelykende
konteks. Dit word gedoen met verwysing na Suid-Afrika, sowel as Europa en die VSA.
Die tesis demonstreer en bespreek die bestaande regsnorme wat Internet
diensverskaffers reguleer met spesifieke verwysing na aanspreeklikheid vir onwettige
inhoud op die Internet en internasionale pogings om hierdie probleem aan te spreek. Ter
inleiding word daar aangetoon hoe die Internet aanleiding gee tot nuwe vorme van
globale kommunikasie en die regsprobleme wat dit tot gevolg het. Dit word gevolg deur
'n ondersoek na die verskillende funksies van Internet verskaffers.
'n Ontleding en bespreking van Internet-spesifieke misdrywe plaas die meer
algemene vraagstuk in 'n meer gefokusde konteks. Tradisionele en nuwe vorme van
misdaad word bespreek. Hierdie afdeling word gevolg deur 'n ontleding van Internet
diensverskaffer aanspreeklikheid ingevolge Duitse reg en die Duitse wetgewing op die
terrein van telediens. Uit 'n internasionale strafreg oogpunt word sekere internasionale
instrumente, soos die Cybercrime Convention van die Raad van Europa, bespreek.
Nasionale wetgewing, veral in die konteks van die Europese Unie, word ook in die
relevante regionale en internasionale konteks geplaas.
Die tesis word afgesluit met sekere gedagtes oor alternatiewe, of moontlik
komplimentêre, metodes in die stryd teen Internet-kriminaliteit. Dit moet nie gesien word
as kritiek op die huidige stand van sake nie, maar eerder as 'n poging om die talle
rolspelers in die stryd teen Internet misdaad se hande te sterk.
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1 Introduction
The revolution in information technologies has changed society
fundamentally and will probably continue to do so in the future. The World
Wide Web 1 0fNVVV) has become one of the main sources of information and
provides a forum for the worldwide distribution of information. Where originally
only some specific parts of society had rationalised their working procedures
with the help of information technology, now hardly any sector of society has
remained unaffected.
Furthermore, the Internet has to a certain extent replaced the traditional
means of communication. Classical telephone calls have been overtaken by
the exchange of vast amounts of data, comprising voice, text, music and
pictures. It is no longer relevant whether a direct connection can be
established. Nowadays it suffices that data is entered into a network with a
destination address or made available for anyone who wants to access it. The
Internet has created a new form of universal communlcatton." The ease of
accessibility and searchability of information contained on the Internet
combined with the practically unlimited possibilities for its exchange and
dissemination, regardless of geographical borders, has lead to an explosive
growth in the amount of information available.
These developments have given rise to an unprecedented economic and
social change, but they also emerge new types of crime as well as the
commission of traditional crimes by means of new technologies.
Manifold cases show that the Internet can be misused for criminal
1 World Wide Web rywvw) is an Internet service for the dissemination of text- and
multimedia contents.
2 Bleisteiner 1999 Rechtliche Verantwortung im Internet 2.
1
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activities, including crimes relating to copyright infringements, libel and hate
speech, the transmission of child pornography, agitation against minorities or
the disparagement of victims of the National Socialist crimes." Nowadays, all
of the above forms of content relating to crimes are accessible from every
computer anywhere in the world. Moreover, the consequences of criminal
behaviour can be more far-reaching than before the invention of the Internet,
because they are not restricted by national boundaries or geographical
limitations. The recent spread of computer viruses all over the world has
provided proof of this reality.
A society's values find expression in its legal system. The law protects
values that are regarded as very important, often by criminal law. This is also
the case regarding communication. Since the Internet makes world-wide
distribution and reception of information much easier than by traditional
means of communication, countries encounter new, hitherto unknown
problems of how to defend themselves against forbidden communication
content and how to hold the persons who create and distribute such content
liable for their actions. The Internet challenges existing legal concepts.
Information and communications flow more easily around the world.
Increasingly, criminals are located not in the places where their acts have
effect, but rather in locations outside of the jurisdiction in which the victims are
located.
Moreover, in democratic societies any attempt regulating communication
has to be balanced against the important constitutional rights of freedom of
expression and freedom of speech.
3 Section 130 (agitation of the people) of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch
(StGB)) and section 220 (a) (genocide) of the StGB.
2
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Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to give an insight into the legal
difficulties every country faces vis-a-vis this new form of criminal offences.
Activities that have been classified as being criminal are, of course, still
criminal when committed via the Internet. Therefore, this thesis will not focus
on the liability of the authors and the purchasers but will raise the question
whether the Internet providers should be held liable for illegal contents on the
Internet.
To make the problem concrete, consider an example drawn from the
Bavarian prosecution authorities' 1995 threat to prosecute the German
subsidiary company of CompuServe America Inc., the CompuServe GmbH4,
for carrying on-line discussions involving persons from around the globe that
violated German anti-pornography laws. CompuServe initially blocked access
to these discussion groups in Germany. Because CompuServe could not
control the geographical transmission of the contents of the discussion- or so-
called newsgroups, its response to the prosecutor's regulation had the effect
of blocking access to these discussion groups for all CompuServe users
worldwide.
The huge significance of the Internet raises the questions: should the
Internet providers be held liable for illegal contents on the Internet? Are the
existing legal norms sufficient to regulate the actual and the expected conflicts
of different interests?
A quotation by American Paul C. Paules about the German multimedia
act has been widely circulated on the Internet: "The Americans invented the
4 (German) private limited company.
3
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Internet, the Germans regulate it. Each does what he can do best"."
In two cases, Germany was the first country to create computer-specific
laws: the Hesse Data Protection Act of 1970 (Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz)
and the Information and Communication Services Act of 1997 (Informations-
und Kommunikationsdienstegesetz). With the so called "multi media act"
Informations- und Kommunikationsdienstegesetz (luKD) Germany created the
first Internet law in the world. On the basis of this Act, the "Internet provider
liability law", the Teleservices Act (Teledienstegesetz) was created." Since
Germany has taken a leading role in adapting its legal system to the
phenomenon of Internet crimes, the thesis will mainly examine the German
approach, which may be used as a model for other countries. This paper
focuses on liability of Internet providers. The legal problems of modern data
transfer have increasingly become a topic of debate in the German legal
literature."
Because of the melting of national and international computer networks
resulting in the global Internet, a criminal act committed in a single country
can affect the worldwide information transfer, raising the question of where
the crime occurred. Basically, one faces not only the problem of whether the
conventional substantial law is applicable and sufficient but also whether the
national law itself is applicable. In other words, one has to examine the
international scope of application of the national criminal law and its
procedural enforcement." Accordingly, this thesis analyses the applicability of
5 www.unmoralische.de/zitate/zitate9.htm.
6 See the grounds for the luKDG-draft BR-Drucks. 966/96, 18, 28.
7 For example: Spindler Vertragsrecht der Internetprovider (1999); Lohse Verantwortlichkeit
im Internet (2000).
8 Breuer "Anwendbarkeit des deutsehen Strafrechts auf extraterritoriale Internet-Benutzer"
1998 MMR 141.
4
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the German criminal law9 in the light of the global cyberspace and examines
the liability of Internet providers. Like the World Wide Web, this discussion is
not therefore limited to Germany but concerns all democratic countries. It is
an international issue.
In chapter 2 the technical and historical aspects of the Internet are
discussed and its target groups determined. Knowledge of the technical
background is necessary for any analysis of Internet-related law. The role of
Internet providers and their potential liability according to their function will be
illustrated by the presentation of cases. In the case of the traditional media
like print, television and radio, functions and liabilities are clearly definable. At
the beginning of the information-chain is the one who spreads his own
contents via the medium, like the journalist or publisher or the editor. At the
end of the information-chain we find the reader, TV viewer or auditor. But the
boundaries of functions and liabilities have become fluid in the case of the
Internet. On the Internet, we find - among others - the so-called content
providers who supply their own contents. The access provider offers user's
access to the Internet. In so-called newsgroups, it is possible both to
contribute one's own information and to use other people's contents. This
functional overlapping makes the legal understanding of facts relatively
difficult. For that reason the technical functioning of the Internet has to be
understood in order to assess provider liability. The presentation of some
famous Internet cases will be used to illustrate that legal norms have to be
analysed in light of the technical aspects, because the different functions are
subject to different legal norms and can accordingly result in different legal
9 Knauer, ibid.
5
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consequences.
Chapter 3 deals with the problem of whether the Internet is a medium
without borders and/or if there is a point of reference for the application of
German criminal law. Since legal theory differs from country to country and
law is enormously influenced by historical, moral and cultural backgrounds, in
some countries a certain activity might not be classified as criminal whereas in
other countries the same activity will clearly be considered a criminal offence
under the respective legal system. For instance, in some countries freedom of
expression has a higher value than the protection of other rights, which
demonstrates how differently an activity can be understood in different,
nationally moulded legal opinions, thereby leading to conflicting rulings. The
protection of minorities and human rights is characteristic for democratic
countries. Germany with its history of National Socialism takes firm legal
action against crimes like defamation and human rights infringements. South
Africa with its history of Apartheid has similar concerns. It is obvious that this
attempt at balancing rights can lead to different outcomes in different
countries due to differing local values.
Chapter 4 presents several crimes that can be committed via the Internet
(such as infringements of personality rights, pornography, etc). They can be
divided into so-called computer crimes and post-computer crimes. With regard
to these numerous offences, providers feel insecure as to when and to what
extent they can be held liable. The crucial question is whether such offences
also incriminate the provider who simply offers access to the illegal
information of a third party. Germany is one of the first countries to have
enacted a law dealing with this question. This "Internet law" also raises new
6
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and complicated legal problems in view of provider liability.
In chapter 5 of the thesis, the criminal liability of Internet providers with
regard to the general criminal doctrine in Germany, on the one hand, and on
the grounds of the new German Internet law, on the other, is presented. After
outlining the German approach, this thesis analyses the Internet law and its
regulations in other parts of the world.
In 2002 the European Union passed a new law (E-TDG) that will be
presented in the following chapter. Furthermore, I will illustrate how countries
like the USA and South Africa are dealing with cyber-crime and the liability of
Internet providers. Since nations differ in their regulatory commitments, many
Internet transactions will be subject to inconsistent regulations. Unilateral
national regulation of the Internet can affect the regulatory efforts of other
nations and the Internet activities of parties in other jurisdictions - as the
CampuServe case shows. Harmonisation strategies are an important
response to the jurisdictional difficulties of Internet regulations. What such
harmonisation strategies might look like will be illustrated by the example of
the Cybercrime Convention of the Council of Europe.
Finally, this thesis deals with the possibilities of preventing and
combating cyber-crime through several measures like filter-software, self-
censorship or "codes of conduct".
2 The Internet - participants and technical background
In the following chapter, the various problems caused by the Internet and
7
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its online services will be discussed. In order to illustrate why such problems
occur and how they can be solved, a few technical concepts and definitions
relating to the Internet must be clarified first.
2 1 Participants involved on the Internet
The participants on the Internet are described using various terms, some
of which may have more than one rneaninq.'? Usually, the participants are
defined in terms of the function that they fulfil on the Internet.
211 User
A "user" is someone who utilizes a service on the Internet. Such service
could be the downloading of data from a website or the copying of a program
from the Internet. A user may also be a person who orders something on the
Internet or enters into a contract over the Internet. In most circumstances, a
user gains access to the Internet via an access provider.
2 1 2 Access provider
The term "access provider" describes an organisation or a company,
which offers user's access to the Internet. For this purpose, the user
establishes a telephone, cable, or wireless connection with the network of the
access provider, which in turn, has a permanent connection to the Internet,
10 Pichler "Haftung des Host Providers fOr Persónlichkeitsrechtsverletzungen var und nach
dem Teledienstegesetz" 1998 MMR 79-80.
8
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and therefore, to other computers and servers worldwide. An access provider
is in other words, the party who owns a computer system, or network, which is
permanently connected to the Internet and who sells this access to other
users. Thus, a link to an access provider can be considered to be a necessary
condition for any use of the lnternet."
2 1 3 Network provider
The infrastructure of the Internet consists largely of switches and
routers 12, hosts 13 and WAN links 14. Various government and private
organisations whose computers are connected to the Internet, own these
switches, hosts and routers. Telecommunications companies, who typically
either provide Internet-compliant switching facilities and routing themselves,
or lease their capacity to network providers who combine those facilities to
create positions on the Internet, own many of the pipes. Telecommunication
businesses are intimately involved in the Internet business. Many
telecommunications companies have expanded into network and Internet
service provision.
Network providers have contractual relations with other networks and
their providers, as well as physical links to them. The physical connection
enables traffic to directly flow from one network to the next. The contractual
relations govern the exchange of information and flow of traffic between the
networks.
11 Koenig 1998 MMR 6.
12 Computers designed to receive and forward packets of data.
13 Hosts store programs and data.
14 Wide area network telecommunication connections that link the hosts and routers together.
9
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2 1 4 Content provider
On every computer, which is linked to the Internet, services and content
can be offered. A content provider is a party that supplies content on its own
or another computer. Accordingly, every user can be a content provider, if he
provides content.
Content providers are among the most important parties on the Internet.
They range from individuals to multinational companies. Content comes in
many forms. It can roughly be categorised as real-time content and
downloadable content.
2 1 5 (Host) Service provider
The service provider (or host provider) enables a third party to make
content available on the hosting server. With this, the service provider
performs the combined function of the access provider and the content
provider. This is the case when the service provider simultaneously offers
access to the Internet and hosts his own content on the network. Examples of
service providers are CampuServe, AOl and Microsoft Net. These service
providers are also access providers and content providers. Online service
providers are service providers that offer access and content, mostly for
members or subscribers."
A host is a digital storage facility, accessible via the Internet. The type of
15 Sieber "KontrollmOglichkeiten zur Verhinderung rechtswidriger Inhalte in Computernetzen"
1997 CR 581 (598).
10
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data stored on the host can vary from text documents to graphics, to
computer programs or any other kind of data. The way in which the files are
stored can vary. A host may also act as a storage facility for Usenet
newsgroups or e-mail held in subscriberamailboxes, or can act as a mail or
news server.
The owner of a host can have various connections to the data stored on
the host. A company that self-hosts a resource owns and actively controls all
of the data. On the other hand, the host owner may have only the most
tenuous connection with the stored content. An example of this is the Usenet
news server. Usenet is a system of thousands of discussion groups on a huge
variety of topics, to which anyone can post public messages. The Usenet host
has in practice only two main potential means of control. He can select the
newsgroups on his server. The other main control mechanism involves
"scrolling off' postings after a few days.
22 History and structure of the Internet
The Internet is often described as a network of networks." A lot of
terms, which are mostly synonyms, are used to describe the phenomenon of
computer networks. These include "cyberspace", "virtual world", and "the net
"or" information superhiqhway''" In 2003, the Internet community was
celebrating the 20th birthday of the Internet, which was created on January 1,
1983.18
16 Hoofacker Online und Telekommunikation von A-Z (1995) 98.
17 Mayer "Recht und Cyberspace" 1996 NJW 1792; Ladeur "Regulierung des Information
Superhighway" 1996 CR 614.
18 www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalte/te/14017/1.html.
11
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The Internet is physically a collection of packet-switched computer
networks tied together by a set communication protocol called TCPIlP
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). This protocol enables the
networks and the computers attached to them to communicate and find other
computers attached to the Internet.
Many authors have tried to find a definition for the term Internet. For
legal purposes, on October 24,1995 the Federal Network Council (FNC)
established, in a resolution, the following definition of the term Internet:
Internet refers to the global system that-
(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space
based on the Internet Protocol (lP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons;
(ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCPIlP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-
ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high
level services layered on the communications and related infrastructure
described herein."
The general structure of the Internet is decentralised, as there is no
central computer. Instead, the Internet consists of a multitude of connected
computers and networks worldwide. This allows for rapid worldwide growth of
the Internet through the connection of new computers." Among the most
important components of the Internet are the so-called "backbones", the
primary high-speed communication links between major data centres to which
19 Koch Internetrecht (1998) 4.
20 Bleisteiner Rechtliche Verantworllichkeit im Internet (1999) 1.
12
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other networks are connected."
Private Internets, the so-called intranets, are also part of the Internet.
Intranets employ the same Internet technology, but are hosted by private
servers, which are not accessible to the public via the Internet. Many
companies make use of Intranets to facilitate their internal information
management, communication and collaboration on projects."
In addition to Intranets, one comes across the term "extranet". This term
describes a closed network of user groups of two or more companies.
Extranets often result from an extension of a company's intranet.23
The special structure of the Internet makes it almost impossible to
determine its actual extent. In August 1981, only 213 host-computers
existed." Ten years later, more than 1 million computers had been connected
to the Internet. By the year 2000 an estimated 330 million people had access
to the lnternet." The University of Dortmund had the first Internet-access in
Germany.26 The connected computers and networks belong to governments,
companies, charitable organisations or private persons. Together they make
up a huge, decentralised, global communication medium, called "cyberspace".
This system enables people around the world to exchange information almost
instantly. Any communication can be directed to a certain person, a group or
the whole online-world.
The Internet originated in the United States of America during the time of
21 Borner Der Internet Rechtsberater (1999) 18.
22 Ibid.
23 Rockey The e-Commerce Handbook 2000 (2000) 255.
24 Koch Internetrecht (1998) 249.
25 www.netcraft.com/market. Erster Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht, Bundesministerien des
Inneren und der Justiz 2002, 202.
26 Schwarz Merkmale, Entwicklungstendenzen und Problemstellungen des Internet in Prinz &
Butz (ed) Medienrecht im Wandel (1996) 3.
13
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the Cold War. In those days, the U.S. military feared an atomic strike by the
Soviet Union. At first, the Internet was a military network, developed to
connect the American department of defence, the Pentagon, with military
bases throughout the world. In 1969, the American defence department
installed a network called Arpanet (Advanced Research Project Agency
Net).27The logic of this was to create a network of computers, which would
not be dependent on one central computer. The danger of having a
centralised computer was that, in the event of a strike, the loss of the main
computer would result in the loss of the entire defence system. The goal was
to develop a countrywide computer network, which would not fail, even during
military attacks. The basis of the communication is the Internet Protocol (IP)2B,
a digital standard for moving data around the network. The lP is independent
of the computer platform."
Arpanet was so attractive that it was quickly and immensely expanded.
By the early 1980s, the Internet had been separated from Arpanet. The host
computers on the Arpanet were required to complete their transition from the
protocol NCP to the TCP/lP protocol by January 1, 1983. Ten months later,
the Arpanet would split into two different networks, the Arpanet and the Milnet.
These developments marked the change from the Arpanet as a single
network, connecting different computers into the Internet. As the military use
and its influence on the Internet decreased, a greater expansion of the
Internet became possible. The result was that more and more academic
27 www.vtw.org/speech/decision.
28 Sieber .Kontrollmëqflchkeiten zur Verhinderung rechtswidriger Inhalte in Computernetzen"
1997 CR 593.
29 Finke Die strafrechtliche Verantwortung von Internet-Providern (1998) 3.
14
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institutions used the Internet system."
In 1986, the National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET) was
established, which made transfer of data easier and quicker. From this point
onwards, the Internet grew rapidly." With the transfer to private ownership in
1995, the commercial use of the Internet gained huge acceptance worldwide.
2 3 Function of the Internet
From a technical point of view, the Internet merges a huge number of
computers, spread out all over the world. These computers are
interconnected by a vast number of communication highways; they "speak"
the same language or "protocol". The protocol is implemented by specialised
software that allows communications between most of these computers. The
Arpanet from 1969 also functioned with the help of specialised software, the
Network Control Protocol (NCP), which made the decentralised use of the
network possible. In the 1980s, the NCP was replaced by a new protocol, the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/lP) that became the
standard for moving packets of data around the Internet. The TCP/lP is faster
and more efficient than the NCP and is still used today.
In principle, the Internet is the connection of a huge number of networks,
which are independent from each other. It basically is a network of nets32
allowing data to be transported to its destination via vast detours. Data paths
of thousands of kilometres are common, even though the computers, amongst
30 www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalte/te/14017/1.html.
31 Bleisteiner Rechtliche Verantwortlichkeit im Internet (1999) 15.
32 Hoeren "Das Internet fur Juristen - eine Einfohrung" 1995 NJW 3295.
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which the data is to be exchanged, may be situated only a few kilometres
away from each other. A protocol is a formal set of rules for specifying the
format and relationships when exchanging information.P It is similar to a
language.
The Internet has hierarchic structures. The "backbone" is the primary
high-speed communications link between major data centres to which other
networks are connected." The job of the backbones is to ensure quicker
communication among the individual computers, which in turn allows for faster
exchange of data among Internet users.
Difficulties arise in controlling the contents of the Internet, as it is
transmitted over winding data highways and is often coded. It is however
possible to trace the path that data have travelled in an attempt to identify the
author of particular content.
In the traditional media such as press, television and radio, the supplier
and the author of information can be easily identified and can therefore be
called to account, governmental identification and control of an author
publishing on the internet is limited because of the complicated and complex
structure of networks. Messages on the Internet can be dismantled into the
smallest unlts." Each of these information units finds its own way through the
labyrinth of the Internet.
Different types of information on the Internet have differing life spans.
Contents on the servers of content providers are at least temporarily stored.
33 Rockey The e-Commeree Handbook 2000 (2000) 268.
34 www.law.vill.edu/veilp/teehnotes/whatis5.htm.
35 Barton Multimedia-Strafrecht (1999) 3.
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The length of the storage period for www-sites36 on a www-server for example
is not limited. On a news server37 messages are automatically erased after a
specified period of time. Such "long-term storage" of contents does not exist
in the case of "real-time services". This communication takes place through a
simultaneous and reciprocal sending and receiving of data." The main forum
for the spreading of illegal contents in real-time is Internet Relay Chat (IRC)39,
which is often used by paedophile Internet users to make contacts and
exchange photo data files.4o
Because of these possibilities, even an "Internet layman" can use the
Internet for illegal activities. To avoid detection and identification, those who
do not wish to be caught in their activities use a cyber cafe or Internet-shop,
where anyone can chat" and "surf,42 anonymously.
2 4 Misuse of Internet providers
The above technical explanations of the Internet show that different
parties are involved in the process of distributing information via the Internet.
The different functions, which include the receiving and sending of messages,
networking, accessing or providing service, linking and newsgroup
moderation, can be illustrated through a study of cases decided all around the
world. The criminal liability of Internet providers often depends on their
36 World Wide Web (WWW) is an Internet service for the dissemination of text- and
multimedia contents.
37 Special computer systems which transmit contents.
38 Sieber Verantworllichkeit im Internet (1999), 38.
39 Via this Internet service participants can directly enter into contact with each other without
time delay.
40 Sieber Verantworllichkeit 39.
41 Chatting is the exchanging of text messages in real time.
42 Surfing is the act of meandering around the Internet from one Web page to another by
clicking on hyperlinks.
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technical functions. Case law can aid in understanding why criminal liability
depends on the technical capability of a provider. Case law further illustrates
that it is not easy to distinguish between the different providers, such as the
access, service and content providers. Since the Internet is international and
crosses borders, foreign case law will be analysed as well.
A famous case, which emphasises the issue of access and network
providing, is the CompuServe case'". In 1995, the public prosecutor of the city
of Munich, Germany, put the manager of the German branch of CampuServe
under preliminary investigation, as he was suspected of spreading
pornographic material over the Internet. German police had served
CompuServe with a list of 282 Usenet newsgroups, which, in their view,
contained images of violence, child pornography and bestiality. The
incriminating content had been stored on CompuServe-USA's newsgroup
servers. In response, CompuServe-USA blocked access to the vast majority
of the newsgroups by all of its worldwide subscribers, unblocking the
.newsgroups only after it provided parental control software to its subscribers.
Citing section 18444 (3) of the German Criminal Code, German authorities
charged CompuServe-Germany's manager with providing access to illegal
content. CampuServe attempted to defend itself under a liability exemption for
online service providers in section 5 of Germany's Teleservices Act45 TDG.46
However, the court rejected this argument when made on behalf of
CompuServe-Germany holding that the subsidiary was not an online service
provider by virtue of its simple hard-line connection to CompuServe-USA. On
43 Amtsgericht Munchen 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95; MMR 1998, 429, 430; www.somm-
case.de.
44 Dissemination of pornographic writings.
45 Teledienstegesetz TOG.
46 Wo 5 TOG!!!!
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June 3, 1998, the District Court of Munich handed down a two-year
suspended sentence and fined the manager US $ 56,200. On November 17,
1999, Chief Judge lazslo Ember announced the German state court's
reversal of the decision. Judge Ember agreed that the technical ability to
effectively block content simply did not exist at that time, adding that more
could not have been asked of Felix Somm, manager of CompuServe-
Germany. This case illustrates clearly that the simple offering of access to the
Internet can lead to legal consequences for a provider.
In July 1996, the public prosecution office of Hamburg began
investigations into the Internet provider Aal because it was suspected of
participating in the spreading of paedophilic pictures. Users had however
exchanged such pictures using e-mail. The investigations were therefore
dismissed, since the privacy surrounding telecommunications restrains
service providers from monitoring the individual e-mail communications."
State prosecutors in Mannheim/Germany were putting pressure on the
commercial online service provider T-Online to block access to Internet
material the government considered illegal under German law. The German-
Canadian neo-Nazi Ernst Zundel48 had placed Holocaust denying data on his
web site in Canada. The prosecutors warned the company of investigations
concerning the question whether it was helping to incite racial hatred. Denying
the holocaust is a crime in Germany. This was specifically confirmed by the
investigation against the service provider giving access to Zundel material. T-
Online could be "assisting in inciting racial hatred." T-Online blocked access
47 Der Spiegel September 23, 1996, 124.
48 ZOndei is internationally known as a neo-Nazi who seeks to rewrite the history of World War
II, saying the Holocaust did not take place.
49 New York Times January 29,1996 "Germany moves again to censor Internet content".
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to the website of the Toronto-based neo-Nazi Ernst ZOndei to avoid legal
steps against T-Online.
The difficulty in distinguishing pure hosting from possible "colouring" can
be demonstrated with the help of two classic American cases referring to the
responsibility of online-services for preventing the publication of insulting
contents.f In 1991 the Federal District Court of New York/USA in Cubby v.
Compuserve" absolved the online-services from responsibility for insults
written by third parties. 52CampuServe had appointed an independent firm to
provide and present an internal Journalism Forum. The firm received a letter
from a third party, insulting the plaintiff. The author posted this article directly.
The court based its decision on CompuServe's lack of knowledge and inability
to control the content, since "an online service would only be an electronic
(... ) library".53
In contrast, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc et al. v. Prodigy Service Co, et al54
the court affirmed the responsibility of the online-service, as insulting news
was published in its Money Talk forum. The decision was based on the fact
that the online-service had marketed the forum's content as being well
supervised by filter-software and controlled by external moderators. Because
of this distinction the judgment differed from that in the case of Cubby v.
CampuServe.
Defamatory remarks were the basis of the complaint in the case of Zeran
50 www.zeus.bna.com/e-Iaw/docs/tribod. html.
51 Cubby, Inc., et al. v. Compuserve, Inc., et al., 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
52 Flechsig .Haftunq von Online-Dienstanbietern im Internet" 1996 Arp 333-334.
53 Cubby, Inc., et al. v. Compuserve, Inc., et al., 776 F.Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
54 Stratton Oakmont, Inc., et al. v. Prodigy Services Co, et al., 1995 WL 323710 (Trial/lASs
pt. 34 Nassau County, N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,1995) (No. 31063/94).
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v. AOL. 55 The provider AOl was not held to be liable for the actions of its
users anonymously published information stating that the plaintiff had
published an advertisement for a T-shirt bearing tasteless references to the
Oklahoma City bomoinq." It was a bad joke. The plaintiff's full name and
address were provided in the AOl publication, which led to his being insulted
and threatened by angry citizens. The plaintiff demanded that AOl erase the
"souvenir advertisement" from the AOl-server. AOl subsequently erased this
advertisement without informing the users of AOl that this had been just a
bad joke. But soon similar shirts with similar advertisements appeared on the
AOl homepage. The plaintiff applied for an injunction and abatement of the
information. He reproached AOl for not having reacted appropriately or
quickly enough. The case was dismissed under the new Communications
Decency ActS? (U.S.C.).58 The court referred to 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c) (1),59
ruling that AOl as the publisher of the insulting statement cannot be held
responsible because this would be against the clear wording of the Act and
therefore against the intention of the legislature to privilege Internet
providers." The court came to the conclusion that the classification of a
provider as publisher (Stratton-Oakment v. Prodigy) or as a simple operator
(Cubby v. CompuServe) would stop the provider from voluntarily controlling
55 Kenneth M. Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 958 F.Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997) affd. U.S.
Ct. of Appeals 4th Circuit, No. 97-1523 of November 12, 1997
~www.usacaselaw.com/4th/971523P.html).
6 The "naughty Oklahoma T-shirts" supposedly carried sayings such as ,,visit Oklahoma ... lt's
a BLAST!" or "Finally a day care center that keeps the kids quite - Oklahoma 1995".
57 Titel V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104, § § 502, 110 Stat. 56; 133-
35.
58 WObke .Meinunqsfreihelt im Internet" 1997 CR 313-315.
59 § 230 (c) (1) U.S.C.: Treatment of publisher or speaker - No provider or user of an
interactive computer system shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
Erovided by another information content provider.
o The intention of that section of the U.S.C. is not to create governmental obligation but to
encourage the providers to monitor independently illegal contents on their servers; Gewessier
"Das neue US-Telekommunikationsgesetz" 1996 CR 626-632.
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the contents on his server and blocking them if necessary."
The liability of service providers was also discussed in the case of
Religious Technology Centre v. Netconr", The plaintiff in this matter applied
for a temporary restraining order against the service provider Netcom, as it
had allowed third parties access to the Internet, and moreover had enabled
them to allegedly save copyright-protected material of the Church of
Scientology in a newsgroup on its newsgroup server. Netcom argued that its
knowledge after receiving notice of alleged infringement was too equivocal,
given the difficulty in assessing whether registrations are valid and in making
fair use analyses. Although it refused to hold that liability must be
unequivocal, the court did agree that a mere unsupported allegation of
infringement does not automatically put a defendant on notice and that if a
defendant is unable to reasonably verify a claim of infringement, the
defendant's lack of knowledge may be found reasonable, resulting in no
liability.
25 Summary
The technical explanations of the Internet described in 2 1 above show
that various parties are involved in disseminating information via the Internet.
The different functions, which include the receiving and sending of messages,
networking, accessing or providing service, linking and newsgroup
moderation, can be illustrated through case law.
61 U.S. Court of Appeals 1135 FN 23, decision under www.findlaw.com.
62 Religious Technology Center, et al. v. Netcom On-Line Communications services, Inc., et
al., 907 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D.Cal. 1995),
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The type of liability and its boundaries for the dissemination of illegal
contents must be defined. The cases illustrate that the application of legal
norms has to be analysed in light of the technical capabilities and given facts
of the new medium, the Internet. It is important to analyse the law with
reference to the technical functions of the Internet because on the Internet the
same person can fulfil different functions, which are subject to different legal
norms and can accordingly result in different legal consequences.
3 General field of application of Internet law
It has never been easier than it is today to contact people from all over
the world via email, chat rooms or newsgroups. With no doubt physical
borders are losing their significance. Every Internet user can place data on the
World Wide Web that can be downloaded simultaneously in more than 150
countries.f This opens new dimensions for offenders operating
internationally, especially in the area of the dissemination of illegal
commentaries and presentations. The omnipresent legal issue arising from
this situation is: when does criminal law of one particular nation apply to an
offence "occurring" on the Internet.
The Internet holds data from every place and country in the world.
Computer systems may be accessed in one country, data manipulated in
another, and the consequences may occur in a third country. Trans-national
criminality and the competence for the application of national punitive power
are problematic in the case of "Internet crimes". The application of national
criminal law will depend on whether the offence was committed within the
63 Cornils "Der Begehungsort von Aul1erungsdelikten im Internet" 1999 JZ 395.
23
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
territorial sovereignty of a country or in a foreign legal system. When an
offender uses the Internet for the commission of a crime, the determination of
the place of crime can however cause difficulties.
The right of a nation to impose a penalty actually has to be limited under
international law.64 The problems concerning national jurisdiction when a
crime is committed on the Internet arise from the fact that the traditional rules
concerning the location of a crime have not yet been adjusted to keep pace
with technological developments. The traditional rules are fine when dealing
with "traditional crime". But when faced with a case where the crime consists
of a "mouse click" which triggers the circulation of information in a technically
complicated way and without leaving any possibility for the person who used
the mouse to control the process, it is difficult both to determine the act and to
point to the effect of a potential infringement. What characterises crimes on
the Internet is that they are trans-national. The result is that different
sovereignties, laws, jurisdictions and rules come into play.
This issue shall be first looked at from an international law perspective
and then with special regard to the German jurisdiction.
3 1 Jurisdiction
The existing international rules of jurisdiction were developed when
applicability of law was merely a question of were an act was physically
committed or which action were to be deemed as the most significant ones.
Those rules therefore deal rather poorly with concurrent and conflicting claims
64 schonke & Schroder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar(2001) Sections 3-7,3.
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of jurisdiction" which are often resolved by strict territorial limits of
enforcement jurisdiction.P"
3 1 1 Principles of international law
There are however some possibilities which allow for the prosecution of
such punishable actions. Points of reference in this regard include the
territoriality principle (Terriforialprinzip or Gebiefsgrundsafz), the flag-principle
(Flaggenprinzip), the universality prtnclple'" (Welfrechfsprinzip) and the
representation principle (sfellvertrefende Sfrafrechfspflege). These principles
overlap and complement each other. Even with these principles and statutory
definitions in place, the determination of the place of an offence and the
application of a particular law can be problematic.
Under traditional English common law criminal jurisdiction was limited to
crimes committed within the territory of England.68 But of course no state
nowadays is committed to such a restrictive view on criminal jurisdiction. Most
states, including Germany, have in fact extended their legal jurisdiction in
criminal law matters by appealing to various principles recognised in public
international law.
The traditional presentation of international criminal law in doctrine as
well as the structure of criminal code invites us to think territorially.'"
65 Oxman Jurisdiction of States in Bernhard (ed) Encyclopeadia of Public International law
1987 Vo110, 277 (282).
66 Harris Cases and Material on International law (1998) 265.
67 The universality principle mandated that states can prosecute Internet crimes under their
own jurisdiction independently from the law of the scene of the crime.
68 Hailsham Halsbury's Law of England (1990) para. 624. Thus, until the statutory law
intervened, an Englishman who killed a person in France did not commit an English crime.
69 Wong "Criminal Jurisdiction over Internet Crimes" in Holoch Recht und Internet (2001) 100.
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3 1 2 Relevant international law cases
There is a series of cases, which illustrate the difficulty of applying
existing law to a medium such as the Internet.
For example, some American and Asian courts have held resident online
providers liable for contents, which could be downloaded through the services
of these providers, even if the contents came from abroad." By contrast, a
court in Florida (USA) held that it did not have jurisdiction over an online user
from New York." This particular user had used a store, which was situated in
Florida. The court decided that it did not have sufficient facts to establish
jurisdiction, if the only contact between the user and the state of Florida was
the use of this information. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would
establish too broad a jurisdiction for local authorities.
In contrast, a court in Tennessee (USA) found that it did have jurisdiction
to pass judgement on a couple from California.72 This couple had been
disseminating pornographic material via the Internet. The couple was
sentenced to six years imprisonment. A U.S. Federal Appeals Court
confirmed the decision. The appellate court reasoned that the couple had
acted with the knowledge that the data could be accessed in Tennessee,
since the user had accessed it from there.
The former Attorney General of Minnesota stated that authors of illegal
data fed into the computer systems from outside the state of Minnesota could
70 SEC v. Scott A. Frye, 95 Civ. 9205; www.sec.gov/news/frye.html.
71 Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One Direct Access, Inc., 636 so.Zd 1351 (Fla. App. Ct. 1994);
www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/pres-kap.txt.
72 United States of America v. Robert Allen Thomas and Carleen Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th
Cir. 1996).
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be punished in Minnesota, In case they know that their data could be
accessed from within Minnesota.
A court in New York granted an injunction barring an Antigua-based
online gaming company from doing business with New York residents." The
court held that regardless of whether gambling is legal in the company's state
of incorporation or operation. The court found that the act of entering the bet
and transmitting the information from New York via the Internet is adequate to
constituting gambling activity within New York State. The company required
users to enter a physical address, and rejected customers whose address
was in a state where gambling was illegal. However, to test the company's
practice, the New York attorney general used a Nevada address from his
residence in New York and was hence able to gain access. The court
consequently held that the company's measures to screen users was not
sufficient to shield the site from liability.
An example of the application of an unrestricted jurisdiction is the French
Yahoo! decision" where no attempt was made to justify why the relevant
action "belonged" to France any more than to any other country." Although
the case was a civil action, the actual illegality consisted of a violation of the
French Criminal Code, which makes the distribution of Nazi material illegal. 76
73 State of New York v. World Interactive Gaming Corp, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 425 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999); www.cnn.comITECH/computing/9907/29/gamblelaw.idg.
74 LlCRA & UEJF v. Yahoo! Inc., Tribunal de Grande Instance Paris;
www.juriscom.netttxttjurisfr/cti/tgiparis2000011200.
75 The Tribunale de Grande Instance de Paris in LlCRA & UEFJ v. Yahoo! Ind. & Yahoo
France held that Yahoo! Inc., a company incorporated in California must take all necessary
measures to dissuade and render impossible any access from French territory via Yahoo.com
to a Nazi artefact auction service or any other service or site consisting Nazi crimes. The
Tribunal confirmed its decision about the provider liability of Yahoo! on November 20,2000.
76 This created room for arguing that the judgement was in fact a penal judgment and thus
should have been informed by jurisdictional limitations under international law. This was,
amongst other things, argued by Yahoo! Inc. in ist complaint which it filed on December 21,
2000 in the US District Court, Northern District of California (complaint No. COO-21275,at
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The Paris court, while acknowledging that the offence committed by Yahoo!
Inc. in France was unintentional, based its assertion of jurisdiction on the fact
that by "permitting the visualisation in France of these objects and eventual
participation of a surfer established in France in such an exposition/sale,
Yahoo! Inc. (....) committed a wrong on the territory of France"."
3 1 3 German law
The previous examination of international rules of law and of specific
cases of different jurisdictions shall now be contrasted with one particular
jurisdiction. It shall be analysed when and under which principles German law
applies to offences committed on the Internet. The challenge, nevertheless, is
the same as mentioned above: by traditional rules the actions are often not
committed on German ground.
"Territorial crimes" means that acts committed within the territory of the
adjudicating state are still treated differently from "extraterritorial" crimes.
Before the different criminal offences that can be perpetrated on the Internet
are discussed in chapter 4 in detail, the question must be posed: Is German
criminal law applicable and if so, to what extent? I will discuss below this
"primacy of territoriality,,78 and argue that the importance given to this primacy
is perhaps misplaced. I will then demonstrate that even if one adhere strictly
to the territoriality principle the application of this principle in practice may
http://pub.bna.com(eclr/21275.htm) and in which it sought declaratory relief that the French
orders were neither recognisable nor enforceable in the United States (see: Yahoo!, Inc. v. La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme at L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.Supp. 2d 1181 (NO Cal. 2001)).
77 See the decision of Judge Gomez on May 20, 2000, unofficial English translation available
at www.gyoza.com/lapres/html/yahen.
78 Wong "Criminal Jurisdiction over Internet Crimes" 94.
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encompass such a wide scope that it can no longer properly be called
"territorial". Given these conflicting considerations, the following chapter of the
thesis will show more of a trend in German jurisprudence and legal literature
rather than clearly reformulated rules.
Sections 3 to 9 of the German Criminal Code StGB enfold under which
circumstances German law can be applied to offences. Section 3 and the
sections thereafter, as well as section 9 of the StGB, relating to international
criminal law. These norms lay down the scope of the internal state authority
by restricting the application of German criminal law to offences that have a
connection to foreign countries." If there is no application for German criminal
law as a result of a lack of connection or reference to foreign countries,
criminal proceedings will be banned. This leads to a withdrawal of the case."
3 1 3 1 The universality principle under German law
The German legislature acted on the universality principle in Sections 5
and 6 of the German Criminal Code. The universality principle
(Weltrechtsprinzip) allows for an unlimited exercise of jurisdiction to an
offence defined in section 6, nO.1-9of the StGB.B1This principle refers to the
79 Lackner Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (1999) introductory remark to sections 3-7, 2.
80 BGH 1985 NStZ 361.
81 Section 6 Acts Abroad Against Internationally Protected Legal Interests. German criminal
law shall further apply, regardless of the law of the place of their commission, to the following
acts committed abroad:
1. Genocide (Section 220a);
2. Serious criminal offences involving nuclear energy, explosives and radiation in cases under
Sections 307 and 308 subsections (1) to (4), Section 309 subsection (2) and Section 310;
3. Assaults against air and sea traffic (Section 316c);
4. Trafficking in human beings (Section 180b) and serious trafficking in human beings (181);
5. Unauthorized distribution of narcotics;
6. Dissemination of pornographic writings in cases under Section 184 subsection (3) and (4);
7. Counterfeiting of money and securities (Sections 146, 151 and 152), payment cards and
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nature of the crime, which must be of a very high severity, for example
genocide or war crimes. The application of German criminal law to the
offences mentioned in section 6 of the StGB is unproblematic, as the
application is based on the principle of universality (Welfrechfsprinzip). This
principle includes an enumerative list of particularly severe offences, which
are recognised by all legal systems." This principle provides for an exercise
of German jurisdiction for the crimes defined in section 6, no.1-9 of the StGB.
This kind of jurisdiction is considered to be in the interest of mankind as
a whole and is only restricted by the rules of international law.83 The principle
is based on the idea that there is an international consensus amongst all
civilised nations that certain rights must be protected and that it is in the
interest of all nations to ensure their protection.
Under the universality principle provided in section 6 of the StGB,
German law will be applicable regardless the place of commission or the
nationality of the offender. It is also applicable to the distribution of child
pornography via data networks." A precondition for the application of German
law is that no statutory international law stands in the way of the application of
section 6 StGB.
According to section 5 of the StGB, German criminal law is also
applicable to acts committed outside of Germany against certain German
citizens under legal protection, regardless of the law of the place of
blank Eurochecks (Section 152a subsections (1) to (4), as well as their preparation (Sections
149,151,152 and 152a subsection (5);
8. Subsidy fraud (Section 264);
9. Acts which, on the basis of an international agreement binding on the Federal Republic of
Germany, shall also be prosecuted if they are committed abroad)
82 Schënke & Schroder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar(2001) Sections 3-9,7.
83 Lackner Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar Section 13, 2.
84 Section 6, no.6 StGB.
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commission.
The application of German criminal law to offences committed abroad
may also be based on section 7 of the StGB.85 Section 7 of the StGB is
relevant where a crime is committed abroad against a German citizen (for
example criminal libel against a German via email in a foreign country).
According to the representation principle, the national punitive power
intervenes in those places where a foreign jurisdiction, which ordinarily would
apply its criminal law, is prevented from imposing sanctions, due to the
existence of intergovernmental agreements, for example. This principle is
defined in section 7 (2) of the StGB.
3 1 3 2 The territoriality principle
The territoriality principle (Territorialprinzip) set out in section 3 of the
StGB, states that German criminal law applies to acts committed within
Germany. This principle determines that authorities of the Federal Republic of
Germany can prosecute all offences committed within Germany. In turn, the
flag-principle of section 4 of the StGB extends German criminal law to
offences committed on board ships and aeroplanes that sailor fly under the
German flag.
85 Section 7 Applicability to Acts Abroad in Other Cases
(1) German criminal law shall apply to acts, which were committed abroad against a German,
if either the act is punishable at the place of its commission or if the place of its commission is
not subject to any criminal law enforcement.
(2) German criminal law shall apply to other acts, which were committed abroad if the act is
punishable at the place of its commission or the place of its commission is not subject to any
criminal law enforcement and if the perpetrator:
1. was a German at the time of the act or became one after the act; or
2. was a foreigner at the time of the act, was found to be in Germany and, although the
Extradition Act would permit extradition for such an act, is not extradited, because a request
for extradition is not made, is rejected, or the extradition is not practicable.
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According to section 3 of the StGB, German criminal law is only
applicable when the offence was committed in Germany. The section
expressly states: "German criminal law applies to acts committed within
Germany". "Committed within Germany" corresponds with section 9 of the
StGB86 'where the offender or the participant committed the criminal act in
Germany. This may be the case where the criminal content was put on the
Internet in Germany.
Internet providers who have their headquarters in Germany and who are
operating from Germany fall under the German jurisdiction in terms of section
9 (1) var. 3 of the StGB.87 According to section 9 (1) of the German Criminal
Code (StGB), a criminal act is committed at every place the perpetrator acted
or, in case of an omission, should have acted, or where the result of the
offence occurs or should occur according to the understanding of the
perpetrator. If the act and the consequence (the statutorily proscribed harm)
do not occur at the same place, different places of crimes can be assumed,
possibly in different countries. The place of the act (Handlungsort) is the place
where the perpetrator carries out an action that satisfies the statutory
definition of an offence.88 The place where the result of an act occurs
86 Section 9 StGB Place of Offence
(1) An offence is committed at every place at which the offender acted or, in the case where
the offender refrained from an action to which he was obligated, the place at which he should
have acted or the place in which the action showed its effects or should have shown its
effects in the offender's intention.
(2) Incitement or accessory ship is committed not only at the place where the act was
committed, but also at every place where the inciter or accessory acted or, in case of
omission, should have acted or where, according to his understanding, the act should have
been committed. If the inciter or accessory in an act abroad acted domestically, then German
criminal law shall apply to the incitement or accessory ship, even if the act is not punishable
according to the law of the place of its commission.
87 www.anwaltsforum.de/gebiete/straf/pelz/strafrecht.htm.
88 Dreher & Trëndle Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze Kommentar(1995) Section 9, 2.
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(Erfolgsorl) is the location where the consequence comes about. 89 The
applicability of German law only requires one of these places (Handlungs- or
Erfolgsorl) to be located in Germany. A similar rule exists in the criminal
codes of various other legal systerns'", including those of Sweden, some U.S.
states (for example Georqia'" and New York'") and Singapore.93
3 1 3 3 Relevant German law cases
In recent years there have been a few milestones of jurisdiction in this
particular field of law. A few of those shall now be discussed to represent the
current German position on the issue.
An expansion of the reach of national criminal law can be observed in
the decision of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichfshof -
BGH) of December 12, 2000 to find the Australian Holocaust-denier Frederic
Toben guilty of sedition, based on information found on his Australian-based
website." In his publications he denied the mass murder of Jews committed
by Germans during the Second World War. Toben had been sentenced to ten
months of imprisonment for distributing revisionist leaflets in Germany. The
German Federal Court of Justice decided in December 2000 that foreigners
might be prosecuted for their online activities, even if these activities
originated abroad. The BGH argued, that given Germany's history, there is
objectively a special link between Toben's material and German territory,
89 ibid, 3.
90 Oehler Internationales Strafrecht (1987) 269-290.
91 Georgia Code § 16-9-93.1.
92 N.Y. Penal Law § 235.21 (3).
93 Bremer Strafbare Internet-Inhalte in internationaler Hinsicht (2001) 86.
94 Decision of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) of December 12, 2000,
Reg. No.1 StR 184/00, published in: NJW 2001, 624-628).
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which justifies assertion of jurisdiction. It also reasoned that, given the focus
of the site on Germans and German history, particularly German users in
particular were among the intended addressees of the site.
This content, the Court found, was capable of disturbing the public
peace in Germany. The court held that the publication could be prosecuted
under German criminal law because although it was published on a server
located in Australia, the action was directed against Germany and addressed
to the German public. The most interesting aspect of this case is the array of
questions concerning both the law of substance as well as issues of
procedure. Special attention was given to the question of how to account for
the fact that the incriminated publications were distributed through the
Internet. The difficult issue before the Court was how to interpret those
sections of the German Criminal Code that deal with the principle of
territoriality, i.e. whether the Code is applicable to crimes committed outside
the German borders." The Internet raises the question of how to define the
place where the crime is committed in accordance to section 9 German
Criminal Code when precisely these parameters of place and location appear
to be in outright contradiction with the nature of the Internet. The Court,
drawing on a considerable amount of scholarship'", held that there was
applicability with respect to the effects of the web-publication in German
territory." The Court declares the protected good to be closely tied to
95 Decision of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) of December 12, 2000,
Reg. NO.1 StR 184/00, published in: NJW 2001, 624-628).
96 See chapter 3 1 4.
97 The Court underlines that the defendant - by "participating" in an ongoing debate about
German history and Nazi-crimes - intently addressed his publication to German readers. The
court finds that the defendant created a piece of information that had the quality to endanger
the communal life between Jews and other groups in the German people. The Federal Court
of Justice puts forward the special connection between the defendant's action and the
protected good (German public peace).
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Germany, especially with regard to German history. It holds this connection"
to be a further argument for the applicability of German criminal law to the
Internet publication in the light of international public law. This does resonate
with different voices in German legal publications but also with the common
measure taken by the European Council 1996 with regard to fighting racism
and hostility against foreiqners."
Another famous case is the ZOndeI case. A German prosecutor
investigated the providers CompuServe and T-Online because of illegal data
that had originated in Canada.l'" The German-Canadian Neo-Nazi Ernst
Zundel had placed it on the Internet in Canada. He denied the Holocaust on
his web sites. The contents were protected by the Canadian and American
constitutions, which are very liberal about the freedom of expresston.'?' In
Germany however, Zundel's Nazi contents (the so-called Zundel-sites) fulfilled
the requirements of the statutory provision of section 130 (3) of the StGB.102
Section 130 of the StGB combats right-wing extremism and propaganda
hostile to foreiqners.l'" The prosecutor found that section 130 StGB also
98 For German criminal law to be applied to cases with links to foreign countries there has to
be a point of reference, a so-called connecting factor or specific link (AnknOpfungspunkt). This
factor is necessary to prevent an arbitrary prosecution of criminal offences. It is necessary
that there is a certain connection or link between the facts in Germany and abroad. If there is
no connection to Germany, the prosecution violates the so-called principle of non-interference
(Nichteinmischungsprinzip), which requires that the sovereignty of foreign states be
respected.
It has not yet been determined what prerequisites have to be fulfilled to assume such a
connection. The application of this rule of law is therefore almost entirely up to the ruling
body's or the judge's discretion.
99 Published in Amtsblatt der Européisctïerï Gemeinschaften L 185, 5.
100 www.cnn.com/2000ITECH/computing/08/29/hate.sites.idg.
101 In the United States, the First Amendment protects hate speech. The German Constitution
allows free expression only within limits: racial speech is not tolerated under Article 5 of the
German Constitution. In 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that Holocaust denial
is not protected speech under Article 5 since it expresses a "claim of fact that has been
woven untrue" (see: BVerfG NJW94, 1780).
02 .Auschwitzluqe" (Holocaust denial).
103 The provision emerged as a reaction to anti-Semitic and National Socialistic recurrences in
Germany after the Second World War. It is therefore punishable to approve, to deny or to play
down actions committed under the Nazi rule.
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includes web pages and corresponding content, managed by foreign nationals
on a foreign server, but accessible in Germany, because the content was
capable of disturbing the public peace in Germany according to section 9 of
the German Criminal Code (crime's effects in German territory).
3 1 4 Proposed solutions to tackle applicability of German jurisdiction
What are in both decisions conspicuous by their absence are references
to the laws of other states and to the potential of conflicting regulation. In
Germany, through legal definition, the application of the territoriality principle
is extended considerably by deeming an act as territorial, not only when it is
performed within the territory of the adjudicating state, but also when the
effects of the act occur there. The question really is, whether the locality of a
criminal act should be irrelevant for certain offences.
Basically the problem is a consequence of different ideologies and
different political opinions. On the one hand, democratic countries like
Germany, the United States or South Africa have a liberal perspective, which
advocates broad freedom of expression with few limitations in the form of
criminal political control. On the other hand, the need to criminalize acts which
express opinions of a political, religious or sexual character is endorsed. The
extension of this liberal perspective is the opinion that a person always has
the right to enjoy all the political and civic rights that he enjoys in his state.
The extension of the other point of view is the opinion that every state has the
right to protect its citizens and itself against criminal information from abroad,
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when this information is contrary to the sense of justice in this state.
The problems concerning the national jurisdiction for crimes consisting of
illegal texts, topics and contents on the Internet arise in part because
provisions concerning such crimes do not contain a requirement of certain
external effect. Under German law they are called Gefahrdungsde/ikfe.104 This
means that there is no legally relevant effect to use for localising the crime,
i.e. the location where the effect of the criminal behaviour occurred. The
possibilities of localising the offence to a certain place or country is limited to
the place where the act was perpetrated. Such a crime is accordingly deemed
to have been committed where the criminal act was perpetrated or, in case of
a crime of omission, where the person is situated when he had the duty to act.
An example: an American neo-Nazi disseminates threats or expressions of
contempt for an ethnic group by creating a web site on the Internet, using his
own computer in California. In this example, the crime is deemed to have
been committed in California because that is where the offender committed
the criminalized act.
3 1 4 1 The principle of the effects of an action
The flexibility of territoriality is understood differently in Germany. In
German legal literature some solutions on how to deal with jurisdiction
problems can be found. The place where the effects of an action occur
(Erto/gsorf) is important for the application of German criminal law in terms of
the dissemination of illegal contents on the Internet. In the opinion of authors
104 Geft3hrdungsdelikte are classified in "offences of abstract endangerment" and "offences of
concrete endangerment".
37
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
of German theory on criminal jurisprudence 105,the place where the result of
such criminal acts takes place will always be Germany, because the illegal
contents can be downloaded in Germany just like in any other country,
including the one where they were created. In their opinion, such crimes
should be prosecuted as acts committed in Germany.106
According to another author!", the term Erfolgsorl should be restricted
through a subjective interpretation. German jurisdiction should only be
applicable if the perpetrator intends to act in Germany specifically. This
approach is called the theory of final interest. The argument is based on the
fact that section 9 of the StGB is too broad in the area of global
communication. Every user of the data highway would have to obtain global
legal advice, which is unreasonable to assume. The result of the restricted
interpretation is that a person or party will only be punished under German
criminal law if it is specifically interested in acting in Germany.
Another view108holds that the place where the effects of an action occur
(Erfolgsorl) should only be regarded as being within Germany if there is a
direct connection to Germany, i.e. a territorial specification, found by means of
objective criteria. Such territorial specification can be in the form of a website
designed in Germany or a site making specific reference to German facts or
persons.
The determination of the Erfolgsorl is not difficult in the case of offences
like the tampering with data or destruction thereof. The Erfolgsorl is where the
result occurs, for example where the data is stored. Similarly, the Erfolgsorl of
105 Kuner "Internationale Zustandigkeitskonflikte im Internet" 1995 CR 453-455; Conradi &
SchlOmer Die "Strafbarkeit der Internetprovider" 1996 NStZ 368-370.
106 ibid.
107 Collard in "Straftaten im Internet" 1995 CR 621.
108 Hilgendorf "Grundfalle zum Computerstrafrecht" 1997 NJW 1876-1879.
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an offence of concrete endangerment (konkrete Gefahrdungsdelike) is easy to
locate: the place where the effects of an action occur is where the tangible
danger nappens.l'" The result is the causation of the danqer.!"
3 1 4 2 Offences of abstract endangerment
Offences of abstract endangerment (abstrakte Gefahrdungsdelikte), for
example incitement to commit genocide or the dissemination of pornography,
are problematic. Under German criminal law one must differentiate between
infringement offences and liability offences. In the case of infringement
offences, the completion of the offence presupposes that someone else's
legal interests are infringed, for example in the case of damage to property.
In comparison, the liability offence is already committed with the
incidence of the endangering. This means that an offence of abstract
endangerment (abstraktes Gefahrdungsdelikt) can occur without any tangible
result. These offences do not need the presence of harm or a concrete
danger to an object. The mere act itself is punishable because the act is seen
as enough of a danger that an additional result is not required.'!' For
example, the publishing of child pornography on the Internet or the distribution
of a leaflet with racist remarks is punishable in itself. A result is not required. If
there is a result, for example someone kills a Jewish or coloured person
because the racist leaflet spurred him on, it is not relevant for the fulfilment of
an offence of abstract endangerment.
109 SchOnke & Schroder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2001) Section 9, 6.
110 ibid.
111 Cornils "Der Begehungsort von Auf1erungsdelikten im Internet" 1999 JZ 395.
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The dominant opinion 112 is that there is no application of German
criminal law for typical Internet offences, because all dissemination crimes are
absfrakfe Gefahrdungsdelikfe (offences of abstract endangerment). This
opinion is based on the view that absfrakfe Getënrdunqsdelikte do not have
an Erfolgsorf (place where the effects of an action occur) and, in the absence
of that, German punitive power in terms of section 9 of the StGB cannot be
invoked. One exception does however exist, namely section 6, no. 6 of the
StGB allows for punitive power for hardcore pornography according to the
universality princlple.!"
According to another opinion in German legal literature!", it is sufficient
for punishment under German law that it be possible to download illegal
contents in Germany (even if they fulfil the elements of an offence of an
absfrakfem Gefahrdungsdelikf). This view is generally rejected in the legal
literature because of the borderless Internet, as all illegal content would then
be judged according to German criminal law.115 A novel view is the extension
of the term Erfolgsorf (section 9 (1) of the StGB) so that categories like
Gefahrdungsdelikfe (offences of endangerment) no longer rnatter.!"
Some authors 117 refer to a "virtual presence" because of the borderless
structure of the Internet: every user of the Internet is virtually present in every
country in the world. Accordingly, the crime is committed at the same time in
every location in the world because it can be downloaded everywhere. It is not
unusual in German criminal law to see an act as a unit in a criminal law
112 Lackner & KOhl Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (1997) introductory remark to Section 13, 32;
Ringel "Rechtsextremistische Propagnada aus dem Internet" 1997 CR 302-303.
113 See chapter 3 1 3 1.
114 Collardin "Straftaten im Internet" 1995 CR 618-621.
115 Cornils "Der Begehungsort von Au~erungsdelikten im Internet" 1999 JZ 395.
116 ibid 405
117 Kuner "Internationale Zustandigkeitskonflikte im Internet" 1996 CR 454.
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sense, even if the act was committed in different places.!"
Another solution would be based on the judgment that an act can be
perpetrated at the same time in several locatlons.l" If the place of the act
(Handlungsorl) is decisive and there can be different Handlungsorle, the
same has to apply mutatis mutandis for offences committed on the Internet,
when a criminal offence is committed on two connected servers at the same
time. In terms of this view, the previously mentioned American racist who
publishes the illegal contents of his web site on a web server in Germany has
to be punished under German law. A restriction would mean a clear restriction
of German state authority.
3 1 5 Conclusion
From the above discussion, the following conclusions can be drawn:
Illegal Internet publications from Germany are always punishable under
German jurisdiction in terms of section 3 of the StGB.
A computer crime is also regarded as having been committed in
Germany and falling under German jurisdiction, if it is purposefully placed on
a German server (as the locus delicti is Germany). If the texts made available
satisfy the requirements of German criminal law and are made available
knowingly by the service provider also in Germany, then the place in which
118 This is accepted in German criminal law for offences with several acts, like robbery.
Robbery includes the act Gewaltanwendung (use of violence) and the act Wegnahme (actual
taking). Only the combination of both parts constitutes the offence "robbery". Both acts can be
sRatially separated.
1 9 Cornils "Der Begehungsort von Aur..erungsdelikten im Internet" 1999 JZ 396.
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the data was entered is unirnportant.!"
Illegal contents stored on foreign servers cannot be punished under
German criminal law, as the crime is committed abroad. German criminal law
is only applicable under certain circumstances (see section 7 of the StGB), for
instance, if the criminal act aims at a German object of legal protection 121or
an international object of legal protection 122.
The proposed solutions for applicability of jurisdiction questions may be
criticised. The outrage over the CampuServe case123was based upon the
argument that Germany indirectly "imposed its moral standards across the
globe".124
The construction of a "virtual presence" would cause very serious
problems concerning legal safeguards for the user of the Internet, who would
be forced to take into account the possibility of an accusation of a crime in a
foreign country, the legal order of which he is quite unaware of or could
reasonably not be aware of. The argument that German jurisdiction is
applicable if the perpetrator has the intent to act in Germany (final interest)
can be criticised because an individual user of the Internet does not have and
- due to the technical complexity of the Internet - cannot always have
knowledge of the effects of the Internet.
The decision of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) in the Toben
case125may also be criticised. The Court ponders at length upon the question
120Opinion of the Federal Court of Justice (see: Toben case (VERWEIs); BGH - 1 StR
184/00).
121Defamation of the State and its symbols, sections 5, nO.3 (a), (b), 90 (a) of the StGB
122Dissemination of "hardcore" pornography, sections 6, no. 6, 184 III, IV of the StGB).
123WOOOO
124Kohl "Eggs, Jurisdiction and the Internet" in International & Comparative Law Quaterly
~2002) 579.
25See chapter 3 1 3 3.
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whether section 9 of the German Criminal Code (crime's effects in German
territory) allows a persecution even when the incriminated content was
distributed from a website erected in Australia. At the same time, the Court
appears to take the matter of the Holocaust denial itself and its incrimination
in the Internet almost for granted. One might still ask whether the allusions
made by the Court, for example to border-crossing environmental harm 126, are
very persuasive. It certainly is highly questionable to compare the spreading
of gases or physical rays through space with the Internet and "cyberspace".
As a consequence, the quality of the Internet and the effects this has on free
speech is not only ignored by the BGH, but also in fact made a non-issue by
placing the decision exclusively within the reference system of German
substantive and procedural Criminal law. This German ruling is in marked
contrast to the reasoning of the New York court in the case State of New York
v. World Interactive Gaming Corp127 that focused on the actual actions of local
online customers, which were then imputed to the foreign provider to bring
him within territorial boundaries.
As German law professor Eric Hilgendorf noted, the matter may be
looked at from another side as well: if we can see German Criminal law as
claiming a policeman's role for wrongdoing in the Internet, we need to imagine
a foreign country incriminating a German national writing in favour of human
rights protection in the Internet. That would be the flip side to the claim made
by German authorities to persecute Internet contents, even when launched
abroad.
Professor Hilgendorf suggests instead the applicability of German
126 BGH Reg. NO.1 StR 184/00.
127 See chapter 3 1 2.
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Criminal law only in those cases where a specific connection of the offence to
Germany is apparent. This proposal of territorially specified crimes again
opens the question of how to define in a satisfactory manner just when this
territorial connection is given. By taking refuge in a seemingly simple territorial
aspect of the crime, the questions of how to establish this territorial effect in a
given case remain unanswered. The territorial argument might prove too
weak. Even if the intent of the perpetrator to address Germans is stronger
than the simple use of the German language, we cannot deny that it will
remain a highly arbitrary procedure by which the territoriality of a crime can be
established.
While prosecution under German law is possible under certain
circumstances, we should consider whether this broad application of German
criminal law contravenes the principles of international law. In the debate on
Internet-related crimes, we can observe a recurrence of what happened when
satellite transmission of radio and TV-programs began years ago. At that time,
it was an international task to formulate international rules on the regulation of
the criminal responsibility for offences committed in the transmitted programs.
In the Nordic countries there was general agreement that the regulation of the
criminal responsibility should be based on the legislation in the country from
which the program was transmitted.F"
The same should apply for Internet crimes. Punishing Internet crime has
less to do with fair and just results and more with protecting public interests.
Germany with its broad definition of the application of German jurisdiction has
to be careful not to disadvantage states with a smaller online presence.
128 Tráskrnan Internet and Crime 119.
44
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Provided that each state only claims jurisdiction over a site as far as it affects
the state's territory, conflicting claims cannot arise.129 Moreover, this would
correspond to the general principles of international law and the Lotus
decision 130 of the Permanent International Court. 131 Under the non-
interference principle, a link has to be established if a country wants to
prosecute crimes that also have links to foreign states.
4 Crimes in Cyberspace
Generally speaking, crimes in the cyber world can be separated into
"computer-related offences" and "ordinary crimes". "Computer-related" in the
widest sense means offences such as hacking, which typically take place on a
computer system compared to "ordinary" (traditional) offences like fraud.132
No convincing definition has yet been found for the term "computer crime".
Generally, it is defined as illegal behaviour involving the processing or the
transmission of data,133 while others 134define it more strictly as a crime
related to the use of computers. In order to clarify the meaning of the term
"computer crime", some of the different crimes on the Internet will be
described and discussed.
Most computer offences are found in the German Criminal Code, the
Sfrafgesefzbuch (StGB), although there are other statutory regulations dealing
129 The German CompuServe judgement was controversial because it effectively precluded
concurrent legislation.
130 France v. Turkey, (1927) PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10.
131 In this decision from September 7, 1927, the Permanent International Court agreed that a
state may prosecute a crime outside its territory provided that there exists a special
connection to the state.
132 See: Cullen Computer Crime in Edward & Waelde (ed) Law and the Internet (1997) 207-
209.
133 Barton Multimedia-Strafrecht (2001) 23-24.
134 Bremer Strafbare Internet-Inhalte (2001) 61-62.
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with computer crimes, for instance the Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wetfbewerb
(Unfair Competition Act) or the Urhebergesetz (Copyright Act).
4 1 Introduction to German criminal law
In order to put our problem in perspective, it is necessary to understand
the basics of German criminal law.
Case law is not actually a formal source of law in Germany because the
function of the courts is to apply the law rather than to create it. The courts are
not bound by the decisions of higher courts under a strict doctrine of
precedent. However, case law in the sense of principles developed and
concretised in judicial decisions is of significant importance. The practical
influence of case law is now even more significant than that of academic
opinion.
In Germany, an offence is divided into the elements of a crime
(Tatbestand), unlawfulness, in English legal terminology: an actus reus135
(Rechtswidrigkeit) and guilt (Schuld). If one fails, there is no crime and hence
no liability. The Tatbestand has to meet the statutorily defined elements of the
concrete offence. The offence elements are in turn divided into objective and
subjective aspects. The objective aspects are the elements which are factual:
what happened, how the act was committed and with what instruments. The
subjective Tatbestand contains the mental elements, the elements that are
associated with the mental reasoning of the offender. The offender has to
have intent (Vorsatz). He has to want or anticipate the result as it is described
135 Foster German legal system & laws (1996) 138.
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in the criminal code.
An act that is performed is defined as human conduct carried out by will
(Handlung) and must also be unlawful (rechfswidrig).136 It is not unlawful if it
can be justified by justifications (Rechtferligungsgrilnden), for example
consent (Einwilligung) or self-defence (Nofwehr). Online acts of
communication can also be unlawful (rechfswidrig) if they conform to the
criminal offence of libel, slander or hate speech, but by the same token these
online communication acts can be justified (gerechtferligf) on the basis of
section 193 StGB (Protection of justifiable interest) or article 5 of the German
Constitution 137 (Freedom of speech and expression).
In the area of pornography, the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgerichf) decided that pornography is considered to be a
form of art and is therefore justified under Article 5 of the Grundgesefz
(freedom of speech and expression).
Additionally, an offence is only punishable if it is done with guilt (Schuld).
A person is considered to be guilty if he can be reproached, i.e. called to
account because of his responsibility for a criminal offence. This presupposes
criminal capacity (Schuldfahigkeif) and no grounds for excluding guilt
(Schuldausschliessungsgrund) .
Section 17 s.1 of the German Criminal Code states that one acts without
guilt, if he could not know that he acts illegally (for example, if he comes from
a country where such an act is legal or habitually respected). This principle
also applies to online communication, for instance, if someone advertises
something on the Internet, which is legal in his home country, not knowing
136 Kaufmann Creifelds Recntswotiemucn (1997) under the term "Handlungsbegriff'.
137 Grundgesetz.
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that it is illegal in Germany.
However, an adult who downloads child pornography from the Internet
can be punished under section 184 (5) of the German Criminal Code because
the Tatbestand is satisfied: he downloaded pornography (objective
Tatbestand) and he acted unlawfully with intent. As mentioned previously.P"
under German law punishment is only possible when the requirements of
Tatbestand, Rechtswidrigkeit and Schuld are fulfilled.
4 2 Infringements of personality rights (Injuring a person's reputation)
Slander and insult are widespread offences on the Internet. Therefore,
defamation liability was one of the first areas of law to be adjudicated in the
field of online services. A person who insults another acts against net-internal
behaviour rules, but also commits an offence in terms of section 185 of the
German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)). An insult is an attack on the
honour of another person, through the declaration of disrespect, deprecation
or disregard thereof. The insults offences are independent from the medium
through which they are spread. Therefore, insult (section 185 StGB),
malicious gossip (section 186 StGB) and defamation (section 187 StGB) may
be committed through email. These offences are a criminal law matter in
German law and their rules place severe restrictions on free expression. In
the first decision relating to insults on data networks, the Magistrate's Court of
the city of Rheinbach concluded that the description "Schlampe" (slut) is
138 See chapter 4 1.
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punishable even when such language is the norm in a chat forum.139
In addition, the StGB includes special norms, which protect the President
and the Federal Republic of Germany against defamatory statements. Section
90 (b) StGB regulates the disparagement of the German constitutional bodies.
The insulting of representatives of foreign countries and the insulting of
philosophical and religious groups are also punishable under section 103
StGB, if it disturbs the "public peace" (offentlicher Frieden) 140.
The German Constitution (Grundgesetz-GG) guarantees the protection
of the expression of opinion. This protection is contained in Art. 5 (1) of the
GG and is therefore a basic right under the GG. Art. 5 GG provides that
everyone shall have the right to freely express and disseminate his own
opinion by speech, writing and pictures.!" Freedom of the press and freedom
of reporting by means of broadcast and film are guaranteed. The law of
slander, hate speech, insult and defamation seeks to find a balance between
the individuals right to a reputation or good name and another's right to free
expression.
The legitimate interest of protection against defamation finds its limits in
Art. 5 (1) of the GG, as statements made in chat forums must be seen in the
light of the basic constitutional right of freedom of expression and the press.
The basic constitutional rights of freedom of expression and the press and the
right of each individual not to be insulted must be carefully weighed. Freedom
of expression can be limited through law. In particular, provisions to protect
139 AG Rheinsbach 2 DS 397/95.
140 See chapter 3 1 3 3 (Toben-case).
141 Jarass & Pieroth Grundgesetz fOr die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Kommentar (2000) Art.
5,25.
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young peopte!" and personal honour" bar defamatory statements.
4 3 Manipulation of data resulting in damage to a computer system
In terms of section 303 (a) StGB, whoever unlawfully erases,
suppresses, renders useless or alters data may be punished. Data is defined
in section 202 (a) of the StGB as "data stored or transmitted electronically,
magnetically or otherwise in a not immediately perceivable manner". Section
303 (a) of the StGB was created because the general offence against
property damage only covers the destruction or damaging of material objects.
The legal interest protected by this provision is the unimpaired disposability of
data by the right holder, i.e. others are excluded from the utilisation of that
data without consent of the right holder.
In contrast, section 303 (b) StGB144 deals with computer sabotage,
which is the interference in the processing of data either in such manner as
mentioned in section 303 (a) (1) StGB or by destroying, damaging, rendering
it useless, or by removing or altering a data processing or storage unit.145
Section 303 (b) of the StGB protects the right of private enterprises and
public administrations to run their computers without malicious mterventlon.l"
Computer sabotage is a special case of data alteration and results in a more
142 Gesetz Ober die Verbreitung jugendgefahrdender Schriften und Medieninhalte (GjS).
143 Insult, malicious gossip, defamation (sections 185, 186, 187 StGB).
144 303 (b) Computer sabotage
(1) Anybody who interferes with a data processing activity which is of vital importance to
the business or enterprise of another or a public authority by
1. committing an offence under section 303 (a) subsection 1 or
2. destroying, damaging, rendering unusable, removing or altering a data processing
system or carrier shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine.
145 Dreher & Trëndle Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze Kommentar (1995) Section 303 (b),
5.
146 ibid Section 303 (b), 2.
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severe punishment. Only if the data processing function of the computer is of
vital importance for a business or enterprise, 303 (b) (1) no. 1 applies instead
of 303 (a) StGB. It is disputed whether § 303 (b) (2) no. 2 only applies, if the
data processing unit or some data storing device is physically damaged, or
whether it applies also to the implantation of a computer virus program. If the
virus has direct damaging effects on the computer hardware this can be
adrnltted.!"
Also data spying, section 202 (a), is an offence under German criminal
law.148 The legal interest protected by this provision is the formal right to
disposability, i.e. the right holder has a right to determine whom has access to
the information contained in the data. The incriminated act is defined as
procuring data for the advantage of oneself or another. This means that the
control over the information must shift to the offender, but it need not
necessarily lead to a complete loss of control on the side of the right holder.
It must be emphasised that simple hacking is not generally punishable in
Germany. Instead, there is a lack of a criminal provision against illegal access
to computer systems (hacking). The question whether the illegal access to a
computer system without any data alteration or computer sabotage - usually
referred to as hacking - is punishable under 202 (a) StGB is hotly disputed in
German scholarship. The majority of the literature answers in the negative.149
This is explained with an explicit statement in the legislative report on the
147 Trëndle & Fischer Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze Kommentar (2001) Section 303
~bJ,7.
4 Data spying, § 202 (a)
(1) Anybody who without authorisation procures for himself or another person data, which are
not meant for him and which are specially secured against unauthorised access, shall be
punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine
(2) Data within the meaning of subsection (1) shall be deemed to be only those which are
stored or transmitted electronically, magnetically, or in any other not directly perceptible way.
149 Lackner & KOhl Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2001) Section 202 (a), 5; SchOnke &
Schroder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2002) Section 202 (a), 1O.
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revision of the German Criminal Code in 1986, which says that merely
intruding into a computer system without authorisation was not punishable.P''
The legislature created the provision as part of its legislative efforts against
rising commercial delinquency.l'" However, German legal literature152
suggests that there is no obvious reason why simple hacking should be
played down compared to other computer attacks.P"
The wording of section 202 (a) of the Criminal Code lends itself also to a
different interpretation. Committing information contained in a certain data file
to memory implies already a procurement of data. Now, upon successfully
overcoming the specific protection of a computer system, the hacker
automatically gets to know messages from the computer's operation system.
If the perceived data contain information (e.g. a password, a file directory, a
list of the stored mails), and the hacker memorises it, the intrusion would
include a procurement of data and, thus, fit the definition given. There is, as
yet, no case law on this particular topic. If data files are opened (e-mail, data
sheet, text) and memorised or copied, section 202 (a) of the German Criminal
Code applies in any case.
44 Sexually explicit materials and (child) pornography
150 BT-Dr.1 0/5058, 28.
151 When the lawmaker proposed the provision in 1986, he expressed the opinion that
hacking was only an act preparatory to offences like computer fraud and a field of activity for
computer-crazy kids (see: BT-Drs. 10/5058, 28).
152 Sieber "Computerkriminalitat und Informationsstrafrecht" 1995 CR 103.
153 In an issued report to the parliament, the Federal government concluded that there is no
immediate need for a revision of the Criminal Code provisions related to computer crimes. It
stated that the international developments will be carefully studied; this will eventually lead to
amendments to the Criminal Code, especially regarding the illegal access to computer
systems (www.bundesregierung.de).
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Sex sells, and therefore pornography on the Internet has lately received
a tremendous amount of public scrutiny. Pornographic images of all variations
are available on the Internet. However, many state and federal criminal
statutes prohibit the sale and distribution of obscene rnaterial.l'" Websites
with "sexual" content are not generally forbidden, except where child
pornography or so-called "hardcore" pornography is concerned.
Pornography, and particularly child pornography, is a worldwide problem
on the Internet. Almost half of all searches made using Internet search
engines are seeking pornographic material.155 For this reason, the Internet is
often termed a "heavily used red light district".156
4 4 1 Definition of pornography
The term "pornography" is unfortunately very ambiguous. There is no
agreed upon definition for (child) pornography in the multinational
environment of the Internet, where cultural, moral, sexual, social and legal
variations of the entire world make it difficult to define pornographic content in
a manner that is acceptable for all.157
In the German legal system, pornographic literature and illustrations are,
according to the original explanation of the legislature, pornography when
154 For example in German section 184 StGS; UK Obscene Publications Act 1959;
Communication Decency Act USA; Films and Publications Act South Africa.
155 Lloyd Information Technology Law (1997) 219.
156 For a collection of materials on the topic see
www2000.orgsm.vanderbilt.edu/cyberporn.debate.cgi.
157 "The regulation of pornography and child pornography on the Internet",
elj.warwick.ac. uk/jiltx97 -1aKDZldefault.
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they exclusively or mainly intend to serve as a "sexual stimulus".158 In
addition, the material is pornographic when it clearly oversteps the border of
"sexual decency".159 Jurists have however criticised this definition, as it does
not correspond with the present moral standards and values of society and it
is not a clear guide.16o
In Germany, representations (writings, broadcasting etc.) with sexual
contents fall under the nomen collectivum of pornoqraphy'" So-called
"hardcore" pornography refers to material dealing with acts of violence, the
sexual abuse of children or sexual acts with anlmals.l'" Section 184 (1) StGB
aims at the protection of children and young person. After the entry into force
of the Informations- und Kommunikationsdienstegesetz163 (luKD) 1997,
section 184 StGB was modified through the luKD. Under the new regulations
photomontages including child pornographic elements are regarded as
"hardcore" pornography.
"Simple" pornography is defined as "a raw presentation of sex in a
drastic and direct way, which reduces the human being to an object of sexual
desire".164 In Germany the isolated presentation of genitals or the simple
representation of sexual intercourse is normally not seen as pornography.
4 4 2 Pornographic writings
158 BT-Drs. VI/1552; Dreher & Trëndle Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze Kommentar
~1995) Section 184,6.
59 ibid.
160 ibid.
161 See section 119 (3) Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (Administrative Offence Act).
162 SchOnke & SchrOder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2002) Section 184, 4.
163 Law to Regulate Conditions for Information and Communication Services.
164 The German legislature decided to restrict the publication of "simple" pornography
because of the enormous significance of the Basic Right of Article 5 of the German
Constitution (freedom of expression), BT-Drs. VI 1552, 33, VI 3521, 58.
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The central term of the pornography offences defined in section 184
StGB is the term "pornographic writing". The term "writing" is defined in
section 11 (3) StGB and includes sonic and pictorial recordings as well as
illustrations and other representations.l'" The coming into effect of the
Informations- und Kommunikationsdienstegesetz (Law to Regulate Conditions
for Information and Communication Services) in 1997 broadened the
definition of the term to include "data storage".166
4 4 3 Offering and providing access to pornography
Whoever brings a person under the age of 18 years into contact with
pornography can be punished under section 184 (1) no. 1 and no. 2 StGB.167
German criminal law punishes the advertisement, transfer and the access to
pornographic material if the "customer" is younger than 18 years old.
It is not necessary for the young person to actually take notice of the
pornographic material. On the Internet, "making the content of a website
accessible" occurs when the electronically saved information can be called up
165 Lackner & KOhl Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (1999) Section 11, 3.
166 In its original meaning, the term "writing" was based on the printed representation thereof
and the traditional form of communicationg information. The Informations- und
Kommunikationsdienstegesetz (Law to Regulate Conditions for Information and
Communication Services) closed the loophole in the law and filled the "liability gap".
Presently, the term ,,"writing" includes electronic, electromagnetic, optical, chemical and other
forms of data storage (see: ST-Drs. 13/7385, 36. With the Informations- und
Kommunikationsdienstegesetz, specially geared to the legal problems connected with the
Internet and its misuse, regulations about the liability of providers were created for the first
time anywhere in the world).
167 Section 184 Dissemination of Pornographic Writings
(1) Whoever, in relation to pornographic writings (section 11 (3)):
1. offers, gives or makes them accessible to a person under eighteen years of age,
2. displays, posts, presents or otherwise makes them accessible at a place accessible to
persons under eighteen years of age (...) shall be punished with imprisonment for not more
~anoneyearorafine.
55
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
and can be seen on the screen.168 This does not include situations where the
young person obtains the specifically secured pornographic material through
criminal means or illegal access.!"
444 Dispatch businesses
Section 184 (1) no. 3 and no. 4 StGB prohibits the advertising or
transferring of pornoqraphy."" The accessibility of pornography is being
granted whenever a homepage or a newsgroup offering pornographic material
will be set up, enabling the access to the corresponding contents. The reason
for the strict approach towards dispatch-businesses is that there is no
trustworthy and reliable age-control system. As a result of this, pornographic
adverts are not permitted on German servers, regardless how safe the access
control of the web server may be.171
4 4 5 Public adverts of pornography
It is also forbidden to publicly advertise pornographic writings to persons
under the age of 18 years.!" Under German criminal law, pornographic
168 OlG Stuttgart NStZ 1992, 38. BVerwGE 85, 169, 175f ..
169 Punishment is excluded for example when a sealed parcel is opened (see: OlG Karlsruhe
NJW 1984, 1975-1976).
170 Section 184
(1) Whoever, in relation to pornographic writings:
1. (...) offers or gives them to another (...) through a mail-order business (...);
2. undertakes to import them by means of a mail-order business (...) shall be punished.
171 Stromer Online-Recht (1997) 93.
172 Section 184
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suppliers are allowed to attract the attention of web users and inform them
that they hold in reserve an offer for adults only. It is however not permissible
to indicate on the "entry page" that this offer contains pornoqraphy.!" The
reason for the statutory prohibition of "porno advertising" on the Internet or
elsewhere is to prevent persons under 18 years of age from becoming
interested in pornographic materials and to prevent their attention being
attracted to the source of supply. 174
44 6 Public cinema performance
Public cinema performance for payment is illegal in Germany when it
has a pornographic content and the payment is for the performance itself
(Section 184 (1) no.? StGB). The definition of "film" is not clear in German
criminal law. The traditional meaning of the word "film" in German is "a strip
made from a material coated with a photosensitive layer" or "a sequence of
moving pictures, which are projected on a screen".175 In the German legal
literature 176"film" is defined as the "transformation of a picture and/or sound -
carrier into pictures and sounds"."? According to the predominant opinton.!"
(1) Whoever, in relation to pornographic writings:
5. publicly offers, announces, or commends them at a place accessible to persons under
eighteen years of age or into which they can see, or through dissemination of writings outside
a business transaction through normal trade outlets (...) shall be punished.
173 Schënke & SchrOder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2002) Section 184, 31.
174 BGH 34, 98,219. .
175 Ouden Das groBe Worlerbuch der deutsehen Sprache (1978) under the term "film".
176 Legal literature such as legal publications or writings of judges and academics may be
important enough to be considered as a quasi source of law, although they are not formally
recognised. The historical section emphasised the important role played by the universities in
the development of German law and so today German legal literature plays much greater role
than in common-law countries (see: Foster German legal system & laws (1996) 116).
177 Dreher & Trëndle Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze Kommentar(1995) Section 184, 24.
176 The work of highly reputable authors can carry considerable persuasive authority. This
authority is particularly enhanced when it forms part of the dominant view of a number of texts
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the prohibition does not include photos, graphics or pornographic slides.179 It
is a totally different situation, when for example a peep show is shown on the
Internet. It is questionable whether this is a "film" and is therefore punishable
under section 184 (1) no.? StGB. There may be doubts since what is actually
"broadcasted" on the Internet (for example, the peep show) has never been in
contact with celluloid, the typical film-materlat."?
4 4 7 Dissemination and possession of pornography
Whoever disseminates and/or gains possession of "hardcore"
pornography may be punished in terms of section 184 (3) no.1181 and
subsection (5) 182 of StGB.
In a case heard before the provincial high court of Bavaria (Bayrisches
Oberlandesgerichf (BayObLG)), a man downloaded child pornography and
sent it via email to five other persons.l'" It could not be established whether
these five persons actually opened the email and downloaded the
or legal writers. This is the so-called herrschende Meinung (see: Foster German legal system
& laws (1996) 121).
179 Dreher & Trëndle Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze Kommentar (1995) Section 184, 24.
180 In German criminal law the possible literal meaning of the norm marks the extreme limits
of possible judicial interpretation. This is based on the principle of prohibition of analogy
(Analogieverbot). This follows from Art. 103 (3) of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz),
which requires that a deed can only be punished if the punishment was statutorily determined
before the deed was committed. For criminal law this means that the possible literal meaning
of the norm marks the extreme limit of permissible judicial interpretation (see: BVerfGE 71,
108, 115).
181 Section 184
(3) Whoever, in relation to pornographic writing, which have as their object acts of violence,
the sexual abuse of children or sexual acts of human beings with animals:
1. disseminates them (...) shall be punished.
182 Section 184
(5) Whoever undertakes to gain possession of pornographic writings (...) which have as their
object the sexual abuse of children, if the writings reproduce an actual or true-to-live event
(...) shall be punished (annotation : the criminal intent has to be concerned with the
~ossession, i.e. possession without malice aforethought will be exempt from punishment).
83 BayObLG, resolution of June 6,2000, 5 St RR 12/00.
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pornographic attachments. The person who obtains possession of
pornographic writings (pictures) is subject to punishment even if he never took
notice of the pornographic rnaterial.l'" Knowledge of pornographic material is
not required.
Furthermore, the BayObLG had to decide whether the accused could
also be punished under section 184 (3) nO.1 StGB for the dissemination
(Verbreiten) of the pornographic material. Accordingly, the mere
dissemination of pornography is considered to be liable to prosecution.
Whether or not somebody else will take notice of the pornographic material
does not make any difference. "To disseminate" implies something real,
something physical. The literal meaning of Verbreiten is that the pornographic
material is distributed in physical form. For a long time one could be punished
for the dissemination of pornographic writings only if the storage medium itself
was dlstrlbuted.!" An alternative view is that "dissemination" is also the
transmission by electronic means, merely by way of downloading.
In 2001, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)) ruling
brought this uncertainty to an end.186 Dissemination in the sense of section
184 (3) no. 1 StGB is not only the dissemination of the data storage medium
itself but also applies if the data is transmitted via Internet and "arrives" on the
computer of the receiver, no matter if this happens through up- or
downloadtnq.?" In both opinions the term "to disseminate" in the sense of
section 184 (3) no. 1 presupposes in addition, that the pornographic material
reaches a large number of people. In the opinion of the German Federal Court
184 ComputerrechtIntern 2000, 173.
185 For example disc, CD-ROM, DVD (see: Trëndle & Fischer Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar
~2002) 44).
86 BGH -1 StR 66/01; BGHSt 13, 257; BGH CR 2002,45-46.
187 ibid; Trëndle & Fischer Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2002) 44.
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of Justice section 184 (3) no. 1 StGB is only fulfilled if the transmission is to so
many people that the "circle of those who obtain knowledge about the material
is not controllable anymore".188
The BayObLG found the accused guilty of "possession" of child
pomoqraphy.l'" not its dissemination, and he received one year and four
months of probation. Five persons received the child pornography via Internet.
In the opinion of the court, distribution to five persons is not punishable
because five persons are a controllable circle of people. In consequence of
this and the BGH's judgement, the mere possession of child pornography will
be liable to prosecution. So under German law, even a quick look at it on the
Internet is punishable, whereas the dissemination of pornography via Internet
will not invariably incur a penalty.
4 5 Infringements of copyrights
4 5 1 Criminal aspects of copyright law
In the mailbox and Internet world the unauthorised copying of computer
software is common. A copyright is a form of protection provided by German
law, as well as in most other legal systems of the world. Copyright law
(Urheberrechtsgesetz (UrhG)) protects the rights of those who create what the
law refers to as "original works of authors''."? In essence, it is a grant of
certain exclusive rights to authors in order to allow them to commercially
exploit their work (sections 15ft. UrhG). Protected works include computer
188 BGH - 1 StR 66/01.
189 Section 184 (5) StGB (see chapter 447)).
190 Definition in section 7 UrhG.
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programs (section 2 UrhG). The unlawful exploitation of computer games is
covered by section 108 (1) no.7 UrhG.
The German copyright law was amended to deal with computer crimes
in 1993 when the Second Act to Change the Copyright Law (Zweites Gesetz
zur Anderung des Urheberrechtsgesetzes, June 9,1993)191 was enacted. A
new statute came into force in Germany on September 10, 2003 in order to
address the effects of digital technologies on copyright and related rights
leqislation.l'" Apart from bringing German law in line with requirements of the
two 1996 WIPO Treaties.l'" the bill was also designed to implement the
European Union Copyright Oirective194of May 22, 2001.
The "Law to regulate copyright in the information society" as it is called
makes it illegal to reproduce copy-protected or bootlegged COs and OVOs. It
is seen as an additional tool in the fight against Internet and software piracy
and is meant to prevent people from downloading music or films from Internet
file-sharing platforms.
Given the massive lobbying by authors' and producers' associations,
representatives of consumer interests and other groups, which had already
accompanied the legislative efforts on the European scale, an exhaustive
reform in due time was almost illusory. The completion of Germany's entry
into the information age is therefore left to a so-called "Second Basket" of
copyright legislation. Preparations of the envisaged follow-up have already
191 Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBL - Federal Law Gazette), Part 1 910.
192 German Law on the Regulation of Copyright in the Information Society (Gesetz zur
Regelung des Urheberrechts in der Informationsgesellschaft), Federal Law Gazette Part I,
No. 46, September 12, 2003, 1774 - 1788.
193 WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20,1996,36 I.L.M. 76, WIPO Publ. No. 227 (E).
194 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, May 22, 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society,
O.J.L. 167,22/06/2001,10-19.
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started and are supposed to be completed by the end of 2004.195
4 5 2 MP3 and peer-to-peer
One of the most controversial topics in the area of online law is MP3
music data files.196 In the early 1990s the Frauenhofer Institut in Germany
developed the Format Moving Picture Experts Group I Audio Layer 3, better
known as MP3. Experts estimate that 80, 000 musical works are stored
without authorisation on approximately 26,000 websites. Around three billion
pirate copies of CDs and OVOs are produced in Germany every year.197
Pieces of music have always been copied since the invention of the
cassette recorder. But this earlier kind of "music piracy" took time and
involved a loss in purity of sound. The economic losses were not dramatic.
With MP3, music pieces can be copied through downloading in seconds
without losing tone quality. Since the development of MP3 the world's biggest
record companies have taken legal action against file-sharing services like
MP3.com, Napster Inc. and Gnutella because of loss of revenue.l'"
In the first conviction for MP3 piracy a 22-year-old student at the
University of Oregon was given a suspended sentence of two years with
probation under the U.S. No Electronic Theft Act (NET).199 The student had
transmitted data files worth 70,000 U.S. dollars via the university server. The
195 The German Ministry of Justice's press-release, September 16, 2003 at www.bjm.bund.de
/~er/service/pressemitteilungen/1 0000790.
1 MP3 is a digital format of encoded audio signals. These signals are digitalised by
computer and attain almost CD-quality. The controversy arises from the fact that the
downloaded music from the Internet deprives the musicians, composers, and record
companies of revenue.
197 www.dw-world.de/dwelle/cda/detail/dwelle.cda.detail.
198 www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/08/biztech/articls/31 music. html.
199 www.zdnet.co.uklnews/1999/46/ns11739.html.
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NET had been enacted in December 1997 to prevent copyright infringements
on the Internet by instituting criminal penalties.2oo
In Germany the criminal nature of downloading MP3 data files from
the Internet was a controversial question as well. There has been a tendency
to extend privilege to those persons who download music pieces for private
use only in terms of section 53 (1) of the former UrhG. Section 53 (1) UrhG
allowed, without any criminal law consequences attached, the copying of data
files for private use, i.e. its reproduction inside the domestic area or amongst
friends or other persons to whom the person who downloaded the files has a
special relationship. Private use does not apply to a disc jockey in carrying out
his profession.
Section 53 of the new German Copyright Act now sets the
conditions of what is permissible under German copyright law, regarding the
reproduction for private and other persons' uses. Despite considerable
pressure by publishers' organisations, the legislature decided to maintain the
already-existing provision in section 53 (1) UrhG, which allows private copies
to be made by other persons.P'
Today, online delivery of digital copies is a heavily contested field
of use for this provision. Under the amended section 53 (1) such a service
200 Section 2319 in conjunction with section 506 (a) United States Copyright Act (U.S.CA)
render punishable the illicit and wilful reproduction or distribution of copyrighted works, even if
the defendant acts without a commercial purpose or does not expect private financial gain.
According to the definition laid down in 17 U.S.C. § 101, the term "financial gain" includes
even the expectation of receipt of anything of value including the receipt of other copyrighted
works.
201 Under § 53 of the "new" German Copyright Act, digital private copies for domestic non-
commercial use remain permitted.
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would be permissible, provided no payment is received_2°2 By now,
reproductions are prohibited if the source is "obviously unlawful". The clause
mainly intended to prevent downloads from the so-called "peer-to-peer'v'"
platforms.204Yet, some commentators have already highlighted a snag: as the
wording draws explicitly on the way the source was produced, it could be
argued that a legally produced copy which is later merely posted on an illegal
platform, does not match this provision.205 Sooner or later, the tribunals will
have to provide clarification. In any case, the requirement for an "obviously
unlawful source" somewhat reduces the costumer's risk of unknowingly
committing a breach of law. Up to now there have not been taken any
proceedings against Internet providers of file trading sites in Germany. As for
prosecuting Internet piracy it is only the user who is brought into focus by the
German copyright law. For the first time in Germany, and in disregard of the
legal uncertainttes.i'" a German court imposed a fine of Euro 400 on a user
who offered thousands of music titles via Kazaa's file-swapping network. 207
In the USA, in Australia and the Netherlands, things are different:
the entertainment industry applying a great number of lawsuits, tries to take
proceedings against file trading sites such as Kazaa und Morpheus.i'"
In June 2004, investigators of the Australian recording industry raided
Sydney's offices of Internet file-swapping network Kazaa in search of
202 However, according to a ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice of 1999, any
delivery of copies sets off a claim to appropriate remuneration for the author which is to be
exercised by a collection society (February 25, 1999, Case no. I ZR 118/96).
203 peer-to-peer is the sharing of computer resources and services by direct exchange
between systems.
204 Demand of the Bundesrat (Upper House of German Parliament) that the Mediation
Committee be convened, May 3, 2003, Bundestag Printed Paper 15/1066, 2).
205 Luft in Wandtke/Bullinger (ed) Erganzungsband zum Praxiskommentar Urheberrechf
F003) § 53, 13.
06 See page 57.
207 Amtsgericht Potsdam, AFP, June 8,2004.
208 www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A 12994-2004jan13?language.
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evidence to support allegations of copyright infringements. In the Netherlands
and the USA, however, proceedings against file trading sites were dismissed.
The U.S. District Court in Los Angeles found that the creators of the file-
trading network Morpheus, Grokster and StreamCast should not be held liable
for copyright infringement in which users of their peer-to-peer software might
be engaged. The court decided that the two companies were not able to
directly control the files traded on networks using their software, and thus did
not substantially contribute to infringement.209
In the case of Kazaa v Buma/Stemra, the first European decision to
protect a file-swapping website against liability for copyright infringement, the
Supreme Court in the Netherlands overturned the District Court's ruling that
Kazaa was liable for copyright lnfrinqernent"? According to the Supreme
Court Kazaa was not responsible for the illegal actions of its users.i!' This
decision, as it is widely believed, does not rule that file sharing is legal. It ruled
that Kazaa could not be forced to take measures against illegal use of the
software.212
The decisions mentioned above will take effects on the entire peer-to-
peer industry. Record companies might be more prepared for licensing their
titles to file trading sites. So Apple's iTunes Music Store and Sony's Connect
try to provide against their smaller turnover rates by offering legal downloads
209 www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2004-02-06-kazaa-raid_x.htm.
210 Hoge Raad der Nederlanden's-Gravenhage LJN-nummer: AN 7253 Zaakur: C 02/186HR
~December 19, 2003); www.rechtspraak.nl/hoge_raad.
11 The Supreme Court settled the issue in 1984 ruling that Sony's Betamax video cassette
recorder had "substantial noninfringing use". As for the Betamax case the judge understood
that video cassette recorders had many noninfringing uses, and that Sony was not liable if
some of its customers also used them to make copies of copyrighted movies (Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.; 464 U.S. 417,104 S.Ct. 774 C (1984)).
212 Time will tell whether the American congress may agree to the decision. At present
experts are discussing controversially about Kazaa's facilities of stopping illegal downloads.
(www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A 12994-2004jan 13?language).
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of music titles.213 Basically however, the entertainment industry will refocus on
copyright legislation and on prosecuting individual file traders.
In principle, the Internet and related developments in technology have
altered and will continue to change profoundly the ease with which people
may engage in infringing activities. The technological advances will provide
prosecutors with novel challenges prosecuting online intellectual property
violations.
4 6 Conclusion
The above survey illustrates how activities carried out on the Internet
can infringe many different statutory provisions.
We can distinguish two different forms of crime: firstly, a classical
computer crime and secondly, a post-computer crime. As a rule, the aim in
cases of post-computer crime is no longer the influence of data or data
processing, but rather the misuse of information technology via the
dissemination of illegal content or the infringement of the rights of a third party
to this information. Computer crime arose from the use of computers as
simple "working assistants". New forms of computer crimes, the so-called
post-computer crimes, developed with the growing global exchange of
information via the Internet. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the computer
as a working assistant has entered the working world and data protection has
become an important issue. Previously unknown forms of criminality like
"hacking" or computer espionage have arisen and have been summarised
213 Deutsche Presse Agentur, June 15, 2004.
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under the term computer crimes.214 In the area of computer crimes, the main
focus was on the protection of data, data processing and protection from data
misuse of property that is restricted. These areas were recognised as being in
need of legal protection during the development of data processing. In the
area of multimedia, new forms of crimes are developing, which are no longer
comparable with the conventional offences, but exhibit other characteristics.
The spreading of information with illegal contents like pornography and the
infringement of third parties' rights, for example through software piracy (so-
called post-computer crimes)215 are now arguably bigger threats than the
attainment of a financial benefit or the manipulation of data processing.
The above survey illustrates likewise that Internet service provider like
Kazaa and Napster are mainly in the firing line for indirect infringements of
copyright. In Germany until now it is only the user of file sharing platforms who
is brought into focus by the German copyright law.
5 Criminal liability of Internet providers
The traditional thinking has been that the position of an Internet service
provider equated with that of the traditional telecommunications carrier, that it
was merely a conduit that passively allowed for the transmission of data and
was therefore not responsible for the nature or character of the data. The
simple logic behind this thought is that it would be unjust, unreasonable and
impractical to expect an Internet provider to monitor all of the services that it
may give access to, so as to safe guard against illegitimate use and or
214 Winkelbauer "Computerkriminalitat und Strafrecht" 1985 CR 40-45.
215 Barton Multimedia-Strafrecht (1999) 23-27.
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criminal activity. This is an approach that is based in true practicality. Many
Internet providers host numerous web-based services, which themselves
allow access to countless websites and services. It has often been contended
that placing such a burden on an Internet provider would adversely affect the
free flowing nature of the Internet.
A broad discussion about provider liability in terms of the dissemination
of punishable information has developed in German law. This complex area of
law can be divided into two time periods. Firstly, the period before 1997 when
liability of providers was regulated by the principles of traditional criminal law
and secondly, the period after 1997, after section 5 of the Teleservices Act
(Te/ediensfgesefz (TOG)) was enacted to specifically regulate the liability of
Internet providers.
The following chapter will illustrate, how and under what circumstances
provider liability can be determined and how the TOG should be interpreted.
Among the questions to be addressed: Should the TOG be seen as a type of
filter, which operates before ordinary criminal law is applied? Or, has it
amended traditional criminal law?
5 1 Traditional criminal liability
The liability of an Internet provider is normally based on traditional legal
principles.216 These principles include the rules about perpetration through
action (Tun) or omission (Unter/assen); guarantor's obligations217 (section 13
216 Sieber "Verantwortlichkeit von Internetprovidern im Rechtsvergleich" 1999 ZUM 198.
217 Fisher German legal system 137.
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(1) StGB, the so-called Garantenpflicht)218; and the rules of perpetration
(Taterschaft) and participation (Teilnahme). These general and fundamental
questions were discussed during the CompuServe case219 in Munich. The
principles of the act or conduct and omission were developed by the German
judiciary220 in accordance with the criterion Schwerpunkt der Vorwerfbarkeit
(basis for liability Imain emphasis of guilt)221which is still the dominant view in
German criminallaw.222
5 2 The regulation of providers in terms of German criminal law
To evaluate the actions of Internet providers in terms of criminal law, one
must first consider the quality of the acts of the alleged offender. Then the
extent of his participation in an action that is possibly punishable must be
determined.
5 2 1 Definition of conduct (positive act) and omission
All the possible Internet offences are committed through an act or an
omission. Omission (or crime through a non-action or non-act) can be
separated into genuine and non-genuine omission. A genuine omission is
218 Section 13 StGB Commission by omission:
(1) Whoever fails to avert a result, which is an element of a penal norm, shall only be
punishable under this law, if he is legally responsible for the fact that the result does not
occur, and if the omission is equivalent to the realisation elements of the crime through action.
219 AG Munchen 1998 MMR 429.
220 Dreher & Trëndle Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (1995) section 13 StGB.
221 SchOnke & Schroder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2002) section 13, 4.
222 German jurisprudence limits the act of omission on the basis of where the main emphasis
of the action lies. Let's take the case of someone who is starving: the main emphasis lies in
the omission - that is, in the omission of providing food. Another example: if I take away the
lifebelt from someone who is drowning I omit to save him, but the basis of liability lies in the
conduct - the taking away of the lifebelt.
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defined in German criminal law in section 323 (c) of the StGB.223 A non-
genuine omission is the mirror image of an offence by commission. Almost all
norms of the StGB punish illegal actions, but they include, like a mirror image,
the omission. For example, there is no difference in German criminal law
between the scenarios where a mother poisons her child (active) and letting
the child starve or drown in a swimming pool (non-genuine omission). This is
not stated as such in German criminal law, but it is considered to be the mirror
image of section 211 of the StGB (first-degree murder). An omission
corresponds to an action, if the incident would not have occurred had the
illegal omission not taken place and this can be said with a probability that
borders on certainty.224
In order to examine the liability of Internet providers, one first has to
determine, whether the activity of the provider is an act or an omission. An act
is, for example, the establishment of the Internet communication, while an
omission could be the failure to prevent the access to illegal contents on the
Internet or the failure to control certain contents. First, the case where the
Internet provider acts as a content provider and places his own contents on
the Internet will be examined. Only in this scenario is an active commission
possible.
This situation becomes problematic where the provider acts as a hosting
provider and permits someone else to store material on his computer, who
runs a computer system as an access-provider or makes it possible to
establish a connection to such servers which store illegal contents, allowing
223 Section 323 (c) StGB states that the genuine omission occurs in a situation where there is
a specific duty to render assistance to those in need in case of accident, common danger or
emergency.
224 Lackner & KOhl Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar section 13, 15.
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the user to access such contents. Here, it becomes difficult to ascertain where
the criminal liability lies.
The German judiciary prefers the normative theory. This theory states
that the distinction between an act and an omission is determined by the
Schwerpunkf der Vorwerfbarkeit (main emphasis of guilt) of the behaviour.225
This means, one must focus on the criminally relevant behaviour. For
example, on a freezing winter night someone injures a person, who
subsequently dies. The focus is on an active doing since the injury caused the
death. The focus would have been on an omission if the person had died as a
result of the cold weather and not because of the injury. In this case, the
person would have died because the offender did not offer help. A classic
example for an omission is the medical doctor who turns off a respirator. The
basis of liability in terms of normative theory is the future medical benefit,
which the patient could have received had the respirator not been turned off,
as opposed to the active "switching off" of the machine.
The author Altenhain offers another opinion.226 In his opinion, normative
theory is useless in the area of Internet law. For the application of "normative
theory" there has to be a starting point, which points to an act or an omission.
Only from such a starting point is it possible to define the quality of an action.
No such starting points can be defined regarding the mere action of providing
Internet access. He concludes that only a positive act is possible in the
access cases.
In summary, it can be concluded that the service provider cannot be held
225 Haft Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (1984) 173; BGH NJW 1953, 1924; Schënke & Schroder
Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar introductory remark section 13 StGB 158.
226 Altenhain "Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fur die Verbreitung rniêbilliqter Inhalte in
Computernetzen" 1997 CR 487.
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responsible as an active perpetrator, if he only indirectly permits access to
illegal contents on the Internet. The German judiciary and the legal doctrine
assume that the service provider, who does not manage the Internet service
himself, could in principle only be liable for omission because he cannot be
blamed for the lawful provision of a communication link or storage capacity.
The creation of the opportunity to misuse the Internet cannot result in grounds
for active perpetration, as this would open the floodgates of liability for
providers. After the establishment of the Internet services, no further legally
relevant actions are carried out by the service provider in fully automated
computer systems.227 This must be distinguished from the situation where the
service provider wilfully makes such contents available, for example in self-
managed news groups. In this case, an active commission can be identified.
Since the service provider can always be at best reproached with
omission, this problematic issue - like the question of intent and grounds for
justification - is analysed in more detail only in view of the dogmatic of
offences by omission.
5 2 2 Perpetration through omission
Internet providers can be criminally liable because of perpetration
through omission. However, in order to punish a provider for an omission, the
following preconditionsf" have to be present:
Firstly, the omission of a reasonable and possible action must be
227 Sieber "Strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fOr den Datenverkehr in internationalen
Computernetzen" 1996 JZ 499.
228 TrOndle & Fischer Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (201) introductory remark to section 24
StGB 1 (b).
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present, which is equivalent to and therefore, corresponds to an active doing.
Secondly, the effect of the criminal act must have been avoidable, had
the provider acted. He has to act only if the action is reasonable and lawful.
The dissemination of the illegal content must have been preventable with
sufficient certainty through the reasonable action of the provider.
Thirdly, the provider must have a legal duty (Garanfensfellung) to
prevent the dissemination of the illegal material. Since 1969, the legislator has
paraphrased this necessary condition for the equal status of commission and
omission by saying that the person failing to act "must be held legally
responsible for the fact that the success does not occur".
5 2 3 Position of being a guarantor
In order for a provider to be held criminally liable, he must be a so-called
"guarantor". Previously, the concept of a guarantor originated from the law of
contract, cohabitation or public statutes.229 In terms of the present doctrine,
one must differentiate between the duties to exercise proper care
(Obhufspflichfen) and the duties of supervision (Oberwachungspflichfen).230
The guarantor's duties are: firstly, the duty to guard certain objects of legal
protection and secondly, the duty to bear the responsibility for certain sources
of threats.P'
229 RG 63, 394.
230 Wessels Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (2001) 104.
231 Schënke & SchrOder Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar section 13, 9.
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5 2 3 1 Guarantor's obligation arising from preceding action
The guarantor's obligation arising from preceding action (/ngerenz) is
based upon the prohibition to injure or damage any other person.232 The
committer, or more appropriately, the non-acting perpetrator, has the
responsibility and power over the concrete source, from which the danger
emanates. It is difficult to establish a control mechanism on the Internet and it
demands considerable effort. The different options, such as filter software, will
be discussed later in this thesis.233
A real risk for the spreading of illegal contents can arise through the
running of computers. The problem is that the running itself is not unlawful in
principle, just as it is not illegal to use the Internet. With the establishing of
computer networks for the Internet, the service provider does not lay claim to
special privileges from which a special liability can arise if he does not prevent
the access to illegal contents.P" A party who "through lawful behaviour
causes the danger of a foreign criminal offence and who does not prevent this
criminal offence or does not avert the consequences of this offence,,235is not
a guarantor. This is the case if the provider lawfully opens up an Internet-
connection.
5 2 3 2 A guarantor's position resulting from general safety obligations
Guarantor's obligations to protect third-party legal interest from any
232 ibid 34.
233 See chapter 8.
234 Derksen "Strafrechtliche Verantwortung fur die in internationalen Computernetzen
verbreiteten Daten mit strafbarem Inhalt" 1997 NJW 1883.
235 OlG Këln NJW 1973, 861; BGHSt 3, 203.
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danger emanating from one's own sphere of control exist moreover for the
supervision of sources of risk the control of which is incumbent on the "non-
acting offender". This obligation is independent from certain behaviour, which
could cause a threat.236 The classic example of a guarantor's position237
emanating from a safety obligation is the operator of a nuclear power station.
He carries a safety obligation at all times, because he runs a dangerous
business and he has influence on its safety devices. The basis for such safety
obligations is the real control of a source of threat and an organisation-
authority from which other persons are excluded.238 Service providers have
the exclusive power of disposal over their servers and data networks. But this
alone is not sufficient to constitute a guarantor's position. This would
otherwise create a limitless liability, because the service providers have, in
theory, the possibility to control the contents on their nets. In practice, the
operational procedure of the provider would collapse on account of the huge
amount of data.
If he knows about illegal contents, then, a guarantor's position resulting
from a safety obligation obliges the service provider to prevent illegal contents
from becoming accessible, once he has become aware of them.
5 2 3 3 Conclusion
A guarantor's position with regard to preventing the transmission of
illegal data is only a consideration if the provider has knowledge of the illegal
236 Dreher & Fischer Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze Kommentar Section 13, 12.
237 Jager & Collardin "Die Inhalteverantwortlichkeit von Online-Diensten" 1996 CR 238.
238 Wessels Strafrecht Allgemeiner Tei/1 07.
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contents. If he has knowledge of them, he is obliged to prevent the
transmission thereof. This duty arises from Ingerenz from the moment of
becoming aware of the data and on account of a safety obligation. For
providers, a general position of being a guarantor and a general duty to check
the entire Internet content cannot be assumed.
5 2 4 Causation and criminal responsibility
In addition to a guarantor's obligation, the criminal liability for omissions
subject to a further prerequisite: the offender must fail to take an action which
is possible and reasonable for him and which would almost certainly prevent
that the elements constituting a criminal offence are fulfilled. The provider
must have the possibility to act. This means that the criminal liability for
omission first of all depends on the precondition that the non-acting person is
physically and actually in a position to take the expected action. The law
cannot mandate impossible actions.
The online provider only causes an offence by omission if he refrains
from removing illegal contents (of which he is aware) from his server and
refrains from preventing such data in an area under his control. This requires
that an effective action would in all probability have prevented the offence.
Otherwise, the provider cannot be made liable for his omission.
5 2 5 Criminal intent
For criminal liability to exist on the part of the service provider, he must
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act with criminal intent. An exception would be where liability is based on
negligence. Criminal intent can be assumed, if the provider takes no action,
although he has recognised that he has the capacity to prevent illegal
contents of which he is aware on his server.
German criminal law distinguishes between different types of intent,239
Intent can be constituted by Absicht, an intensified form of direct intention,
which may be adequately present if there is motivation, whereby the offender
desires a specific result (direkter Vorsatz), or where the offender knows or
expects the result of the action and desires this result. Another form of intent
is the Eventualvorsatz, where the offender seriously expects the result.24o
Intent is present for an offence by commission, if the service provider himself
puts illegal contents on the Internet. Intent is present for an offence by
omission, if a provider, once he identifies illegal contents or acquires
knowledge of their presence, does not act to block such data and therefore
does not prevent access to such data.
5 2 6 Unlawfulness
Where the provider has intentionally committed an offence, it must also
be unlawful, in order to be punishable. An act is unlawful if it violates the law
and cannot be excused by justifications like self defence (section 32 StGB)_241
In the area of Internet law, a criminal offence can be justified on the
basis of "permitted risk", "social adequacy" or "preservation of legitimate
239 Wessels Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (2001) 211-213.
240 Foster German legal system & laws (1996) 205.
241 Trëndle & Fischer Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2001) introductory remark to section 13,
24.
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interests". The preservation of legitimate interests (section 193 StGB) is
however only applicable to offences of insult.242 Apart from that, almost every
legally established ground of justification for unlawful conduct is applicable to
offences that can be committed on and through the Internet. If one has no
justification for his action or his commission by omission and he acts also with
culpabilitl43 he will be held liable. The principle nulla poena sine lege applies
in the German criminal law system and as such, in the area of provider
liability. Guilt, according to Section 46 (1) of the StGB, is the basis for
punishment and is determined by the ability of the offender to discern
between lawful and unlawful conduct.
5 2 7 Conclusion
Access and service providers can be held liable because of their
omission to take preventative measures against illegal contents. The judiciary
seems to be of the opinion that the liability is based on the omission, not the
active act of "opening of a communication connection" or the arrangement of
the account for an Internet user. Except in the case where a server is installed
specifically to permit the dissemination of illegal content by third parties, or to
host such illegal content, the simple setting up or operation of a server is not
in itself punishable, even if the server is used to store or transmit illegal
content, without the knowledge of the server's operator. Therefore, the basis
for liability lies in the omission of an act, where the provider - subsequent to
gaining actual knowledge - fails to take adequate steps to remove the illegal
242 Kroger & Gimmy Handbuch zum Intemetrecht (2001) 597.
243 Section 46 (1) StGB.
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content or fails to block access to such content.
A service provider may be liable under German criminal law, if he is the
author of illegal content or if he makes it accessible to the public at large. The
mere possession of child pornography can lead to liability also_244
Criminal liability of a provider as access provider has to be ruled out,
even if the technical equipment was misused by the user to spread or to make
illegal data accessible. Only if he knowingly transmits and makes such
material accessible does criminal liability becomes applicable. The same
applies to Usenet-administrators, if they knowingly make illegal contents
accessible to their users. They have a duty to erase illegal contents on their
servers and a duty to block the access to the newsgroups concerned, if they
have knowledge of such content. The criminality derives primarily from the
function of the data transmitter.
5 3 Provider liability and their modification through the TOG
One of the most important questions relating to the Internet on a national
and international basis is liability. Two typical characteristics of the Internet
make it difficult for jurists to deal with the topic of liability: its multi-functionality
and its global nature.
The risks of liability for providers have motivated the German legislature
to enact legislation to protect the future development of the Internet. As shown
above, provider liability can be determined by traditional criminal law. Why
then has Germany introduced specific Internet laws? This question will now
244 See BayObLG, chapter 447 ..
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be addressed.
The Teleservices Act (Teledienstegesetz (TOG)) was the first provider
liability law to be enacted anywhere in the world. The Teleservices Act is
applicable to the individual interactive user. The Mediendienstestaatsverlrag
(MOStV) is the liability law for services, which address the public. Both acts
regulate the liability of Internet providers. What distinguishes the
Mediendienstesttaatsverlrag from the Teledienstegesetz are the terms
"individual communication" and "mass communication". Examples for
services, which fall under the law of the MOStV, are video-an-demand and
electronic press, where journalistic articles are presented to the public. The
New York Times or the Herald Tribune online for example, would fall under
the liability law of the MOStV. An example of the TOG is individual
communication such as email, newsgroups and the World Wide Web, but also
online banking or online learning. It is difficult to distinguish between the two
in particular cases, but to apply the correct law to the correct Internet service
is unproblematic in practice, because the statutory provisions are almost
identical. For the sake of convenience and because it is more relevant in
practice, only the TOG will be discussed. Its basis - like that of the MOStV -
was the introduction of the Information and Communication Services Act
(/nformations- und Kommunikationsdienstegesetz (IuKOG)) in 1997.
The Teledienstgesetz provides for the first time a framework within which
to assess the liability of a provider. The TOG/MOStV regulate the liability of
providers for own and foreign contents.245 From this law specific
245 Koch "Zivilrechtliche Anbieterhaftung fur Inhalte in Kommunikationsnetzen" 1997 CR 193.
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characteristics have developed_246This law does not contradict the discussion
of the liability of providers presented elsewhere in the thesis. This "Internet
law" generally lays down the rules outlined in the preceding chapter. Special
regulations apply independently and in addition to the general liability
regulations of the different fields of law. In the area of criminal liability of
providers this means, that the TOG modifies the liability that arises from the
"traditional" criminal law as stated in the Criminal Code of the StGB. A
provider can only be liable if the liability preconditions according to the general
rules, as well as the rules of the TOG, have been satisfied.247 The TOG is not
lex specialis to the liability rules in German criminal law.248 Only in certain
circumstances does the TOG differ from the liability established in traditional
criminal law. This means that the TOG offers certain privileges for providers.
In other words, the TOG reduces the liability risks for providers.
In January 2002, only a few years after its enactment, the TOG had to be
adjusted to the E-Commerce-directive249. All member states of the European
Union are expected to incorporate the European directives into their national
law. Because of this, the German legislature modified the TOG. It is now
known as the E-TOG (European-TOG). Since 17 January 2002, all member
states have the same law regarding provider liability, which amends their
traditional criminal law. Germany's TOG was similar to the regulations in the
European E-Commerce-directive, which meant that few changes had to be
made to the TOG.
The following part of the thesis will illustrate how the TOG has modified
246 Bortloff "Die Verantwortlichkeit von Online-Diensten" 1997 GRUR 387.
247 BT-Drs. 13/7B85, April 9, 1997.
248 Sieber "Kontrollmëglichkeiten zur Verhinderung rechtswidriger Inhalte in Computernetzen"
1997 CR 583.
249 www.ispo.cec.be/ecommerce/legal.htm; ABI (gazette) EG 199 no. C 30/4.
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the liability of providers and what changes have occurred through the
enactment of the new E-TDG, based on the E-Commerce Directive. The "old"
TOG, the various subsections of section 5 of which documented the
possibilities of creating or avoiding liability, illustrates how the Internet law
works.
5 3 1 Section 5 TOG
On 22 November 1995, the Munich public prosecutor authorised police
to search the premises of CompuServe Germany. They suspected that child
pornography was being disseminated through newsgroups using the Internet
provider CompuServe. CompuServe Inc, USA immediately blocked these
newsgroups worldwide, since the online service was at risk of incurring
potential criminal and civil liability in Germany. In May 1998 the county court
of Munich sentenced the former managing director of CompuServe Germany
Felix Somm to two years probation and a fine of OM 100,000 for the public
distribution of pornographic writings.25o
The excited headline reactions to the CompuServe case ranged from
"Germany's Internet Angst,,251to "Efforts to control the Net abuse liberty,,252.In
1999, an appeal led to Somm's acquittal. The Landgericht (District Court)
Munich, as the appeals court, acquitted Somm on the basis of section 5 (3)
TOG (Te/edienstegesetz).253 Section 5 (3) of the TOG states that providers
who only offer a connection to foreign contents are exempt from possible
250 See introduction; AG Munchen MMR 1998, 429,438.
251 www.wired.com/news/news/E-mail/other/politics/story/12884. html.
252 www.sjmercury.com/columnists/gilmore/docs/dg052998.htm.
253 LG Munchen 1,2000 CR 117-119.
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criminal liability.
The discussion of criminal liability of providers was raised by the
preliminary investigations such as the famous CampuServe case.254 The
German legislature has since regulated the liability of online services in terms
of the luKOG (/nformafions- und Kommunikafionsdiensfegesefz). Section 5
TOG takes into account the technical characteristics of the international data
networks. The liability privilege should reduce the economic loss and loss of
reputation that resulted from the CampuServe case and other radical
prosecutions.i'"
531 1 Section 5 (1) TOG
Section 5 (1) of the TOG provides that the content provider is liable for
its own contents as with every Internet-participant. He is liable under the
general statutes (allgemeinen Gesefze), for example sections 185 ff of the
StGB.256 There are no grounds for privileges. Therefore, the producer of an
Internet newspaper is as liable as a participant of a chat forum or an owner of
a homepage.
254 Derksen "Strafrechtliche Verantwortung fOr die in internationalen Computernetzen
verbreiteten Daten mit strafbarem Inhalt" 1997 NJW 1878-1882; Sieber "Strafrechtliche
Verantwortlichkeit fOr den Datenverkehr in internationalen Computernetzen" 1996 JZ 429-
430.
255 Sieber "KontrolimOglichkeitenzur Verhinderung rechtswidriger Inhalte in Computernetzen"
1997 CR 581-582.
256 Harting Internetrecht (1999) 168.
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531 2 Section 5 (2) of the TOG: the service provider
Since August 1,1997, the liability of the host (or service) provider was
explicitly provided for in Section 5 (2) of the TOG. Examples of service
providers can be found in the music business, where the providers offer the
music of bands under contract on the Internet.
The service provider offers access to foreign contents. Under section 5
(2) of the TOG, the provider is only liable if he is aware of illegal content and if
it is technically possible and acceptable for him to block these contents. It is
important to remember that the liability of a service provider depends on
actual knowledge of the illegal content; it is not sufficient that the provider
should have known about it.257 Constructive knowledge is not enough to
create liability of a service provider. In the opinion of the AG Munich in the
CompuServe case, it was sufficient that CompuServe knew that child and
animal pornography was accessible in some Internet forums, using
CompuServe as a service provider.258 With the acquittal of Felix Somm by the
District Court Munich, it has become clear what "knowledge" according to
section 5 (2) TOG means: knowledge in the sense of dolus directus
(unmittelbarer Vorsatz). In other words, the provider knows about illegal
contents to be on his server and permits their continued presence there.
Furthermore, the blocking of the contents has to be technically possible and
reasonable. The limitation of the liability through the term "reasonable" is
necessary in order to prevent a situation where the provider would be forced
257 Stromer Online-Recht (1997) 73.
258 AG Munchen 1998 MMR 429-433.
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to incur an enormous expense to avoid the illegal contents.259 The provider
does not have to block an entire service area or suspend the service in its
entirety because of minor illegal content. The provider merely has to block
unlawful content as soon as he has positive knowledge of it, for example,
because of a complaint from a third party. Apart from this, the German
legislature did not dictate self-enforcing control obligations on the service
provider. There is no obligation for the service provider to monitor. The
provider must take steps if contents on his server clearly and identifiably
contravene the prevailing law, for example, if a customer offers child
pornography for downloading_26o
531 3 Section 5 (3) TOG: the access provider
Providers who only offer a connection to foreign contents are exempt
from punishment in terms of section 5 (3) TOG.261 The reasons behind this
provision are the above-mentioned technical facts; that the common access
provider generally has no way of controlling the data traffic on its nets.
An automatic and short-term storage of foreign contents by the user (so-
called Proxy-Cache-Storage)262 was also privileged as a result of section 5 (3)
s.2 TOG. The access provider is even exempt from punishment if he knows
259 To the motives of section 5 (2) TDG (see: ST-Drs. 13/7385, 20).
260 Stromer Online-Recht (2002) 73.
261 Section 5 TDG Responsibility
(3) Providers shall not be responsible for any third-party content to which they only provide
access. The automatic and temporary storage of third-party content due to user request shall
be considered as providing access.
262 Part of the memory of a computer. Used to store interim or current information for fast
retrival (see: Rockey The e-Commerce Handbook (2000) 254).
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about illegal Internet content to which he provides connection_263Of course,
he is not allowed to explicitly advertise such illegal content, for example with
Link-lists.264
5 3 1 4 Section 5 (4) TOG
Section 5 (4) TOG provides that any duties to block the use of illegal
content under general laws remain unaffected, insofar as the service provider
gains knowledge of such content.
Sections 5 (1) - (3) TOG presupposes Verschulden (fault) as a
precondition for the liability of a provider. Section 5 (4) of the TOG deals with
liability of omission, which is verscnutdensunebhënqiq (independent from
fault). The provider has to block the illegal site when he becomes aware of it
and if the blocking is possible and acceptable. This is an exception, because
the access provider is generally not responsible for foreign illegal content. He
must thus work actively to eliminate the illegal sites.
5 4 (Hyper) Links
The information on the Internet is chaotic. The easiest way to find a way
through the information-jungle is to set up a Hyperlink (shortened form: Link)
between related sites.
263 Spindler "Haftungsrechtliche Grundprobleme der neuen Medien" 1997 NJW 3193, 3198.
264 ibid.
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5 4 1 What is a (Hyper) Link?
A link is a reference that can be established from one point on a website
to any other site on the World Wide Web_265 Links make it unnecessary for
users to use a search engine to find a website as they allow a user to easily
proceed from one web page to another on the World Wide Web.266
5 4 2 Liability
The liability for hyperlinks has not been conclusively established in
German law. The same applies to frames.267 The German legislature has
established a privilege by enacting section 5 of the TOG.268
The case of the extreme left-wing magazine radikal and Angela
Marquardt raised the question of criminal liability for links.269 Content
providers and homepage-creators felt insecure."? An initiative on the web
called Freedom for Links arose.271The case attracted worldwide attention.272
The grounds for the prosecution of the magazine was the assistance it had
provided in distributing instructions on how to commit a crime (section 27, 130
(a) StGB) through the setting up of a link.273By setting up a link to radika/,
Angela Marquardt had committed a criminal offence according to the county
265 Rockey The e-Commerce Handbook 2000 (2000) 255.
266 www.mbendi.co.za/werkmns/net_law/guide03.htm.
267 A way of transmitting information in small data packets. Framing occurs when one displays
material from another web site within the frame in one's web page (see: Hofman Cberlaw
~1999) 92).
68 Harting Internetrecht (1999) 169.
269 Amtsgericht Tiergarten 260 Ds 857/96; 1998 MMR 49-50.
270 www.jra.uni-sb.de/jurpc/aufsatz/19980046.htm.
271 www.afs-rechtsanwaelte.de/linkhaftung.htm.
272 New York Times June 6, 1997, page 1 "Germany's effort to police the web upset
business".
273 Amtsgericht Tiergarten 260 Ds 857/96; 1998 MMR 49-50.
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court of Berlin Tiergarten. The County Court dismissed the case in June 1997,
ruling that Ms Marquardt had unknowingly supported terrorism. The court said
that she had neither installed the link nor maintained it with the knowledge of
its illegal contents. In the opinion of the court, the installation of a link without
knowledge about the content of the linked text is not illegal.
It is questionable whether setting up a link falls under section 5 (3) TOG.
The consequence would be the exemption from liability. The opinions about
liability for links are divided. Besides the radikal case, the Terrorist's
Handbook case of the BayObLG (provincial high court of Bavaria) dealt with
the important question of Iink-liability.274 The accused had a handbook for the
production of Molotov-Cocktails (also called petrol-bombs) in his mailbox. He
had found the terrorist handbook on the Internet. Another person wrote it. His
mailbox was accessible to 800 members of a computer club. The case was
dismissed. The opinion of the court was that the simple dissemination of the
text with illegal statements, which was not written by the accused, is not
punishable. He did not make use of the contents and he did not instruct
himself in the production of petrol-bombs.F" The precondition for a penalty
under the relevant section 53 (1) no. 1 of the Waffengesetz (Weapons Act)
was not fulfilled in this case because the preconditions are the asking for or
instruction in the production of flammable substances.
In 1998, the District Court (Landgericht) of Hamburg sentenced a
website owner to pay compensation for damages, because he had a link to a
foreign web page with insulting contents ("The blockhead of the month,,).276
The person pointed out that he was not responsible for the foreign content,
274 BayObLG - 4 St RR 232/97; Bay ObLG 1998 CR 564; 1998 MMR 262.
275 BayObLG - 4 St RR 232/97.
276 Landgericht Hamburg 1998 CR 565.
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but this argument did not satisfy the court_277By the legal decision, the District
Court decided that one might be responsible for the contents of the linked
page as a result of the creation or making available of links. According to the
District Court this can only be prevented if the authors distance themselves
clearly from these contents and declare that they do not have influence on the
linked contents. The web site owner who had linked to the foreign web page
was sentenced to pay compensation for the damage caused.278 A comment
that not he as the linking person but the author of the text shall be liable does
not suffice. One has to distance oneself clearly. But the court did not provide
an answer to the question of how exactly one can distance oneself clearly
from the content to which one sets up links.
The two cases about links with two entirely different outcomes increased
the insecurity of the net-community. In the case of the Terrorist's Handbook,
the court could not find evidence that the perpetrator intended to provide
guidance for the production of Molotov-Cocktails and the simple transmission
of a data program is not punishable according to the District Court Hamburg.
In the court's judgment the crime of instructional guidance for the production
of weapons" is an offence that can only be committed by means of a
statement (lwsserungsdelikt) , not by simple dissemination
(Verbreitungsdelikt). The action in the case of crimes like criminal instructions
for the production of weapons or insult and defamation lies in the criminal
remark. On the other hand, the illegality of dissemination crimes lies in making
277 Landgericht Hamburg 312 085/98.
278 In Germany it is possible to sentence a person to pay compensation for damage, as if for a
civil injustice if there is also a relevant connection to criminal law. In this case, the insult
(section 186 StGB (malicious gossip)) violated the civil-law-relevant offence of an attack on
one's honour as a loss of one's civil rights.
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illegal contents accessible.279
It is important to determine whether the "link" person himself expresses
a disclaimer in setting up a link or approves of the insult on the web page. In
the Blockhead of the month case ("D-Depp des Monats"), the court ruled that
the website owner had not really disassociated himself from the insulting
foreign content.
Dissemination of pornography is a different situation. In this case it is
sufficient grounds for prosecution if the dissemination of pornographic writings
is supported through a link, independent of the will to disseminate. The criteria
for criminal liability are satisfied if the linking person knows about the
forbidden content on the Internet, but nevertheless sets up a link to this
page.28D Simply providing access to the Internet and to newsgroup servers
with illegal content is not punishable in terms of section 5 (3) TOG. This is why
the decision of the County Court Munich of May 28, 1998 against the former
manager of CompuServe Germany was considered to be incorrect and why
the District Court Munich 1 later acquitted him.281
5 5 Conclusion
Section 5 TOG is the prototype Internet law. It regulates the liability of
Internet providers. The liability of providers depends on the function of the
provider. This law takes into account the role of providers and aims primarily
at the author of illegal content.
279 Trëndle & Fischer Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar (2001) section 74 (d), 5.
280 See chapter 5 3.
281 See chapter 3 1 33 (CompuServe-case).
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6 European initiatives and the E-Commerce Directive
The EU-directive for electronic transactions (E-Commerce Directive) was
approved by the European Parliament on 4 May 2000 and came into force on
July 17, 2000 with its promulgation in the official gazette.282
Articles 12-15 of the directive contain specific regulations for the liability
of Internet providers.283 With the enactment of the directive, the different
regulations for the liability of providers in the various European countries were
harmonised at a European level.284The goal of this directive is to protect the
freedom of providing services. The directive is primarily designed to create
exemptions from liability. These are valid for the intermediaries on both the
criminal and the civil level. It is important to note, that the directive recognises
that intermediaries have no positive obligation to seek out and monitor illegal
information, while simultaneously acknowledging that service providers have
a duty to act under certain circumstances, in order to prevent illegal activity.
6 1 Scope of application
Providers285 are defined in Article 2 (Providing an information society
service)286.287An "established service provider" is defined in Article 2 (c) as "a
282 www.ispo.cec.be/ecommerce/legal.htm.
283 ABI (gazette) EG 199 nr. C 30/4.
284 Landfermann "Der Richtlinienvorschlag Elektronischer Geschaftsverkehr - Ziele und
Probleme" 1999 ZUM 795 (800); Geis "Die Europaische Perspektive der Haftung von
Informationsanbietern und Zertifizierungsstellen" 1999 CR 772-774.
285 Article 2 (b) "service provider": a natural or legal person providing an information society.
286 Article 2 (a)"information society service": services within the meaning of Article 1 (2) of
Directive 98/34/EC amended by Directive 98/48/EC, as (1) normally for remuneration, (2) at a
distance means that the service is provided without the parties being simultaneously present,
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service provider who effectively pursues an economic activity using a fixed
establishment for an indefinite period. The presence and use of the technical
means and technologies required to provide the service do not, in themselves,
constitute an establishment of the provider". Even providers, who offer the
service of hosting homepages free of charge to private persons and finance
themselves by means of advertising, are service providers as anticipated in
the directive. For the member states there is no obligation to extend the
liability-privileges for providers of private homepages or universities.
The directive only regulates the liability of service providers with regard
to contents of a third party, but not to their own content.
Art. 12-14 of the E-Commerce Directive deals with information, which is
published on the Internet by a "recipient of the service" (user)_288 "Recipient
of the service" of an information society service is also a person, who uses
this service to offer information to others as defined in Art. 2 lit. (d). The
directive does not regulate every kind of service presently known, but only the
simple transmission (Art. 12), the caching (Art. 13) and the hosting (Art. 14) of
data. It omits any protection of furnishing information location tools such as
directories and hypertext links, helpful communication tools which make the
Internet easier to use and are distinct from the provision of content.289
(3) by electronic means: (... ) the service is sent initially and received at its destination by
means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage
of data, and entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by optical means
or by other electromagnetic means, no CD-ROMs, telephone or fax; and (4) at the individual
request of the recipient of the services means that the service is provided through the
transmission of data on individual request, not television, radio, teletext.
287 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down a
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations
and of rules on information society services.
288 "Recipient of the service" Article 2 (d): any natural or legal person who, for professional
ends or otherwise, uses an information society service, in particular for the purpose of
seeking information or making it accessible.
289 See chapter 6 1 1.
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The case of the mere conduit, covering both the transmission and the
provision of access, is dealt with in Article 12.290 It establishes an exemption
from liability as regards the provision of information society services, which
consists in the transmission of information in communication networks
whereby the service provider plays a passive role as a conduit of information
for third parties (the recipients of the service). This liability exemption covers
cases in which a service provider could be held directly liable for an
infringement and cases in which a service provider could be considered
secondarily liable for someone else's infringement, for example as an
accomplice. As for the types of activities covered by this Article, the provider
cannot be subject to prosecution in a criminal case.
When the service provider is transmitting its own information, it can no
longer be considered to be performing a mere-conduit activity as an
intermediary. The same holds if the provider itself modifies the information
during the course of the transmission. An exemption from liability will be
granted if and when the intermediary does not play any active role in the
transmission of the information, neither with regard to the origin (he must not
have made the decision to perform the transmission), nor with regard to the
destination (as he does not select those to whom the transmission is
addressed), nor with regard to its content (he acts merely as a vehicle, which
does not make any selection). Transient and intermediate storage taking
290 Article 12 - Mere conduit:
1) Where an information society service that consists of the transmission in a communication
network of information provided by the recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a
communication network, Member States shall provide in their legislation that the provider of
such a service shall not be liable, otherwise that under a prohibitry injunction, for the
information transmitted on condition that the provider
a) does not initiate the transmission,
b) does not select the receiver of the transmission and
c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.
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place during the transmission of the information in order to carry it out is
covered by the mere-conduit exemption. Only those acts of storage which
take place during the course of transmitting the information and do not serve
any other purpose than carrying out the communication will benefit from
exemption. These acts of storage do not include copies made by the provider
for the purpose of making the information available to users. This case is
addressed on caching, Article 13. The term "automatic" refers to the fact that
the act of storage occurs in the ordinary operation of the technology. The term
"intermediate" concerns to the fact that the storage of information is made in
the course of the transmission. The term "transient" refers to the fact that the
storage is for a limited period of time.
Art. 13 deals with caching activity,291 which is an indemnity against
liability, and is comparable with section 5 (3) s.2 TDG.292 The community
directive identifies some conditions for exemption in the event of automatic,
intermediate and temporary storage of information, if this is done for the sole
purpose of improving the efficiency of the information's further transmission
to other recipients of the service upon their request. The provider is mainly
obliged to abstain from such actions in which any obligation is combined with
a further obligation to respect the rules and standards relating to access of the
291 Article 13 - Conditions
a) The provider does not modify the information
b) The provider complies with conditions on access to the information
c) The provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a
manner consistent with industry standards
d) The provider does not interfere with technology, consistent with industry standards, used to
obtain data on the use of the information
e) The provider acts expeditiously to remove or to bar access to the information upon
obtaining actual knowledge of one of the following
- the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network
- access to it has been barred
- a competent authority has ordered such removal or barring.
292 5 (3) s. 2 TDG: The automatic and temporary storage of third-party content due to user
request shall be considered as providing access.
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information and its updating.293 Liability can normally be avoided by checking
up regularly that user's server in order to up-date the information of the
service provider's server. The Internet service provider must remove,
therefore, the outdated information as soon as he obtains acknowledge that
the information has been removed from website or access has been disabled.
Article 14 holds the most important rule_294Art. 14 deals exclusively with
the liability relating to information stored on request of the user. This
regulation is similar to the section 5 (2) hosting-regulation of the TOG.295
Comparing the seemingly similar wording "actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information" in the directive and "knowledge of such content" in section 5
(2) TOG, the Internet provider is only liable if he has actual knowledge of the
illegality. There is no criminal liability if the provider, upon obtaining
knowledge of illegal activity, acts expeditiously to remove or disable the
access to the information. This principle provides a basis for notice-and-take-
down procedures, and parties may identify and follow for notifying the service
provider about information, which is the subject of illegal activity in order to
obtain its removal or disablement.
The "actual knowledge" standard under Article 14 can be a problematic
basis for criminal liability arising from the activities of third party Internet users.
For example, a low level employee of a service provider who receives a
293 No influence on the content transmitted and no interference with the technical system.
294 Article 14 - Hosting
1. An information society service consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient
of the service, and the Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for
the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as
regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances of which the legal activity
or information is apparent; or
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove
or to disable access to the information. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of
the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider.
295 See chapter 5 3 1 2.
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complaint to superiors could trigger criminal liability for the corporation. In
view of the fact that most service providers often receive contents from
millions of content providers on their servers and also have large numbers of
legally unsophisticated customer service support representatives available at
any hour who may receive such complaints, criminal liability under these
circumstances is not appropriate in case of absent other evidence of criminal
intent. 296
As the Commission developed substantive criminal standards for
computer-related crime, it should have made clear for these offences that an
intermediary service provider is not liable for content created or developed by
users.
6 1 1 No regulation for the liability of (Hyper) Links in Europe
The liability of providers for links, providers of search engines and
indexes was deliberately not regulated in the directive. In terms of Art. 21 (2),
this liability is explicitly reserved for a later adjustment of the directive, as no
general consensus was reached during the legislative process. Contrary to
Section 5 of the TDG297, which was drafted in comprehensive language, the
liability rules in the directive are formulated in a technically specific manner.
This makes it impossible to include a link-liability through the extensive
interpretation or by drawing an analogy, which German jurists thought
possible, although link-liability has not legally been settled as such.298
The European member states are consequently free to create their own
296 Freytag "Providerhaftung im Binnenmarkt" 2000 CR 608.
297 See chapter 5 3.
298 Harting Internet-Recht (1999) 169-170.
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liability norms to regulate the liability for hyperlinks and search engines. This
may lead to enormous complications in the common market.
6 1 2 Conclusion
The Directive limits the liability of Internet service providers when they
act as online intermediaries, by setting forth exceptions fore mere conduit,
caching and hosting. The limitations apply to both civil and criminal liability. In
order to benefit from one or more of the exceptions, certain conditions must
be fulfilled. For example, in order to benefit from the liability exemption for
hosting, the service provider must have no actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information.F" When the service provider obtains such knowledge, he must
act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information in order to
avoid liability.
The Directive aims at specific activities or functions rather than particular
categories of operators. As a result, Internet service providers that provide a
wide variety of service, only some of which fall within the definition provided in
Articles 12-14, would still benefit from the Directive's provisions on liability, but
only with regard to those services that can be characterized as online
intermediary activity. The Directive does not address the liability of providers
for hyperlinks or search engines. These activities will still be subject to the
diverging regulatory approaches of the Member States.
The terms liable and liability in the directive are, similarly to the German
law, to be interpreted in the sense of to be responsible for an infringement of
299 As regards claims for damages: awareness of facts or circumstances from which the illegal
activity or information is apparent, Article 14 (1) (b).
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rights. In German law, the regulation of criminal liability has been a main area
of focus for the German legislature through the creation of laws to regulate the
Internet.
Although criminal law is not within EU-competence, criminal liability falls
under the directive. The member states have the freedom to create their own
criminal law. Criminal law aspects can however become part of EU laws,
without having to challenge the autonomy of the member states in this matter,
if their regulations are necessary for the function and realisation of the
common market.
The directive is not applicable to providers in non-EU-countries. It was
intended to be enacted into the national law of the member nations before 17
January 2002. Where this did not occur, the liability-regulations of the
directive became directly applicable as a result of the so-called self-executing-
nature of European directives. The directive represents the foundation of a
European-wide means of regulating electronic commerce and offers a legal
framework for this. Problems with non-EU-countries still exist, although the
European unification process and the directive formed a basis for a step-by-
step evolution of closer co-operation between the respective national legal
systems and hence, pragmatic improvements in the regulation of this liability.
This demonstrates that no sovereign country will lose its own legal traditions
in the process.
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62 The E-TDG: the new Internet law
As already mentioned, the European Internet liability directive did not
change much in the TOG. The regulations in the "new" Internet law are
however more accurately formulated.
6 2 1 Content provider
As in the "old" TOG (section 5 (1) TOG), providers are criminally liable in
terms of section 8 E-TOG (section 8 deals with the general principles) for any
content that they generate, just like every Internet participant who places
illegal contents on the net. Providers have no duty to supervise the data they
transmit and store. They also do not have to search for circumstances that
point to or indicate an illegal activity. This is one of the most important
provisions of the E-Commerce Oirective. In other words: the law allows the
provider to renounce control. If a provider controls and gains knowledge about
illegal content or places illegal content on the net, then he is clearly criminally
liable. This liability flows from the general principles of traditional criminal
law.30o It must be noted that this provision provides for a legal privilege for the
host- and access provider.
6 2 2 Access Provider
In terms of section 9 of the E-TOG, providers are not criminally liable
under certain circumstances for foreign content that they transmit or to which
300 See chapter 5 1 ff ..
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they offer access. These circumstances include the situations where the
provider has not initiated the transmission, the provider does not select the
addressee of the information and the provider has not selected or altered the
transmitted information.
The provider is privileged because he does not influence the information
in any way. An automatic and brief caching of third party content due to a user
query (in particular in so-called proxy-cache servers) therefore also enjoys
this liability privilege by being classified as access provision from a functional
viewpoint.
The above does not apply in terms of section 9 (1) of the E-TDG where
the provider works together with one of his users with the intention of
committing a crime. This provision corresponds to the former section 5 (3)
TDG. Besides the provision of access, the sending of email and the routing
thereof are also privileged. This does not apply where a provider stores an
email for a longer period, for example in his archives. In this case, he
becomes a host-provider in terms of section 11 E-TDG.
623 Cache
Section 10 of the E-TDG regulates the temporary storage of information.
This kind of storage is necessary for the communication between the network
users, particularly in the case of caching of information. Under section 10 of
the E-TDG, providers are not liable for foreign information, which they store
for a user if they have no knowledge of the unlawful activity or content.
Alternatively, providers become active as soon as they obtain actual
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knowledge of the information and erase it or prevent access to it. This rule is
not applicable if the user is subordinated to the provider or is supervised by
him.
6 2 4 Host or Service Provider
Section 11 does not list liability criteria but enumerates the preconditions
for the limitation for service providers. The provider shall not be liable for the
simple transmission and automatic short-term storage of foreign contents. A
service provider stores foreign information on his computers and offers
access to information to a third party. The extensive provision of section 11 E-
TOG states that providers who store data only for the purpose of enabling the
efficient transmission of foreign information are not liable if they do not alter
the information or immediately take steps to erase illegal information or block
the access to the information.P'" Only if the provider gains actual knowledge
that he stores illegal contents is he required to erase or to block the access to
them. Under this provision a service provider could never be liable if he has
absolutely no knowledge about illegal contents on his server. If he knows
about the content of certain data on his server, the provider can only be held
liable if he knows that the content contravenes the law.302
6 2 5 (Hyper-) Links, peer-to-peer systems and search engines remain
301 Eck & Ruess "Haftungsprivilegierung der Provider nach der E-Commerce-Richtlinie" 2003
MMR 363-366.
302 ibid.
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unregulated by law
In 1996 when the TOG was enacted the German legislature did not take
note of the problem relating to links. This non-regulation was based on the
ignorance at the time regarding the technical (and criminal) possibilities on the
net.303 Since then the legislature has recognised the problem and is in the
process of creating a statutory provision for links. The European member
states are allowed to regulate link-liability thernselves.P'" A direct application
of the liability privileges does not come into play, since the statutory provisions
of the E-TOG do not apply to links.
The same applies for peer-ta-peer systems (P2P). One can further
distinguish between centralised and decentralised peer-ta-peer systems.
Centralised P2P systems like Naptster place all information on a central
server. The registered users receive the file information at the server's
disposal. There is in principle no difference to the query of a search engine.305
Centralised non-genuine P2P systems like Napster are bare search
engines, however one can take this example to highlight a special
characteristic of this form of search engine: Napster for example never
examines contents of the averaged files. Liability for adopted content or
intellectual liability could merely occur on the basis of the file name. As there
is no real intellectual connection to the file name or to the provided content,
303 www.bundesregierung.de/Gesetzgebung.
304 See chapter 6 1 1.
305 The only genuine P2P system is the decentralised P2P. Queries by users are answered by
a third party computer, which is registered with the P2P and contains the actual information.
Decentralised P2P systems can be technically qualified as a kind of closed network, although
it is publicly accessible. The approved files of all computers, which receive the retrieval query,
are also evaluated. Providers like Gnutella or Morpheus are therefore not information
intermediaries; they only deal with a program, which allows locating information on computer
networks.
102
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the only possible form of liability would be a liability as a technical distributor.
The users of decentralised genuine P2P systems are undoubtedly responsible
for contents stored on their computers. However, there can be no liability of
the provider for results of his information-averaging program as these search
results are, as those of Napster and other search engines, an accumulation of
lP addresses. Neither is liability possible for the users of this software, as the
results of the search engines are not made available to other users.
Liability for links and search engines can only be determined by applying
traditional criminal law. Similar rules will have to be applied to those
techniques, which have been developed in the last few years. No liability
exists for linked contents, if the link provider is unaware of the linked content.
If he however installs the information himself, he can be held criminally liable.
The ongoing discussion surrounding liability for links in Germany and the
European Union shows that the legislation could be desirable to clarify this
legal question. An example of such legislation can be found in South Africa.306
6 2 6 Conclusion
In principle, the degree of liability fixed in section 5 TOG and its
subparagraphs has been retained. The liability privileges set out in sections 8-
11 E-TOG are applicable for commercial and non-commercial providers alike.
Like the "old" TOG, the sections of the E-TOG have a filter-function and partly
exempt providers from the liability relating to illegal activities and information
of third parties. The German legislature also intended to privilege
306 Section 76 ECTA (only for civil liability (see: chapter 7 1 3).
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infringements of copyrights to make them also the object of the new TOG.
7 Internet law and its regulation in the world
The liability of Internet providers is a novel problem just like the Internet
itself is a new medium. Conclusions can therefore only be drawn from legal
systems in which these questions have been determined by special laws. It is
important to compare the different laws and create international harmony
between the laws to prevent the distortion of competition and "criminal law
liability dumping" (judicial units countries, states, cities seeking to attract
business at the expense of other, competing, units by offering a less rigorous
legal code). Fortunately, in the European Community, Internet law has been
standardized since January 2002.
Since this thesis focuses primarily on German criminal law, the
comparative analysis is intended to only give a short overview of various
jurisdictions and regulations in the American legal system. Considering the
criticism of earlier legal practice it is important to examine the treatment of
these new legal phenomena in other countries. A common ground must be
found in order to regulate Internet liability internationally, which is desirable,
and to create uniform control methods to combat crime online. A common
ground is also needed for all legal systems with regard to cyber offences that
will be prosecuted worldwide.
7 1 Liability of Service providers in South Africa
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The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA) came into
force on August 30, 2002, as per Regulation 68 of 2002.307The Act is a very
broad piece of legislation, reflecting the previous lack of legislative direction
on many of the important and pressing e-commerce issues including the
validity of electronically concluded agreements, the legal validity of electronic
data, the admissibility of electronic documents in courts of law and the legal
status given to electronic signatures. It also deals with issues which are either
unique to an electronic environment or which are needed to provide legal
certainty. The sections of the law, which are most interesting for the purposes
of this thesis, will be pointed out in chapter XI (Limitation of liability of service
providers)308 and chapter XIII (Cybercrime) of the ECTA. As in German law,
the ECTA does not affect criminal or civil liability in terms of traditional law -
respectively in the case of South Africa, the common law.309
7 1 1 Chapter XIII of the ECTA
Chapter XIII of the Act contains the first statutory provisions on
cybercrime in South African law. The chapter establishes several computer-
related offences like unauthorised access"? to data, interceptiorr'" of or
interference312 with data, computer-related extortion, fraud and forgery
(apparently aimed at preventing interference with commercial activities
307 See the ECTA under www.acts.co.za/documents.
308 In this chapter, "service provider" means "any person providing an information system
service" (section 70 ECTA).
309 About the background of common law liability see Prof. Coenraad Visser "South Africa:
New Liability Regime for ISPs" 2003 Computer Law Review International issue 3, 94.
310 Section 86 ECTA ,for example "hacking" and trading in passwords used to commit an
offence (see: Guide to the ECTA www.michlsons.com).
311 ibid, or example denial of service attacks or tapping into data flows.
312 ibid, for example computer viruses.
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conducted under the ambit of the Act).
The term "unauthorised access to data" (section 86 (1) ECTA), which
seeks to outlaw, the "hacking" of databases is of particular interest. The
person who is "hacking" has to act intentionally. The Act for the first time
makes hacking itself a criminal offence, whether or not data is interfered with
in the process.
The Act also states that the unlawful production, distribution and use of
devices and applications designed primarily for the purpose of overcoming
data protection security measures are punishable offences. Who performs
any of those acts with regard to a password, access code or any other similar
kind of data with the intent to unlawfully utilise such item to contravene section
86 is punishable (section 86 (3) ECTA). While the wording of the Act suggests
that such actions must be done with intent, this is not expressly stipulated.
The penalties are fixed in Section 89 ECTA. The Act punishes less
serious offences313 with a fine and/or imprisonment of up to 1 year and more
serious oftences?", with a fine and/or imprisonment of up to 5 years.
Attempting, aiding and abetting the commission of an offence under the Act is
of course itself a punishable offence (Section 88 ECTA).
7 1 2 Service provider liability
Chapter XI deals with the limitation of the liability of persons providing
information system services. As described earlier in the thesis concerning the
liability of providers in Germany and the European Union, the liability for
313 For example section 86 (1), (2), (3) ECTA (unauthorised access to, interception or
interference with data).
314 Section 87 ECTA (computer-related fraud extortion, fraud and forgery).
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service providers basically depends on the role a provider plays in a particular
transaction. The Act sets out to limit such liability, drawing extensively on the
European E-Commerce Directive315 and the American Digital Millennium
Copyright Ace16.
In the ECTA the definitions of the terms, information system" and,
information system services" are broad and could extend protection to
telecommunication service providers, corporate entities and persons, involved
in the activities of information system services. This does not encompass
everyone who uses the Internet but those who perform the functions, which
make the Internet available to users.317
Chapter XI deals with the limitations of the liability of service providers in
general. Firstly, only those service providers can be subject to the privileges
and limitations in question who are members of an industry representative
body, approved by the South African Minister of Communications, by notice in
the Government Gazette, and who are subject to and who implement that
body's code of conduct. Secondly, only certain types of activities are protected
in terms of Chapter XI.
7 1 3 Limitation of liability for Internet providers
Section 73 ECTA318 establishes that no liability exists for the mere
315 See chapter 6.
316 USA Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) Pub. L. NO. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
~October 28, 1998).
17 Prof. Visser "South Africa: New Liability Regime for ISPs" 2003 Computer Law Review,
issue 3,94.
318 Section 73 Mere conduit
(1) A service provider is not liable for providing access to or for operating facilities for
information systems or transmitting, routing or storage of data messages via an information
system under its control, as long as the service provider-
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transmission of data messages in information systems if the service provider
plays a passive role as a conduit of information for third parties. A service
provider, who provides information system services and who merely acts as a
conduit in the transmission of data, will not be liable for any unlawful activity
associated with its information system services, as long as it does not initiate
the transmission, does not select the addressee and the data and does not
modify the data contained in the transmisslon.ê" Section 73 ECTA affords
protection to service providers in case such providers have little or no control
of the content of the data transmitted.
Caching, section 74 ECTA320, is the process by which information is
temporarily stored by the service provider, in order to make the information
more readily available if the end user should require that information at some
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the addressee;
(c) performs the functions in an automatic, technical manner without selection of the data; and
(d) does not modify the data contained in the transmission.
(2) The acts of transmission, routing and of provision of access referred to in subsection (1)
include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted in so
far as this takes place-
(a) for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the information system;
(b) in a manner that makes it ordinarily inaccessible to anyone other than anticipated
recipients; and
(c) for a period no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.
(3) Notwithstanding this section, a competent court may order a service provider to terminate
or prevent unlawful activity in terms of any other law.
319 Section 73 ECTA
320 Section 74 Caching
(1) A service provider that transmits data provided by a recipient of the service via an
information system under its control is not liable for the automatic, intermediate and
temporary storage of that data, where the purpose of storing such data is to make the onward
transmission of the data more efficient to other recipients of the service upon their request, as
long as the service provider-
(a) does not modify the data;
(b) complies with conditions on access to the data;
(c) complies with rules regarding the updating of the data, specified in a manner widely
recognised and used by industry;
(d) does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used by
industry, to obtain information on the use of the data; and
(e) removes or disables access to the data it has stored upon receiving a take-down notice
referred to in section 77.
(2) Notwithstanding this section, a competent court may order a service provider to terminate
or prevent unlawful activity in terms of any other law.
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point in the near future. The limitation of liability given to service providers
who cache data for recipients is subject to certain prerequisites, as for
example the fact that the service provider removes or disables access to data
in a reasonable time upon receipt of a take-down notification (section 77
ECTA)321.
Section 75 ECTA322lays down under which conditions a service provider
is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the
service.323 Section 75 ECTA refers to damages only and only defines if and
when civil liability is excluded. In order to avoid liability in the case of hosting,
the service provider is required to appoint an agent for the receipt of a take-
321 Section 77 Take-down notification
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, a notification of unlawful activity must be in writing, must
be addressed by the complainant to the service provider or its designated agent and must
include-
(a) the full names and address of the complainant;
(b) the written or electronic signature of the complainant;
(c) identification of the right that has allegedly been infringed;
(d) identification of the material or activity that is claimed to be the subject of unlawful activity;
(e) the remedial action required to be taken by the service provider in respect of the
complaint;
(f) telephonic and electronic contact details, if any, of the complainant;
(g) a statement that the complainant is acting in good faith;
(h) a statement by the complainant that the information in the take-down notification is to his
or her knowledge true and correct; and
(2) Any person who lodges a notification of unlawful activity with a service provider knowing
that it materially misrepresents the facts is liable for damages for wrongful take-down.
Pi (...)
2 Section 75 Hosting
1) A service provider that provides a service that consists of the storage of data provided by a
recipient of the service, is not liable for damages arising from data stored at the request of the
recipient of the service, as long as the service provider-
(a) does not have actual knowledge that the data message or an activity relating to the data
message is infringing the rights of a third party; or
(b) is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the infringing activity(or the infringing
nature of the data message is apparent; and
(c) upon receipt of a take-down notification referred to in section 77, acts expeditiously to
remove or to disable access to the data.
(2) The limitations on liability established by this section do not apply to a service provider
unless it has designated an agent to receive notifications of infringement and has provided
through its services, including on its web sites in locations accessible to the public, the name,
address, phone number and e-mail address of the agent.
(3) Notwithstanding this section, a competent court may order a service provider to terminate
or prevent unlawful activity in terms of any other law.
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the
authority or the control of the service provider.
323 Hosting.
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down notification. A service provider is not liable for wrongful take-down in
response to a notification, and he is exempted from liability for any damages
caused by a wrongful take-down.F" Any person who lodges a notification
knowing that it materially misrepresents the facts is liable for damages for
wrongful take-down.325 The requirement that such misrepresentation must be
"knowingly" excludes strict liability.
South Africa's representation of justice has taken the view against
privileging criminal liability for hosting, but on the other hand - and in contrast
to European326 and German327 guiding principles - it has decided in favour of
privileging information location tools (section 76 ECTA)328 if and when the
service provider does not have actual knowledge that the data message or an
activity relating to the data message will infringe the rights of a person or is
not aware of facts or circumstances which reveal the infringing activity of the
data message. This exception of liability however, is according to the wording
of the regulations only applicable to civil and not to criminal liability. So in
South Africa as well as in Germany there is still a juridical uncertainty about
the service providers' duties and how to get away from criminal liability when
applying information location tools.
The ECTA also establishes in section 78 ECTA329, corresponding to
324 Visser "South Africa" 2003 Computer Law Review International 95.
325 Section 77 (2) ECTA.
326 See chapter 6 1 1.
327 See chapter 5 4 and chapter 6 2 5.
328 Section 76 Information location tools
A service provider is not liable for damages incurred by a person if the service provider refers
or links users to a web page containing an infringing data message or infringing activity, by
using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hyperlink
~29·~~ction78 ECTA No general obligation to monitor
1) When providing the services contemplated in this Chapter there is no general obligation on
a service provider to-
a) monitor the data which it transmits or stores; or
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Article 15 E-Commerce Directive, that there is no general obligation (FN:
Text) for Internet service provider to monitor the information, which they
transmit or store. This means that neither in European countries nor in South
Africa the provider is obliged to actively seek for facts or circumstances
indicating an unlawful activity.
Besides the ECTA, specific provisions for Internet service provider can
be found in the Films and Publications Act.33oThe Act became operational on
November 8, 1996 and represents the primary source of legislation regarding
the classification of films and publications in South Africa. It was amended by
the Films and Publications Amendment Act, No, 34 of 1999 and led to
important innovations concerning the Internet industry perspectlve.P"
The term of "publication",332 according to this Act, is defined very broadly
and was amended by the 1999 Act as "any message or communication,
including a visual presentation, placed on any distributed network including,
but not confined to the Internet". "Visual presentation" means "a drawing,
picture, an illustration, a painting or an image, or (... ) any combination thereof,
produced through or by means of computer software on a screen or a
computer printout". Thus Internet has become an issue for the investigative
jurisdiction of the Film and Publication Board.333
In terms of section 27 of the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996, it is
an offence to produce, import and possess publications that contain child
b) actively seek facts or circumstances indicating an unlawful activity.
f)/··) The Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996,
www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1996/act96-065.html.
331 The Film and Publications Act, No. 65 of 1996 and the Film and Publications Amendment
Act, No. 34 of 1999 (see: www.gov.polity.org.za).
332 Chapter 1 ECTA.
333 Chapter 2 ECTA (Establishment of Film and Publication Board and Film and Publication
Review Board ).
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pornography. The distribution of hate speech is a criminal offence in terms of
section 29 (1).334 In the near future, Internet service providers335 will be
brought within the jurisdiction of the Act in so far as child pornography is
concerned. It is therefore necessary to include definitions of "Internet
address,,336 and "Internet service providers". The meaning of "possession"
will thereupon include the downloading on computers. Section 1 of the Films
and Publications Act will then be amended by substituting the definition of
"distribute".337
According to section 27A, the service provider, among other things, has
to take reasonable steps to prevent access to child pornography after he has
obtained knowledge.338
The main objective of the Films and Publications Amendment Bill is to
define provisions for the prohibition of child pornography and for matters
incidental to the more effective investigation and prosecution of child
pornography offenders. The significant readjustments of the Films and
Publications Act do not include a tightening up regarding the hate speech on
Internet respectively corresponding regulations for Internet service providers.
334 "Any person who knowingly distributes a publication which, judged within context - (c)
advocates hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and which constitutes
incitement to cause harm, shall be guilty of an offence".
335 Amendment of section 1 of Act 65 of 1996, as amended by section 1 of Act 34 of 1999 1.
(d) 'Internet service provider' means any person who provides access to the Internet by any
means)
336 Means a website, a bulletin board service, an Internet chat-room or newsgroup or any
other Internet or shared network protocol address.
337 "Distribute", in relation to a film or a publication, without derogating from the ordinary sense
of the word, includes" to sell, hire out" or "offer" or "keep for sale or hire" and, to the purpose
of sections 25 (a), (b) and (c), 26 (1) 8 (a) and (b) and 28 (1) and (2), it will include "to hand or
exhibit a film or a publication to a person under the age of 18 years", and also "the failure to
take reasonable steps to prevent access thereto by such person".
338 See chapter 7 1 4.
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7 1 4 Conclusion
To sum up, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of
2002 defines certain categories of service providers who do not incur liability
for information carried via those providers. The aim of these provisions is to
not hold service providers liable for the illegal dissemination of information,
when the service provider itself did not positively commit an illegal transaction.
Section 73 ECTA establishes that no liability exists for the mere
transmission of data messages in information systems wherein the service
provider plays a passive role as a conduit of information for third parties.
Section 73 ECTA is very similar to Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directivé39,
the former section 5 (3) TDG340 and section 9 E_TDG341. The provisions of
Article 73 and Article 12 are almost identical in excluding liability for service
providers who offer mere conduit. Both provisions presuppose that service
providers have neither knowledge of nor control over information, which is
transmitted or stored by them.
In South Africa and Europe the regulations of privileging liability as for
caching resemble each other closely, in particular Article 13 (1) (a) - (d) E-
Commerce Directive and section 74 (1) (a) -(d) ECTA. Section 74 ECTA in (1)
(e) however, establishes that the service provider is not liable for caching as
long as he removes or disables the access to the data he has stored upon
receiving a take-down notice.
Neither the Directive nor the E-TDG proposed statutory "notice and take-
down"- procedures concerning the disabling or removal of access to
339 See chapter 6.
340 See chapter 5 3 1 3.
341622.
113
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
information. According to Article 13 (1) (e) of the Directive instead, an
exception of liability presupposes that the provider will act expeditiously to
remove or to disable access to the information he has stored as soon as he
obtains actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of
the transmission has been removed from the network, or the access to it has
been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such
removal or disablement.
The knowledge requirements in section 75 ECTA correspond literally
with those fixed in Article 14 E-Commerce Directive ("actual knowledge" / "not
aware of facts or circumstances"). But section 75 (1) ECTA only states the
conditions and circumstances, under which the service provider is not liable
for damages.
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive instead applies to criminal
liability as well. The provider in Europe is only criminal liable, if he gets actual
knowledge of the illegality and - upon obtaining knowledge of illegal activity -
acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information.
Consequently, the E-Commerce Directive provides for a privileging of liability
not only for mere conduit and caching, but also for hosting. The ECTA
however, does not define provisions for hosting as far as criminal liability is
concerned.
Besides the ECTA, specific provisions for Internet service providers can
also be found in the Films and Publications Act_342Internet service provider
must take into account some important judicial changes, in case the Films and
Publications Amendment Bill will be legally passed.
342 www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1996/act96-065. html.
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The definition of "distribute" including "the failure to take reasonable
steps to prevent access thereto by such a person" seems to be ambiguous
because it is questionable if it only refers to privately held collections on a
personal computer or if it will regard Internet service provider as well.
The term "reasonable steps" Films and Publications Amendment Bill
can be interpreted differently. Section 27 of the Films and Publications Act
simply provides the terms "creates", "in any way contributes to", "imports", or
"obtain or access", which do not seem very clear. Thus an Internet service
provider who gives mere access to the Internet could be considered a
distributor within the meaning of the Act. This may cause juridical
uncertainties among South African Internet providers.
The ECTA states very distinctly that a service provider is not liable for
providing access to or for operating facilities for information systems or
transmitting, routing, or the storage of data messages via an information
system under its control in certain cases.343 There is a contradiction proposed
in the Films and Publications Amendment Bill. The ECTA excludes strict
liability for Internet service providers whilst the Bill confirms - according to the
wording - a strict liability. Consequently the Films and Publications Act defines
the duties for service providers and the ECTA provides for possible
justifications. So as for a consistency, the provisions of the ECT Act and the
Bill leave much to be desired.
Opposed to German law344, the Act has made service providers subject
to the injunctive procedure commonly known as "notice and take-down" to
avoid liability. Because take-down notices have a chilling effect on freedom of
343 See chapter 7 1 3.
344 The E-Commerce Directive suggested in Article 15 (2) that a "notice and take-down"
procedure could be established in a form of self-regulation in the member states.
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expression and can be compared to prior restraints, they apparently contradict
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression as determined by
previous rulings of South Africa courts.
This take-down requirement coupled with the right accorded to the
Minister to approve the code of conduct for the industry representative body
for service providers may have serious repercussions with respect to the
unique opportunities offered by the Internet and other new media for freedom
of expression. Notice and take-down-procedures can lead to a kind of self-
justice and should be allowed to be carried out only by prosecution authorities
or in response to a judicial order.
7 2 American law
Similar principles for the liability of Internet providers to those found in
Germany can also be found in the USA. The legal position in America,
however, is characterised by numerous individual regulations.
7 2 1 Liability for harmful content
States are particularly concerned about the control of pornography and
obscenity on the Internet, also the United States. Finding that minors have
access to harmful materials through the availability of the Internet, the
Congress in 1998 enacted the Child Online Protection Act (COPA)345 to
restrict access by minors. This section was carefully drafted to respond to a
1997 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
34547 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
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(ACLU) 521 U.S. 844 (1997), that struck down as unconstitutional provisions
of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)346, which was enacted by
Congress in 1996 to limit the exposure of children to sexually explicit
materials online. The CDA stated that anyone who, "by means of a
telecommunications device, knowingly makes, creates, or solicits, and
initiates the transmission of any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene (...) or indecent, knowing
that the recipient of the communication is younger than the age of eighteen, is
subject of criminal penalties of imprisonment of no more than two years, or a
fine, or both".347 § 223 (d) of the CDA criminalized using knowingly an
interactive computer service to send, or display in a manner available to
others, any image or "communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activity or organs". 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a) and (d) found to be
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.348 The ACLU decision also
challenged the provisions of sections 223 (a) (2) and 223 (d) (2) which made it
a crime for anyone to "knowingly permit any telecommunications facility under
his control to be used for any activity prohibited" in sections 223 (a) (b) and
223 (d) (1).
Still of relevance is § 223 (e). According to 47 U.S.C. § 223 (e) (1),349an
346 Title V, § 502, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000)).
347 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a).
348 In its June 26, 1997 decision, the Supreme Court held that the CDA' s "indecent
transmission" and "patently offensive display" provisions violated the First Amendment's
rI0tection of free speech (see: Reno v. ACLU, 929 F.Supp. at 879).
947 U.S.C. section 223 (e) Defences
In addition to any other defences available by law:
(1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d) of this section solely for
providing access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not under that
person's control, including transmission, downloading, intermediate storage, access software,
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access provider is not liable, if he merely offers access to an open computer
network. The provision protects Internet service provider who has taken, "in
good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to forbidden
communications". This also includes the disposal of the necessary access
software or the operating of a Proxy-Cache-Server. Under 47 U.S.C, section
223 (e) (2) (3),350there is no exemption from liability if and when the Internet
provider works together with the author of illegal content or advertises illegal
content or offers access to the computer system used to distribute the
content, which is under his control. Other federal laws remain unchanged.
A further approach in the USA can also be seen in 47 U.S.C. § 231,
introduced by the "Child Online Protection Act".351 This provision352 makes
those liable, who knowingly and for commercial purposes make any
communication by means of the WVVW which is available to any minor and
includes any material that is harmful to minors.353 The liability provision
however, does not apply to network and access providers or search engines
or other related capabilities that are incidental to providing such access or connection that
does not include the creation or the content of the communication.
35047 U.S.C. section 223 (e) Defences
In addition to any other defences available by law:
(2) The defences provided by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be applicable to a
person who is a conspirator with an entity actively involved in the creation or knowing
distribution of communications that violate this section, or who knowingly advertises the
availability of such communications.
(3) The defences provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be applicable to a
person who provides access or connection to a facility, system, or network engaged in the
violation of this section that is owned or controlled by such person.
351 www.cdt.org/speech/constitutional.html.
352 On May 13, 2002, in Ashcroft v. ACLU - 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002) , the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld sections of COPA as not unconstitutionally overbroad, but the Court expressed no
viewpoint as to whether COPA surveys strict scrutiny.
353 47 U.S.C. § 231 (a) Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the
material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the I..NNW, makes any
communications for commercial purpose that is available to any minor and that includes any
material ( ... ) is harmful to minors shall be fined no more than $ 50,000, imprisoned no more
than 6 month, or both.
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or similar functional carriers. All Internet providers can provide an affirmative
defence in the case of prosecution by showing they have taken control
measures restricting access by minors to material harmful to minors.354 This
includes, for example, requiring the use of a credit card or adult personal
identification number.
Several single states like Pennsylvania enacted a net blocking law that
enables the state Attorney General to order the blocking of web sites by
Internet service providers.355 Similar measures will be taken in Maryland,
Oklahoma and New Jersey. Internet providers are required to block sites even
if they do not host the content and have no relationship whatsoever with the
publishers of the content. The law provides that the state Attorney General or
any county district attorney can unilaterally apply to a local judge for an order
declaring that certain Internet content may be child pornography, and
requiring any Internet service provider serving Pennsylvania citizens to block
the Internet content. Net blocking law like Pennsylvania's child porn law led to
a massive over blocking of websites, because the technical design of the
Internet dictates that most Internet service providers can only comply with the
blocking orders by also blocking a significant amount of innocent web site
content as well. The court proceeding occurs with only government
participation and no prior notice to the Internet Service Provider. One Internet
Protocol number may be in use for hundreds of legal sites as well as one
illegal. A blocking order concerning one incriminated website of the
international Internet provider MGI in Pennsylvania demanded the blocking of
terra.es, the biggest hoster in Spain although American MGI customers would
354 47 U.S.C. § 231 (b) (1) .
35518 Pa. C.S. § 7626.
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hardly have been able to access thousands of Spanish websites.356
7 2 2 Liability for copyright infringement
Violators of intellectual property rights have long been subject to criminal
prosecution in the United States. The State of New York enacted criminal
sanctions against trademark counterfeiting in 1847, and 39 other states
followed suit by 1899.357 Copyright infringement has been considered a
federal crime since 1909. The statutes governing criminal copyright
infringement were substantially amended in 1997.358 These amendments
modified the requisite elements of crime.
Copyright infringement is a crime if and when it is done wilfully and either
for commercial advantage or private financial gain;359 or by reproduction or
distribution on a large scale - even if not committed for commercial gain.36o
Service provider liability was taken into consideration in light of Congress'
reaction to the issue, i.e. the enactment of the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Ace61, which significantly circumscribes the conditions
under which online service providers might incur liability.362 This section
provides limitation for infringement in the following cases:
(i) automatically transmitted communications (such as electronic mail
356 "Pennsylvania child porn law causes massive over blocking off sites",
www.theregister.co.uk/2004/01/13/pennsylvania_child_porn_law_causes/print.html).
The constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute is under challenge (See Centre for
Democracy and Technology v. Fisher, E.D. Pa. No. 03-5051).
357 www.aippi.orrg/reports/q169/q169usae.html.
358 No Electronic Theft Act (NET), Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
35917 U.S.C. § 506 (a) (1) in concert with 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
36017 U.S.C. § 506 (a) (2).
361 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877
~1998).
6217 U.S.C. § 512.
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messages) which are not modified or edited by the service provider and are
not maintained any longer than reasonably necessary,363
(ii) system caching of materials requested by users (such as
popular websites) on behalf of subsequent users364
and
(iii) information residing on systems at the direction of users365.
The United States also regulated the limitation of liability for information
location tools in the case of copyright infringements. Information location tools
referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or
infringing activity are not liable as long as the service provider does not have
knowledge of the infringement or financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, if and when the service provider, upon notification, removes
the infringing materials or the access to them.366 Section 512 also provides a
process, by which copyright holders may notify service providers of allegedly
infringing activities, and service providers have certain duties to respond and
by which injunctive or other relief may be sought.367
In order to address online service provider liability and to remove it
under certain circumstances, in 1998, the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act was signed into law. As outlined above, it limits, in a
number of online contexts, liability of service providers.368
363 17 U.S. C. § 512 (a).
364 (17 USC. § 512 (b).
365 Such as a hosted Web site as long as the service provider does not have knowledge of the
infringement or financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, if and when the
service provider, upon notification, removes the infringing content, (17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)).
366 (17 U.S.C. § 512 (d)).
367 (17 U.S.C. § 512 (g)-U)). See also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05183
MHP, 2000 WL 573136, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000).
368 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
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7 2 3 Conclusion
It is quite impossible for network and access providers, to control and
block content sent over the Internet, which is why they are on the whole
exempt from criminal liability under the E-Commerce Directive of the
European Union, the German E-TDG and 47 U.S.C. § 223 (e) (1). According
to 47 U.S.C. § 223 (e) (1) an access provider is not liable, if he merely offers
access to the Internet. This provision is similar to section 73 ECTA, which
establishes that no liability exists for the mere transmission of data messages
in information systems wherein the service provider plays a passive role as a
conduit of information for third parties and to Article 12 of the E-Commerce
Directive369, the former section 5 (3) TDG370 and section 9 E_TDG371.
The Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act limits in a number of
Internet contexts the liability of Internet service providers. Like in South
Africa's ECTA, opposed to German law372, 17 U.S.C. § 512 has made service
providers subject to the injunctive procedure commonly known as "notice and
take-down" to avoid liability for copyright infringements.
The Pennsylvania Law imposes potential liability on Internet service
providers for child pornography, even if the providers are not hosting the
offending content and have no reference to the author and publisher of the
content. The Act restricts Internet content and sets a precedent on regulating
369 See chapter 6.
370 See chapter 5 3 1 3.
371 See chapter 622.
372 The E-Commerce Directive suggested in Article 15 (2) that a "notice and take-down"
procedure could be established in a form of self-regulation in the member states.
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Internet providers without notice.373
7 3 Convention on Cybercrime
Cybercrime is transnational and requires a transnational response. For
that reason, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Cybercrime.374
The Convention on Cyber-crime is the first international treaty on crimes
committed via Internet and other computer networks, dealing particularly with
computer-related fraud, infringements of copyright, child pornography and
violations of network security.375 The Convention is the product of four years
of work by the Council of Europe (including Germany) and by the United
States, Canada and other countries (like South Africa), which are not
members of the organisation. The Convention and its Explanatory Report376
were adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
November 8, 2001 and the Convention was opened for signature in Budapest,
on 23 November 2001, at the conclusion of the International Conference on
Cybercrime during which the doubts of human rights activists and data
protectors were expressed.377 To date 31 states have signed the Convention,
including Germany and South Africa.378 The Cybercrime Convention entered
into force on 1st July 2004 following its ratification by Lithuania, Albania,
373 On September 9, 2003, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Pennsylvania filed in
a constitutional challenge to the "net blocking law". The challenge, filed in the U.S. District
Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, argues that the "net blocking law" is a prior
restraint on speech that violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, see:
www.theregister.co.uk/2004/01/13/pennsylvania_child_porn_law_causes/print.html).
374 Convention on Cybercrime under www.conventions.coe.inVTreaty.
375 Substantive criminal law in chapter II, section 1 of the Convention.
376 The text of the Explanatory Report does not constitute an instrument providing an
authoritative interpretation of the Convention, although it might be of such a nature as to
facilitate the application of the provisions.
377 See the initiative of the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (www.gilc.com) and their
members like the American Civil Liberties Union, Canadian Journalists for Free Expression or
C~ber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK).
37 www.conventions.coe. inVTreaty/EN/searchings.asp?NT= 185&CM=1 &DF= 16/04/04.
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Croatia, Estonia and Hungary. Ratified conventions are binding for a state.
Nearly three years after the treaty was open for signature by the member
states and the non-member states, which have participated in, its elaboration
only five countries have ratified the convention. This shows that harmonisation
of law is often not easy to achieve.
During the drafting of the convention some states wanted to act
internationally against racist and discriminating contents; for example
Germany wanted to be able to take legal action against Nazi websites in the
USA. But such limitations on the freedom of speech and expression in the
Convention were rejected, particularly by the USA.379 In response, an
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the
Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature committed through
Computer Systems was drawn up. The protocol can be ratified independently
from the "main" convention."? Through the Additional Protocol the members
of the Council of Europe aim to achieve greater unity over the question of how
to define and combat racist and xenophobic material.
This convention supplements other conventions like the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters from 1959. Article 45 of
the Convention on Cybercrime regulates how interpretation problems can be
solved.381
379 www.krefeldercomputerclub.de/Computer/cybercrime.htm.
380 www.conventions.coe.int; www.heise.de/newsticker/data/anw.
381 Settlement of disputes (Article 45)
Article 45 (1) provides that the European Committee on Crime Problems (COPC) should be
kept informed about the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention.
There is an obligation on the Parties to seek a peaceful settlement of any dispute concerning
the interpretation or the application of the Convention. Any procedure for solving disputes
should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned. Three possible mechanisms for dispute-
resolution are suggested by this provision: the European Committee on Crime Problems itself,
an arbitral tribunal or the International Court of Justice.
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7 3 1 Content and implications of the Convention and the Additional
Protocol
The Convention represents a substantial revision of the provisions
contained in an earlier version released on April 25, 2000 and provides in
chapter I (Use of terms) definitions of critical terms. "Service provider,,382
means "any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the
ability to communicate by means of a computer system; any other entity that
processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communication service
or users of such service".
The definitions are overly broad and unclear about what conduct falls
within the definitions. For example, the Convention defines a computer as
"any device or a group of interconnected or related devices one or more of
which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of data,,383.This
definition is problematic because it does not define or limit what constitutes a
device, thus, potentially including Palm Pilots or cable TV boxes. The broad
definition of a service provider in the Convention could conceivably
encompass any Internet user who maintains a website. Furthermore, it is not
382 Explanatory Report about service provider: "The term "service provider" encompasses a
broad category of persons that play a particular role with regard to communication or
processing of data on computer (... ) it is made clear that both public and private entities which
provide users the ability to communicate with one another are covered. Therefore, it is
irrelevant whether the users form a closed group or whether the provider offers its services to
the public, whether free of charge or for a fee. The closed group can be e.g. the employees of
a private enterprise to whom the service is offered by a corporate network (... )." For example,
under this definition, a service provider includes both services that provide hosting and
caching services as well as services that provide a connection to a network. However, a mere
provider of content (such as a person who contracts with a web hosting company to host his
web site) is not intended to be covered by this definition if such content provider does not also
offer communication or related data processing services (www.conventions.coe.inUprotocol).
383 Article 1 (b) of the Cybercrime Convention.
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clear whether the ambiguous definition of "traffic data,,384 includes for
example hyperlinks385. If the definition of "traffic data" does include hyperIinks,
the definition may be more invasive on communication than the drafters of the
Convention intended.
Chapter II of the Cybercrime convention describes measures to be taken
at the national level. In section 1, the substantive criminal law is described.
The Convention encompasses a list of crimes, some of which currently are
crimes in one signatory country but are not in another.
The measures relate to specific fields where each party to the treaty
shall adopt legislative measures to provide for offences against the
confidentiality, availability and integrity of computer data and systems;
computer-related offences, content related offences, offences related to
infringements of copyrights and related rights; ancillary liability and sanctions.
The Convention does not, however, include guidance detailing the elements
required for those offences. For example, the USA may want to prosecute a
citizen form France for the crime of illegal access. France's criminal cyber law
may not include access to a computer system connected to another computer
system within the definition of illegal access. Thus, the USA could not
prosecute a French citizen who accessed a computer connected to another
computer. In contrast, if the USA and France were both signatories to a
Convention codifying the elements of the crime, US prosecutors could
prosecute a French citizen because both countries would recognise the same
384 Article 1 (d) "traffic data" means any computer data relating to a communication by means
of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of
communication, indicating the communication's origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration, or type of underlying service.
385 Defining hyperlinks as an element in an electronic document that links to another place in
the same document or to an entirely differently document.
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criminal elements. If signatories do not agree upon the elements of a crime,
we could face a similar problem as was confronted in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue
Contre Le Racism Et L' Antisemitisme386. Crime standardization could pose
some difficulties for regulators because countries may be reluctant to sign the
Convention if it infringes upon domestic legal regimes and cultures. Especially
when we compare Germany and the USA there are radically different
fundamental rights and freedoms between the two countries. As shown, what
is hate speech in Germanl87 is freedom of speech, protected by the First
Amendment in the United States.
The Convention drafters empowered signatories to enact crime
legislation out of concern that if the Convention retained too much power,
members would be unwilling to ratify it.388
Chapter II, section 2 of the Convention describes procedural measures
to be taken at national level by nation states that proceed to ratify the treaty.
The measures relate to: specific fields where each party to the treaty shall
adopt legislative measures to establish criminal procedures ensuring the
empowerment of competent authorities to search and seize stored computer
data, make production orders, request the expedited preservation of data
stored in a computer system, request the expedited preservation and
disclosure of traffic data, intercept electronic communications, and order real-
time collection of traffic data.
386 See chapter 3 1 2; LlCRA & UEJF v. Yahoo! Inc., Tribunal de Grande Instance Paris;
www.juriscom.netltxtljurisfr/cti/tgiparis2000011200.
387 See chapter 3 1 3 3 (TOben case and ZOndeI case).
388 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, at 145 (articulating the Convention's
purpose is to strike a balance between harmonizing international law and the sanctity of the
sovereign.
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The provisions of the Convention addressing jurisdiction389 and
international cooperation are intriguing. In particular, each nation state shall
enact laws enabling the exercise of jurisdiction over offences committed in its
territory. It is apparent that extra-territorial jurisdiction to be exercised by the
signatories to the Convention can only be realised through international
cooperation. Thus, in addition to asserting general principles concerning the
widest possible international cooperation, the Convention details international
procedures applicable in various cases. Among the items covered by the
Convention are extradition, mutual assistance requests in the absence of
applicable international agreements, mutual assistance regarding provisional
measures, transborder access to stored computer data not requiring mutual
legal assistance, mutual legal assistance regarding interception of data, and
real-time collection of traffic data.
The Convention drafters included broad jurisdictional provisions to
provide flexibility for states to decide jurisdictional issues in the event of a
dispute. Article 22 (1) states, that "each Party shall adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction (... ) when the
offence is committed in its territory; or on board a ship flying the flag of the
Party; or on board on aircraft registered under the laws of that Party; or by
one of its nationals, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it
was committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction
of any State". This provision corresponds to sections 3, 4 and 7 (2), no. 1 of
the German Criminal Code (StGB)390.
Article 22 (5) of the Convention allows the parties to determine the most
389 Chapter II section (3) of the Cybercrime Convention.
390 See chapter 3 1 3.
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appropriate forum to prosecute a claim. But the Convention does not contain
a mechanism to deal with conflicts in jurisdiction, further supporting the
necessity of clear jurisdictional guidelines. Where crimes involve multinational
contact, conflicts of jurisdiction are sure to arise. For example, jurisdiction
issues existed where a company incorporated in Vanuatu, operated its
business from Australia, maintained its computer server in Denmark,
maintained its source code in Estonia and the original developers resided in
the Netherlands.391 The court had to determine whether jurisdiction was in the
home state, in each state through which the data traffic travelled or where the
harm occurred.
In spite of the Convention, and considering the lack of clear jurisdictional
guidelines in place, juridical problems as shown in the Frederic Toben's
case392 do not seem to be fully avoidable either.
The Convention may yield unwieldy conflicts and inconsistent decisions
as long as a priority of jurisdiction is not established between the states .
. Jurisdictional priority should be given to the institutions of a country where the
harm incurred and not to the country where the crime was initiated.
Moreover, a detailed guidance should be determined as to what types of
political offences or prejudices will legitimately justify a refusal to cooperate by
competent authorities.
The section on "attempt and aiding or abetting" (Article 11) in Title 5 of
Chapter 11393 is of particular interest to Internet providers. According to the
explanatory report of the convention, the purpose of this article is to establish
additional offences related to attempting and aiding or abetting the
391 Leiber v. Consumer Empowerment BV, No. 01-09923-SVW (C.D. Cal. 2003).
392 See chapter 3 1 3 3.
393 Ancillary liability and sanctions.
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commission of the offences defined in the Convention.
Although the transmission of harmful content data or malicious code
through the Internet requires the assistance of service providers as a conduit,
the Convention provides that a service provider that does not have criminal
intent cannot incur liability under this section. Thus, no duty is imposed on a
service provider to actively monitor content to avoid criminal liability under this
provision. As with all the offences established in accordance with the
Convention, attempt and aiding or abetting must be committed intentionally.
Article 27 of the Convention specifically allows a party to refuse
extradition under certain circumstances, such as crimes constituting political
offences or those that may prejudice a nations interests.394
The provision does not clarify what types of offences qualify as "political"
in nature or which they will consider prejudicial. As seen in the Yahoo!
case,395 this provision will quickly run afoul simply from different
interpretations of what constitutes a political offence.
7 3 2 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime
The Protocol addresses the definition of "racist and xenophobic material"
394 Article 27 (4) (a)), allowing parties to refuse to extradite nationals if "the request concerns
an offence, which the requested party considers a political offence or an offence connected
with a political offence, or it considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice its
sovereignty, security order public or other essential interests".
395 See chapter 3 1 2; LlCRA & UEJF v. Yahoo! Inc., Tribunal de Grande Instance Paris;
www.juriscom.netltxtljurisfr/cti/tgiparis2000011200.
130
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
and how the members of the Council of Europe could act against such
material through criminal law and criminal procedure. The Protocol first links
to the Convention the critical terms like "computer system" and "service
provider" and defines "racist and xenophobic material".396 One should note
that "dissemination" of such material in a computer system (Article 3) includes
exchanging such material in chat rooms, posting similar messages in
newsgroups or discussion fora, because such material is thereby made
available to the public.397The term "to the public" used in Article 3 makes it
clear that private communications or expressions via email communicated
through the Internet fall outside the scope of this provision. The distributing or
otherwise making available through a computer system to the public of
material, which denies, grossly minimises, approves or justifies acts
constituting genocide or crimes against humanity (Article 4) shall be criminally
punishable under the domestic law of each nation. This provision would not
lead to change of German criminal law because Germany has a very strict law
against genocide as described in chapter 4 above. As in the Convention itself
all offences contained in the Protocol must be committed "intentionally" in
order for criminal liability to apply. The drafters of the Protocol like those of the
Cybercrime Convention agreed that the exact meaning of "intentionally"
should be left to national interpretation. In the case of Internet service
providers it is, for example, not sufficient for a finding of liability, that the
provider served solely as a conduit for, or hosted a website or newsroom,
396 "Racist and xenophobic material" means "any written material, any image or any other
representation of ideas or theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred,
discrimination or violence against any individual group of individuals, based on race, colour,
descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for any of these
factors" (Explanatory Report on Article 2 of the Protocol).
397 See the commentatory on the articles of the Protocol under www.conventions.coe.int
/Protocol/comments.
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containing racist and/or xenophobic material, unless there was intent, as
required by the applicable domestic law. Moreover, Internet providers are not
required to monitor conduct to avoid criminal liability. This liability regulation
for Internet providers conforms to the European E-Commerce Directive. It is
incorporated in German law in terms of the E-TDG.
7 3 4 Conclusion
The Convention attracted widespread attention and sometimes critical
comments from various interest groups like privacy activists questioning the
access provisions; security professionals querying the restriction on tools; and
the International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications
disagreeing with the requirement of maintaining traffic data.
Domestic laws are generally confined to a specific territory. As
cybercrime is not limited to national boundaries, it can only be properly and
efficiently addressed by having some international understanding as to what it
is and how it should be fought. As the above discussion shows, achieving a
global consensus is always difficult. Differences in the participating states
over cultural and national security issues have made the attempt to establish
common standards a daunting task. Solutions to the problems posed in the
thesis should be addressed by international law, necessitating the adoption of
adequate international legal instruments. The Convention aims to meet this
challenge. But the criticism of activists like the Global Internet Liberty
Campaign, an international Internet association of different groups like data
protectors, journalists and human rights activists should also to be taken into
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account. 398 The Convention could contravene the norms for the protection of
the individual like freedom of speech and expression, and it would expand the
police authority of national governments. The Convention will probably reduce
government accountability in future law enforcement conduct.
The provisions'" that will require Internet service providers to retain
records regarding the activities of their customers are problematic. These
provisions pose a risk to the privacy and human rights of Internet users and
contravene principles of data protection. The Convention does not provide a
stricter liability for access, content, and service providers"? than does
German criminal law.
The purpose of the Additional Protocol is twofold: firstly harmonising
criminal law in the fight against racism end xenophobia on the Internet and
secondly improving international cooperation in this area. The Additional
Protocol offers a great opportunity to continue international harmonisation in
combating cybercrime dealing with racist and xenophobic material. While the
Convention covers various harmonisation strategies about many, diverse
topics, the Protocol deals with a more restricted area. It tries to harmonise the
understanding of what is, for example, "racist" or "denial of genocide and
crimes against humanity". From this shared understanding the Protocol then
promotes coordinated action against racist and xenophobic material on the
Internet.
The Cybercrime Convention is a long-overdue start towards addressing
the exigent circumstances evolving from the Internet. Its success will hinge
398 www.gilc.com.
399 Articles 17, 18, 24, 25 of the Cybercrime Convention.
400 On the Convention they fall all under the term "service provider", see chapter I Article 1 ©
of the Convention.
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upon the cooperation of all countries, both parties to the Convention and
those that are not.
8 Excursion: Possibilities for preventing criminally intended contents
8 1 Measures of self-censorship
Most legal systems are aware that child pornography and other illegal
contents in computer networks cannot be combated through criminal
prosecution alone. This has led to the formation of pressure groups of Internet
providers, for example in Germany, France, Belgium, Canada, Austria, the
United Kingdom and Spain.401These countries have developed organisations,
in which authorities, Internet providers and users work together, collaborating
in two fields: self-censorship and codes of conduct.
8 1 1 Codes of conduct
Self-censorship of Internet providers is often called "codes of conduct,,.402
Committees or national associations of Internet service providers lay down
these codes. They are developed partially from contractual provisions among
Internet providers and their subscribers, and partially through governmentally
set-up working groups (particularly in France and Japan). In Italy, the codes of
conduct are only binding after endorsement by state authorities.403 Regarding
the commitment to codes of conduct, international Internet providers are
401 For Spain: the AUI-Associacion des Usuarios de Internet; for France: Association des
utilisateurs de l'lnternet.
402 For Germany see: www.fsm.de/webvk1.html
403 www.echo.lu/legal/de/internet7wp2de-chap.html.
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obliged to turn their attention in particular to the legal use of the Internet in
order to prevent the presence of unlawful contents on the Internet. They are
obliged to create registration offices, make an effort in identifying their
subscribers or to inform prosecution authorities about certain offences and
infringements.
The codes of conduct provide special sanctions'P' for any infringements of
these duties. These sanctions vary from disapproval to public rebukes. In
some countries, governmental registration offices exist. The "Meldepunt
Kinderporno" was developed in the Netherlands by providers, users and the
police. It opened in June 1996 and was the first its kind in Europe.f" This
Meldepunt informs providers about illegal contents on their servers. A similar
organisation exists in Germany, the "Netz gegen Kinderporno" that searches
the Internet for child pornoqraphy.?"
Problems arise for the laying down of codes of conduct for internationally
active online providers. They are operating in different legal systems, in which
varying penal provisions apply. Special problems arise if certain behaviour, for
example the dissemination of Nazi propaganda, is illegal in a particular
country (for example Austria and Germany), but lawful or acceptable as a
result of the freedom of expression in other countries. For example, in
Denmark, the dissemination of Nazi symbols, such as swastikas, is legal and
can be disseminated on the Internet without any legal consequences.f" It will
therefore be interesting to see to which codes of conduct these internationally
active online providers will be subjected. These codes are likely to be "soft
404 An exception is the code of conduct of the Canadian Association of Internet Provider
iCAIP) - it does not provide consequences in cases where the code is disregarded.
05 VVINw.meldepunt.de.
406 www.heise.de/Netz_gegen_Kinderporno.
407 Sieber "Verantwortlichkeit von Internetprovidern im Rechtsvergleich" 1999 ZUM 209.
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law", which however have the potential to serve as precursors for a more
harmonised world-wide criminal law.
8 1 2 Self-censorship of online providers in Germany
In Germany, the Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia Dienstanbieter
e.V.408 (FSM)409 assists actively in reducing punishable online contents. An
advantage of being a member of the FSM is that professional providers who
offer contents, which may be harmful to young people, are as members of
FSM exempt from the duty to have a youth protection commissloner"? The
aim of the FSM is to ensure youth protection and to prevent the presence of
illegal content on the Internet and to remove any such contents, which may be
present. Individual communications, such as email, are excluded from this
form of control. The Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia Dienstanbieter e. V.
is also not competent to check data-rights, copyright or competition law
lnfrlnqernents''!'.
The members of the FSM obligate themselves to contribute to the prevention
of illegal contents. This obligation is however limited to statutory liability and it
408 www.fsm.de.
409 Self-censorship of Multimedia Service provider -incorporated association.
410 § 7a s.4 GjSM, 8 IV s.1 MdStV.
411 Rath-Glawatz & MOiler-Using "Rechte in der freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle" 1997JMS-Report
(5) 53.
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applies only if the prevention of illegal contents is actually possible and can
reasonably be expected of the member. Content that should not be offered or
made accessible is content that is punishable in terms of section 130 StGS412,
section 130 (a) StGS413, section 131 StGS414, section 86 StGS415 and section
184 (3) StGS416.
The code of conduct of the FSM provides that its members have a duty to
ensure that children and young people do not have access to illegal content,
which is punishable under section 184 (1) StGS (dissemination of
pornographic writings. In terms of the latter section, such content includes
offers, which are obviously harmful to children and young people. If an
infringement of the code of conduct occurs, anyone may file a complaint. The
complaints have to be sent to the FSM via email.417 Once the appointed
committee of the FSM investigates the complaint and discovers that an
infringement of the code of conduct has taken place, it can sanction the
wrongdoer. The sanction can take the form of a request to put things right, a
display of its disapproval or a rebuke.
The request to put things right and the disapproval of infringements against
the code of conduct remain unpublished and are made only to the provider,
serving merely as an appeal to the provider's conscience. Only the rebuke is
published. The online provider has the duty to ensure the publication of the
rebuke on the Internet for one month, so that every user can determine which
providers do not adhere to the code of conduct.
412 (Genocide).
413 Instruction for crimes.
414 Racial hatred.
415 Dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organisations.
416 Dissemination of pornography.
417 hotline@fsm.de.
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Where a foreign provider offers illegal content and so infringes codes of
conduct, an equivalent to the FSM may exist in its country of origin. In this
case, the FSM passes on its complaint to the self-censorship controlling body
in the provider's country. This self-censorship controlling body can then
decide whether it wants to sanction the provider in question.
A provider-independent initiative also exists: "Netz gegen Kinderporno,,418
(Network against child pornography), which was established by the German
Child Welfare Organisation in conjunction with some German newspapers.
The widespread willingness of users to co-operate with this initiative came as
a huge surprise to the initiators and the prosecution. Three months after the
founding of the registration office, 450 announcements about child
pornography on the Internet were made. As a result of this, 300 investigations
into child pornography were cornrnenced.?"
8 2 Special obligations of providers and their capabilities and
possibilities for exercising control
Some legal systems do not limit the liability of Internet providers. They
however burden the providers with special duties to control unlawful and
harmful contents on the Internet. The main duty of online providers is to install
filter software. American reform proposals include the duty to install filter
software, bring charges against criminal users and to expel certain persons
from the Internet.
418 www.heise.de/ctlNetz_gegen_Kinderporno.
419 ibid.
138
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 2 1 What is filter software?
In the past couple of years, the software industry developed various filter
software with different functions. The Criminal investigation Department of the
German state Hesse (Hessisches Landeskriminalamt) has developed
software that makes use of the data bank of the Federal Criminal Investigation
Department (Bundeskriminalamt). This software makes it possible to find child
pornography on hard discs.42o New software has been developed particularly
in the area of youth protection software. These technical systems allow for the
blocking of various content, so that aspects of various moral and legal
opinions of different legal systems are addressed. In addition, parents are
enabled to decide what kind of content their children may be exposed to on
the Internet.
The blocking of the contents does not take place on the "source" of
contents, as the publication of the content itself is not prevented. The blocking
takes place because the user cannot call up the contents. The filter software
operates by means of so-called negative lists. All web sites, which are noted
on these lists, are blocked, while a content not listed is allowed to pass. The
best-known programs are Cyber-Patrol and Surfwatch421. These programs
can be downloaded from the Internet and are useful in protecting children
from exposure to harmful contents. Sometimes however, even these
programs need protection. In May 2001, Cyber Nanny, the developer of
filtering protection software, was hacked and defaced422.
420 Die Zeit March 26, 1998, 69.
421 www.cyberpatrol.com; www.surfwatch.com.
422 www.theregister.co.uk/contenU6/18412.html.
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Negative lists must be contrasted with positive lists that block all Internet
contents except these which are marked as permissible. This procedure is
used mostly in schools.423.The third method is the neutral mark. Web sites are
marked free of any value and can be rated according to the opinion of the
user. The World Wide Web Consortiumf" has developed PiCS (Platform for
Internet Content Selection), which is the most significant neutral software and
rating system. PiCS is widely supported by various governments and industry-
based organisations, such as the Internet Watch Foundation in the UK. PiCS
works by embedding electronic labels in the text or image documents to vet
their content before the computer displays them or passes them to another
computer.f"
The vetting system of PiCS can be applied to political, religious,
advertising or commercial topics. The most common scheme is that
developed by the Recreational Software Advisory Council on the Internet
(RSACi). This was originally a scheme for rating computer games426. It rates
material according to the degree of violence, sex, nudity and obscene or
profane language. PiCS can read other negative and positive lists (for
example Cyber-Patrol), but also uses the ratings systems of publishing
houses, religious organisations and online providers.?" A lot of online
providers offer several filter software to their users. Parents, teachers and
companies can choose which filter software best serves their needs.
423 Ritz Inhalteverantworllichkeit von Online-Diensten (1998) 43.
424 www.w30rg; Union of more than 100 international companies, among them hard-and
software industry, telecommunication businesses and media firms (AT&T, AOl, Apple,
CompuServe, IBM, Microsoft, Time Warner).
425 www.julius.co.uk/censorship/faq.html.
426 www.rsaci.org.
427 Ritz Inhalteverantworllichkeit von Online-Diensten 44.
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8 2 2 Duty to offer filter software
In recent years, reform proposals in the USA have demanded that
Internet providers should be obliged by law to offer filter software free of
charge to their users.?" Furthermore, certain end users, like schools or public
libraries, should be obliged to use filter software by law. Laws such as the
Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act of 1997429,
Family-Friendly Internet Access Act of 1997430 or Who is E-Mailing our Kids
Act of 2001431 force the blocking of contents, which are harmful to children. To
block the contents, Internet providers will have to offer their subscribers filter
software free of charge or at cost price. The model for the reform proposals
was the Internet provider CampuServe, who has been providing filter software
free of charge to their subscribers since 1996. 432
The reform proposals of Safe Schools Internet Act of 1999433 and the
Children's Internet Protection Acr34 want schools and public libraries, which
offer Internet access, to bear the duty of using filter software to prevent the
access to harmful Internet content for children and young people.
823 The duty of Internet providers to inform the Criminal Prosecutor
Through the insertion of 27A in Act 65 of 1996 (The Films and
428 Sieber "Verantwortlichkeit von Internetprovidern im Rechtsvergleich" 1999 ZUM 205.
429 H.R. 1964 of the 105th congress, introduced June 19, 1998, www.thomas.loc/gov/
home/c1 05query. html
430 H.R. 1180 of the 105th congress, ibid.
431 H.R. 1846: To amend section 254 of the Communications Act of 1934 to require schools
and libraries receiving universal service assistance to block access to Internet services that
enable users to access the www; ibid.
432 Sieber "Verantwortlichkeit von Internetprovidern im Rechtsvergleich" 1999 ZUM 205.
433 www.thomas.loc.gov/home.
434 Pub.L. 106 - 554, titel XVIII; www.tcc.gov/wch/universal_service/chipact.de.
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Publications Act),435South African Internet service provider shall register with
the Board and have to fulfil several obligations. The obligations for Internet
service providers are only concerning child pornography. Under section 27A,
Internet provider "shall take all reasonable steps to prevent the use of their
services for the hosting or distribution of child pornography" (27A (1) (b)). The
section provides the legal obligation on Internet service providers who have
knowledge that their service is used for the hosting or distribution of such
material to report the presence of child pornography to the South African
Police Service. The Internet service provider has also report the police
particulars of the person "behind" the child pornography on the Internet.436
The providers are obliged to preserve evidence of child pornography for
purposes of investigation and prosecution and shall, upon request by the
South African Police Service, furnish the particulars of users "who gained or
attempted to gain access to an Internet address that contains child
pornography". The provision statutes in paragraph (4) that "any person who
fails to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of an offence".
In the United States, another possible way of imposing obligations on
Internet providers is the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of
1998. This law, 42 U.S.C. § 227, obliges every provider of telecommunication
and data communication services to inform criminal prosecution authorities
about the production, dissemination or possession of child pornography in
435 Film and Publications Amendment Bill (explanatory summary of the Bill published in
Government Gazette No 25421 of September 1, 2003).
436 "Registration and other obligations of Internet service providers" 27A. (2) If an Internet
service provider has knowledge that its services are being used for the hosting or distribution
of child pornography, such internet provider shall - (b) report the presence thereof, as well as
the particulars of the person maintaining or hosting or distributing or in any manner
contributing to such Internet address, to a police official of the South African Police Service;
( ... ).
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terms of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2251 (a), 2252, 2252(a), 260. If an Internet
provider knowingly omits this notification, he may be fined for up to
US$50,OOO; if the omission occurs again, the second fine can be up to
US$100,OOO. The Internet providers must inform the criminal prosecution
authorities about child pornography. They do not however have to control their
subscribers or the contents (42 U.S.C. § 227 (3)). With this rule in place, the
regulations of 42 U.S.C. § 227 go beyond the regulations that exist in most of
the European legal systems.
8 3 Conclusion
Technical solutions and codes of conduct can act as supplements
preventing criminal liability. The protection of children against harmful content
will be supported by the use of filter software like PiCS, but without
safeguarding complete protection. It can nevertheless assist in avoiding
conflicts between different legal systems and the problem of distinguishing
which content is to be considered pornographic or harmful in different
countries. It must be applied cautiously and be carefully balanced with the
right of freedom of expression - a basic right in every democracy. Codes of
conduct as well as registration offices can help to prevent Internet crime and
to support the enactment of legal liability provisions for Internet providers.
The US-legislation as well as the obligations drafted by the South African
Film and Publications Bill and the development of codes of conducts will also
be supported by the European Union within Article 16 of the E-Commerce
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Directive437.
9 Concluding remarks
The above-mentioned discourses have shown that the Internet is a
space where criminal law does indeed apply. Providers and users are
exposed to many risks of criminal prosecution.
However, the difficulties which multimedia data transfers open for
legislatures are so plentiful and novel that they require an entire set of new
rules in many areas of criminal law. Since nations differ in their regulatory
commitments, many Internet transmissions and transactions will be subject to
inconsistent regulations. And most unilateral national regulations - especially
the most demanding and restrictive ones - will affect the regulatory efforts of
other nations. These problems will only be solved by the introduction of
unambiguous international regulations. The establishment of such rules
seems unlikely in the near future, due to the existence of divergent opinions
and cultural differences. The European Directive and the Convention on
Cybercrime does however seem to be a first step into the right direction.
The norms of criminal liability of Internet providers show different
regulatory models in various countries. There are regulations, which overlap.
In some legal systems, for example the German legal system, the liability of
Internet providers depends on the legal provisions relating to the Internet,
combined with general criminal law principles concerning the differentiation
437 Codes of conduct (article 16): Member States and the Commission shall encourage the
drawing up of codes of conduct by professional and consumers associations.
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between commissions and omissions and guarantors' positions. Generally
these regulations often lead to an exclusion of liability for network and access
providers, and to a limited liability for service providers if and when they have
knowledge of certain unlawful contents. In some countries, stricter liability
regulations are in place, for example in the United States.
German law has been developed quite extensively in this regard. In
concluding this analysis as far as the liability of Internet providers is
concerned, the main rules can be summarised as follows: Firstly, German
criminal law is applicable to offences on the Internet, even if they are
abstrakte Gefahrdungsdelikte (abstract strict liability torts), which are typical in
the area of the Internet. The abstrakten Gefahrdungsdelikte do not require
that there is harm or a concrete danger to an object for the offence to apply,
as the simple act is seen as such a danger that there is no need for a
consequence.f" It is however necessary for the prosecution authorities to
show evidence that there is a certain link between the offence and Germany.
In addition, the perpetrator must have wanted his act (committed on the
Internet) to have an effect on the German public.
Secondly, the service provider cannot be held liable for the commission
of an illegal act when he acts as a conduit for the transmittal of data, even if
such data is illegal or contains illegal elements. Liability can only be found in
the omission of an act, if and when the provider fails to remove or block the
illegal content.
Thirdly, the guarantor's duty to prevent the access to data that is
punishable under criminal law is only breached if he has actual knowledge of
438 See chapter 3 1 4 1 and 3 1 42.
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the data, by controlling his server for example. A guarantor's obligation to
prevent the access to such contents can be fulfilled by the refusal to transfer
the data.
The service provider is not liable for data, which he transmits or makes
accessible if he does not know that the data's content is illegal. When the
service provider puts his own illegal contents on the Internet, he is liable on
the basis of the same principles, which apply to the content provider.
The content provider of illegal content is liable because of an active
commission. This does not differ from offences, which are not committed on
the Internet. When the service provider does not place his own contents on
the Internet, but transports only foreign data to a third party, an offence, i.e. an
omission, can be taken into consideration concerning his criminal liability.
Thus the offence is based on the fact that the provider did not prevent the
access of a third party to the data.
The privilege offered to service providers in relation to foreign content in
terms of section 8 E_TDG439 must be interpreted restrictively, because it is not
intended to benefit the service provider who enables access to foreign
contents to the users, if he knows that the content is illegal.
Because of the inherent complications, which arise from the entire theory
of provider liability, it would appear advisable to focus on the prosecution of
offences committed by content providers (operators of websites) rather than
hosts, and on the prosecution of those who knowingly receive or transmit
such illegal content.
South Africa's administration of justice also restricts the criminal liability
439 See chapter 6 2 1.
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of Internet service providers. In pursuance of the Electronic Communications
and Transactions Act of 2002 Internet service are not held liable for the illegal
dissemination of information, if and when the service provider himself did not
positively commit an illegal transaction.
Section 73 ECTA is very similar to Article 12 of the E-Commerce
Directive44o. Both provisions exclude liability for service providers who offer
mere conduit presupposing that service providers have neither knowledge of
nor control over information, which is transmitted or stored by them.
Regarding mere conduit, South Africa and Europe's statute laws accordingly
are correspondent. According to 47 U.S.C. § 223 (e) (1) an access provider is
not liable, if he merely offers access to the Internet. This provision is similar to
the sectiond in South African law, the E-Commerce Directive and the E-TDG.
The conditions of privileging the liability for caching in South Africa and
in Europe resemble each other to begin with, in particular concerning Article
13 (1) (a) -(d) and 74 (1) (a)-(d). 74 ECTA in (1) (e) lays down however that
the service provider is not liable for caching as long as he removes or
disables the access to the data he has stored upon receiving a take-down
notice. Neither the Directive nor the E-TOG proposed statutory "notice and
take-down"- procedures concerning the disabling or removal of access to
information. Article 13 (1) (e) of the Directive instead claims for an exclusion
of the service provider's liability that he shall act expeditiously to remove or to
disable access to the information he has stored as soon as he obtains actual
knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the
transmission has been removed from the network, or the access to it has
440 In Germany section 9 E-TDG (see chapter 622).
147
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such
removal or disablement. So basically the facilities for privileging liabilities of
Internet service providers regarding their caching are very extensive both in
South Africa and in Germany.
However, South Africa's ECTA and Europe's E-Commerce Directive
(inclusive of Germany's E-TDG) totally differ as far as the Internet providers'
privileging of criminal liability is concerned. The knowledge requirements in
section 75 and in Article 14 E-Commerce Directive are literally identical
("actual knowledge" / "not aware of facts or circumstances"). But section 75
(1) states only the conditions and circumstances under which the service
provider is not liable for damages. Article 14 instead also applies to criminal
liability. The European provider is only considered criminal liable, if and when
he has actual knowledge of the tlleqality. Thus, the E-Commerce Directive
privileges the liability of Internet service provider not only referring to mere
conduit and caching, but also to hosting. So Internet service providers are not
considered criminal liable as long as they do not obtain actual knowledge or
information of illeqal activity. The ECTA instead does not provide a privileging
of liability of this sort for hosting as regards criminal liability. Hence, South
Africa's Internet service provider receive less legal protection than those in
Europe.
As shown above, there is a contradiction proposed in the Films and
Publications Amendment Bi". The ECT Act excludes strict liability for Internet
service provider whilst the Bill establishes - according to the wording just the
opposite - a strict liability. Consequently, achieving a consensus of rights
turns out to be difficult not only between different nations, but even in one and
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the same country.
Besides the illustrated specific statutory solutions, more technical
measures have to be taken to prevent a misuse of the Internet. This can be
achieved by increasing international co-operation. Furthermore, an
international consensus about liability on the Internet and the duty of providers
to delete unlawful contents (if they know about it) has to be established. The
Pennsylvania Law imposes liability on Internet service providers for child
pornography even if the Internet providers are not hosting the offending
content. This statute restricts Internet content and sets a dangerous
precedent of regulating Internet providers without notice. Directly contacting of
the hosting Internet provider about the alleged child pornography would be a
less constitutionally damaging alternative.
The Internet provider, in its own interest, must exhaust all possibilities in
preventing an abuse of its technical equipment. This way he protects himself
from eventual criminal liability and ensures a good reputation. To secure this,
voluntary self-censorship or pedagogic measures could be employed, but with
care. An extreme censorship is not the answer for a medium such as the
Internet. The Internet interprets censorship as a disturbance - and goes
around it, says Internet guru John Gitrnore.?" This is not entirely true because
governments are not powerless, as this thesis has illustrated.
Access providers of a state, for instance, can be ordered to ensure that
certain content does not become accessible. This is possible, for example, by
introducing so-called negative lists. Saudi Arabia and China store every single
Internet content, control it by means of a negative list and then, finally, decide
441 Eck & Ruess "Haftungspriviligierung der Provider nach der E-Commerce-Richtlinie" 2003
MMR 363-365.
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whether or not it may be made accessible to its citizens or not. But such filter
software can fail. Another example are web sites with medical content that
cannot be written without the use of certain terminology, which can be filtered
out as "sexually explicit".
Besides the two incidents described above, the question of who defines
what pornographic or violent data mean must be posed. The decision of the
German Federal Court of Justice BGH (Bundesgerichfshof) of December
2000442 has led to worldwide outrage and provoked a discussion about who is
ruling whom. As the court sentenced the Australian citizen Frederic Toben,
who published his contents of hate from Australia around the world in order to
infringe German criminal law, the court has, in practical terms, extended
German jurisdiction to the whole Internet. Some German web sites surely
infringe on Chinese, Saudi-Arabian and Afghani law or morals and Germany
would defend them as falling under the right of "freedom of expression" and
therefore being not punishable under German law. If every country would
attempt to prosecute the owners of websites of other countries it would lead to
mere chaos.
It seems to be highly advisable to find common standards of values
between as many countries as possible and not to immediately ask for
censorship and punishment. The United States for example vehemently
opposed the hate speech provision in the Additional Protocol to the
Convention on Cybercrime443, because it abridges the First Amendment'?".
The Amendment protects hate speech, notwithstanding a few narrow
442 See chapter 3 1 33 (Toben -case).
443 See chapter 7 3 2.
444 Declan McCullagh, U.S. Won't Support Net "Hate Speech" Ban, CNET News.com, Nov.
15, 2002; at www.news.com/2100-1023-965983.html(declaring that the United States cannot
be party to any treaty that abridges the U.S. constitution).
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exceptions that allow the Government to ban speech which would constitute a
breach of the peace or speech directed at an individual intended to "provoke
imminent lawless conduct"). It is interesting that the American Jewish
Committee has taken the view against censorship of hatred web sites on the
Internet because thus certain activities can be monitored more closely. The
gap between the freedom of Internet communication and the difficulties in
censoring certain data can provide a chance. It will create open-minded
discussions and protects one of mankind's most important basic rights:
freedom of expression. And it should not be forgotten that free communication
is the enemy of any undemocratic ideology.
Another problem, which must be combated by worldwide consensus, is
child pornography. It is suggested that a universal child pornography law
should be developed.
Legislators and governments worldwide must be careful not to become
the "Big Brother" predicted by George Orwell in his anti-utopia of 1984. In
particular the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 may lead to the creation
of a "Big Brother" on the Internet by the enactment of various new acts and
provisions which set up a "transparent user" and make Internet providers the
"sleuths" of governmental authorities. The journalist organization reporters
without frontiers (Reporter ohne Grenzen) criticized an increasing worldwide
control of the rights of Internet users, website providers and online journalists
on the Internet since September 11, 2001, even in cemocracles.v" The
situation in many underdeveloped countries, however, is by far worse. In
China and Vietnam certain Internet data are being filtered out as
445 www.internet.rsf.org, June 23, 2004.
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"disagreeable" information. In China more than 60 persons have been
arrested because of distributing "subversive contents" on the Internet, thus
"undermining the supreme power".446
The development of a more satisfactory method of fighting cybercrime
will take a long time, and Internet providers will have to play a key role in
fighting computer-related crime. The Cybercrime Convention with its 45
member states agreed after all on a minimum of standards for fighting against
criminal Internet activities. Time will tell if it turns out to be "a ground-breaking
aqreement"?"
When we consider the laborious attempts to establish common
regulations for, say, environmental protection at an international level, it
becomes clear just how tedious a similar process will be in the area of the
Internet. Nevertheless, law and jurisdiction will expand as the Internet
expands. The above statements show that despite the multitude of unresolved
points at issue, the Internet is not an unprotected area. Looking at the past it
becomes clear how the law has had to evolve while technology was
developing. The technological progress of the 19th and zo" centuries led to
new challenges for the jurisprudence of all time. Technical innovations offer
an opportunity for the individual and for society as a whole. Simultaneously
however, it is in the nature of such innovations that the risks for the individual
and his protected interests increase.
446 www.ifex.org;ww.heise.de/newsticker/meldung.
447 Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, dpa March 18, 2004.
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